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3
Serious harm

Although the requirement to show a well-founded fear of “being persecuted” is at the heart
of the refugee definition, the Refugee Convention does not define or elucidate the meaning
to be given to this concept.1 Indeed, it is generally acknowledged that the drafters of the
Convention intentionally declined to define “being persecuted” because they recognized
the impossibility of enumerating in advance all of the forms of maltreatment that might
legitimately entitle persons to benefit from international protection.2 The need for a flexible
approach to “being persecuted” is especially important today given the duty under the 1967
Protocol to apply the refugee definition in a manner that ensures its relevance to “new
refugee situations.”3
Yet the importance of interpretive flexibility must be balanced against the imperatives of
the rule of law, militating against any approach that “abandon[s] the quest for standards”4
in interpreting what is perhaps the key term of the treaty.5 Rather, as Lord Justice Laws
explained in Sepet:
However wide the canvas facing the judge’s brush, the image he makes has to be firmly
based on some conception of objective principle which is recognized as a legitimate
source of law.6
1

2

3

4
5

6

“There is no universally accepted definition of ‘persecution’, and various attempts to formulate such a
definition have met with little success”: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”),
Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the
1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, UN Doc. HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.3 (2011) (“Handbook”), at
[51].
As noted by Grahl-Madsen, “[i]t seems as if the drafters have wanted to introduce a flexible concept which
might be applied to circumstances as they might arise; or in other words, that they capitulated before the
inventiveness of humanity to think up new ways of persecuting fellow men”: A. Grahl-Madsen, The Status
of Refugees in International Law (Vol. I, 1966), at 193.
The Preamble of the Protocol states that, “new refugee situations have arisen since the Convention was
adopted” and “it is desirable that equal status should be enjoyed by all refugees covered by the definition
in the Convention irrespective of the dateline 1 January 1951”: Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees,
adopted Jan. 31, 1967, entered into force Oct. 4, 1967, 606 UNTS 267 (“Refugee Protocol”).
Applicant A v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, (1997) 190 CLR 225 (Aus. HC, Feb. 24, 1997),
at 277, per Gummow J.
In Horvath v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2000] Imm AR 205 (Eng. CA, Dec. 2, 1999) Ward
L.J. noted, after citing the UNHCR Handbook’s statement as to there being no universally accepted definition, supra n. 1, that “[d]espite that discouraging note, it is necessary to understand what is encompassed
by the notion of persecution”: at [54].
Sepet v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2001] Imm AR 452 (Eng. CA, May 11, 2001), at
477–78 [66].
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The challenge, then, is to adopt an approach to interpretation of “being persecuted” that
is flexible, yet which provides guidance based on objective principle. The goal must be
to understand the core construct of “being persecuted” as “a living thing, adopted by
civilised countries for a humanitarian end which is constant in motive but mutable in
form.”7
In this chapter we first explain why the twin challenges of flexibility and principled
consistency are best met by adopting the view that a risk of “being persecuted” requires
evidence of a sustained or systemic denial of human rights demonstrative of a failure of
state protection. We then offer a detailed, though by no means exhaustive, guide to the
implementation in practice of this standard.

3.1 A bifurcated understanding of “being persecuted”

15

20

While the drafters of the Convention refrained from codifying a precise definition of “being
persecuted,” there is nonetheless insight to be gained from analysis of the Convention’s
drafting history.8
First, the drafters clearly viewed persecution as a sufficiently inclusive concept to capture
the spectrum of phenomena that had induced involuntary migration during and immediately following the Second World War, including deprivation of life and liberty, the extensive
economic persecution inflicted by the Nazis, and the ideological conformism imposed by the
Communist states.9 From the beginning, there was no monolithic or absolute conceptual
standard of wrongfulness, the implication being that a variety of measures in disregard of
human dignity might constitute persecution.10 In addition to the Convention’s acceptance
of deprivation of basic civil and political freedoms as sufficient cause for international concern, serious social and economic consequences were acknowledged to be included within
the notion of persecution.11 Refugee status was premised on the risk of serious harm, but not
on the possibility of consequences of life or death proportions – an understanding affirmed

7
8
9

10

11

R v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Another; Ex parte Shah, [1997] Imm AR 145 (Eng. HC, Oct. 25,
1996), at [24], per Sedley J.
As per Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, adopted May 23, 1969, entered into force Jan. 27, 1980,
1155 UNTS 331 (“Vienna Convention”), at Art. 32. See text supra, Introduction, at nn. 69–71.
“As to refugees, both present and future, arriving in central and western Europe from eastern European
lands, he considered that, having regard to the terms of the draft Convention and the observations of
the High Commission for Refugees, the non-governmental organizations need have no fear that such
refugees would not be covered by the present text”: Statement of Mr. Warren of the United States, UN
Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.21 (Jul. 14, 1951), at 15.
“[W]hat is persecution in the particular case is a question of fact. Other measures in disregard of human
dignity might also constitute persecution”: P. Weis, “The Concept of the Refugee in International Law,”
(1960) 87 J. du droit international 928, at 970.
This point was established in an exchange between the representative of the American Federation of Labor
(“AFL”) and the delegate of France during the drafting of the Convention. Mr. Stolz of the AFL “recalled
that people sometimes left their country for social or economic reasons, an eventuality which was not
specifically mentioned [in the Convention].” Mr. Rain of France replied that he “thought that the nature
of the persecution should be described in very broad terms. In actual practice he felt sure that the people
referred to by the [AFL] representative would be recognized as refugees”: UN Doc. E/AC.32/SR.17 (Jan.
31, 1950), at 3–4. Indeed, European determination authorities readily recognized such claims even in the
early years of the Convention’s life: see Grahl-Madsen, supra n. 2, at 201–9.
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by Art. 33’s prohibition of sending a refugee to a place where “life or freedom” would be
threatened.12
Second, the intention of the drafters was not to protect persons against any and all forms
of even serious harm, but was rather to restrict refugee recognition to situations in which
there was the risk of a type of injury inconsistent with the willingness and ability of a state
to protect its own population.13 As a holistic reading of the refugee definition demonstrates,
the drafters were not concerned to respond to certain forms of harm per se, but were rather
motivated to intervene only where the maltreatment anticipated was demonstrative of a
breakdown of national protection.14 Refugee law is thus “substitute protection”15 in the

12

13

14

15

In line with this understanding, courts have appropriately rejected the argument that Art. 33’s reference
to “life or freedom” constrains the otherwise inclusive meaning of “being persecuted” in Art. 1(A)(2) of
the Convention: see Adan v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [1997] 1 WLR 1107 (Eng. CA,
Feb. 13, 1997) (per Simon Brown L.J.: “In my judgment it is article 1 . . . which must govern the scope
of article 33 rather than the other way round”: at 1116); see also Adan v. Secretary of State for the Home
Department, [1999] 1 AC 293 (UKHL, Apr. 2, 1998). For further authority see Choudhrey v. Immigration
Appeal Tribunal, [2001] EWHC Admin 613 (Eng. HC, Aug. 1, 2001), at [33]; and OO (Sudan) v. Secretary
of State for the Home Department, [2009] EWCA Civ 1432 (Eng. CA, Nov. 18, 2009), at [24]. For an
early decision of the Federal Court of Canada see Arguello-Garcia v. Canada (Minister of Employment and
Immigration), [1993] FCJ 635 (Can. FC, Jun. 23, 1993), in which the Canadian Federal Court held (at
[4]): “The court has accepted a broad range of harassment and ill treatment as constituting persecution.
Furthermore, the court has stated that neither deprivation of physical liberty nor physical mistreatment
are essential elements of persecution.” In an oft-cited passage, McHugh J. of the High Court of Australia
noted in Chan v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, (1989) 169 CLR 379 (Aus. HC, Dec. 9, 1989),
at 430–31: “Other forms of harm short of interference with life or liberty may constitute ‘persecution’
for the purposes of the Convention and Protocol. Measures ‘in disregard’ of human dignity may, in
appropriate cases, constitute persecution . . . the denial of access to employment, to the professions and
to education or the imposition of restrictions on the freedoms traditionally guaranteed in a democratic
society such as freedom of speech, assembly, worship or movement may constitute persecution if imposed
for a Convention reason.” In the US it is clear that harm need not amount to life-threatening violence:
Sizov v. Ashcroft, (2003) 70 Fed. Appx. 374 (USCA, 7th Cir., Jul. 2, 2003), at 376. See also Yadegar-Sargis
v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, (2002) 297 F.3d 596 (USCA, 7th Cir., Jul. 22, 2002), at 602.
This concern is most clear in the early formulations of the generalized refugee definition. The British
draft, for example, provided that the Convention would apply to “unprotected persons” (UN Doc.
E/AC.32/L.2 (Jan. 17, 1950), at 1), while the French draft spoke of persons who were “unwilling or
unable to claim the protection of [their] country” (UN Doc. E/AC.32/L.3 (Jan. 17, 1950), at 3). As
finally agreed to, the Convention extends only to a person who is “unable or . . . unwilling to avail
himself of the protection” of his country of origin: Convention relating to the Status of Refugees,
adopted Jul. 28, 1951, entered into force Apr. 22, 1954, 189 UNTS 137 (“Refugee Convention” or
“Convention”), at Art. 1(A)(2). In addition, the Preamble to the Convention refers to the intention of
the parties to “revise and consolidate previous international agreements relating to the status of refugees
and to extend the scope of and the protection accorded by such instruments,” and to the importance of
coordinated measures to facilitate the UNHCR’s task of “supervising international conventions providing
for the protection of refugees”: Preamble. For a modern explanation of this underlying intention, see
Horvath v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2001] 1 AC 489 (UKHL, Jul. 6, 2000), per Lord
Clyde.
Shacknove helpfully explained, “[i]t is this absence of state protection which constitutes the full and
complete negation of society and the basis of refugeehood”: A. Shacknove, “Who Is a Refugee?” (1985)
95 Ethics 274, at 277, while Goodwin-Gill has long taken the view that “the degree of protection normally
to be expected of the government is either lacking or denied”: G. S. Goodwin-Gill, “Non-Refoulement
and the New Asylum Seekers,” (1986) 26(4) Virginia J. Intl. L. 897, at 901. See infra Ch. 4.2.
J. Patrnogic, “Refugees – A Continuing Challenge,” (1982) Annuaire de droit international medical 73, at
75.
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sense that it is a response to disfranchisement from the usual benefits of nationality.16 The
existence of a risk of serious harm standing alone does not therefore suffice; it is rather
only when the risk has an unrelenting or inescapable character because there is no domestic
remedy that it rises to the level of a risk of “being persecuted.”
These basic tenets – an inclusive sense of the types of past or anticipated harm that
warrant international protection,17 and a fundamental concern to identify forms of harm
demonstrative of a failure of state protection – underlie the modern understanding of “being
persecuted” as the sustained or systemic denial of basic human rights demonstrative of a
failure of state protection.18 As this well-accepted formulation makes clear, the phrase “being
persecuted” comprises two essential elements, succinctly expressed by Lord Hoffmann as
“persecution = serious harm + failure of state protection.”19
16
17

18

19

Ad hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, Refugees and Stateless Persons, “Memorandum
from the Secretary-General,” UN Doc. E/AC.32/2 (Jan. 3, 1950), Annex.
“The term ‘persecution,’ used in the Refugee Convention and Protocol as well as in the UNHCR Statute,
has never been officially defined, but the drafters of the Convention clearly conceived it in a liberal way”:
A. Grahl-Madsen, “Identifying the World’s Refugees,” (1983) 467 Annals A.A.P.S.S. 11, at 15.
The phrase “sustained or systemic violation of basic human rights demonstrative of a failure of state
protection,” first set out in J. C. Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status (1991) (“Refugee Status”), at 101,
has been extensively adopted in the modern jurisprudence. For a selection of references, in Australia,
see Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. Khawar, (2002) 210 CLR 1 (Aus. HC, Apr. 11,
2002), at 37 [111], per Kirby J.; Lek v. Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs
(No. 2), (1993) 45 FCR 418 (Aus. FC, Oct. 8, 1993), at 426; Denissenko v. Haskett (Unreported, Aus.
FC, May 29, 1996), at 5; Islam v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, (2000) 171 ALR 267
(Aus FC, Mar. 27, 2000), at 272 [17]; Applicant R v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs,
[2001] FCA 943 (Aus. FC, Aug. 3, 2001), at [26]; SBBT v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural
and Indigenous Affairs, [2002] FCA 628 (Aus. FC, May 17, 2002), at [5]. In Canada, see Ward v. Canada
(Attorney General), [1993] 2 SCR 689 (Can. SC, Jun. 30, 1993), at 733; Chan v. Canada, [1995] 3 SCR 593
(Can. SC, Oct. 19, 1995), at 634 [69]; Narvaez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1995]
89 FTR 94 (Can. FC, Feb. 9, 2005), at [9]; Limarto v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
(2009) FC 521 (Can. FC, May 20, 2009), at [21]; Arguello-Garcia (Can. FC, 1993). In the UK, see Horvath
(UKHL, 2000), at 495, per Lord Hope; R (Ullah) v. Special Adjudicator, [2004] 2 AC 323 (UKHL, Jun.
17, 2004), at 355 [32]; Sepet v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2003] 1 WLR 856 (UKHL,
Mar. 20, 2003), at 862–63 [7], per Lord Bingham; HJ (Iran) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department,
[2010] 3 WLR 386 (UKSC, Jul. 7, 2010), at [13], per Lord Hope; RT (Zimbabwe) v. Secretary of State
for the Home Department, [2012] 3 WLR 345 (UKSC, Jul. 25, 2012), at 360 [39]. In Ireland, see Msengi
v. Minister for Justice Equality and Law Reform, [2006] IEHC 241 (Ir. HC, May 26, 2006), at 6. In New
Zealand, see Re MN, Refugee Appeal No. 2039/93 (NZ RSAA, Feb. 12, 1996), at [38]–[40], [56]; Refugee
Appeal No. 71427/99, [2000] NZAR 545 (NZ RSAA, Aug. 16, 2000), at [47]; Refugee Appeal No. 74665/03,
[2005] NZAR 60 (NZ RSAA, Jul. 7, 2004); Isak v. Refugee Status Appeals Authority, [2010] NZAR 535
(NZ RSAA, Jun. 4, 2010). Hugo Storey has recently characterized the human rights approach, which
he notes was “pioneered by James Hathaway” in Refugee Status, as representing “the most important
paradigm shift in refugee jurisprudence to have occurred since the publication of the 1979 [UNHCR]
Handbook”: see H. Storey, “Armed Conflict in Asylum Law: The ‘War-Flaw’,” (2012) 31(2) Ref. Survey
Q. 1, at 3.
R v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Another; Ex parte Shah, [1999] 2 AC 629 (UKHL, Mar. 25, 1999),
at 653 (per Lord Hoffmann), 655 (per Lord Hope of Craighead), and 658 (per Lord Hutton). See also
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. Khawar, (2002) 210 CLR 1 (Aus. HC, Apr. 11, 2002),
at 39–40 [118], per Kirby J.; Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. Respondents S152/2003,
(2004) 222 CLR 1 (Aus. HC, Apr. 21, 2004), at 35; Refugee Appeal No. 71427/99, [2000] NZAR 545 (NZ
RSAA, Aug. 16, 2000), at [112]; BG (Fiji), [2012] NZIPT 800091 (NZ IPT, Jan. 20, 2012), at [96]; Msengi
(Ir. HC, May 26, 2006), at 6. For academic support, see D. Anker, The Law of Asylum in the United States
(2011), at 159; A. Zimmermann and C. Mahler, “Article 1A, para. 2 (Definition of the Term ‘Refugee’),”
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The second half of this formulation – the failure of state protection – is addressed in
Chapter 4. The remainder of the present chapter focuses on the first part of the bifurcated
definition of “being persecuted,” namely how to determine whether a person is at risk of
serious harm.

3.2 Identifying serious harm
While “framing an exhaustive definition of persecution for the purpose of the Convention
is probably impossible,”20 it is nonetheless “necessary to understand what is encompassed
by the notion of persecution.”21 What standards should guide our understanding of the
content of the serious harm component of “being persecuted,” assuming the commitment
to a principled but flexible interpretation set out above?

5

3.2.1 The subjective approach rejected
One approach, predominant in the United States, is to define persecution as “the infliction
of suffering or harm upon those who differ . . . in a way regarded as offensive”22 or as “punishment or the infliction of harm . . . that this country does not recognize as legitimate.”23
This approach emphasizes that “inconvenience, unpleasantness, and even a modicum of
suffering may not be enough to meet that [persecution] benchmark”;24 that persecution is
“an extreme concept that does not include every sort of treatment our society regards as

20

21
22

23

24

in A. Zimmermann (ed.), The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol: A
Commentary (2011), at 345.
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. Ibrahim, (2000) 204 CLR 1 (Aus. HC, Oct. 26, 2000),
at 21 [65], per McHugh J. See also Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v.
Kord, (2002) 125 FCR 68 (Aus. FFC, Mar. 28, 2002), at 80 [35], per Marshall and Dowsett JJ.
Horvath (Eng. CA, 1999), at [54], per Ward L.J.
Nagoulko v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, (2003) 333 F.3d 1012 (USCA, 9th Cir., Jun. 24, 2003),
at 1015; Duarte de Guinac v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, (1999) 179 F.3d 1156 (USCA, 9th
Cir., Jun. 8, 1999), noting that “this court has consistently defined persecution” in this way: at 1161,
citing Korablina v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, (1998) 158 F.3d 1038 (USCA, 9th Cir., Oct.
23, 1998), at 1043 and Ghaly v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, (1995) 58 F.3d 1425 (USCA, 9th
Cir., Jul. 6, 1995), at 1431. As noted by the Petitioner in the US Supreme Court case of Negusie v. Attorney
General, 2008 US S.Ct. Briefs LEXIS 518 (Jun. 16, 2008), the Tenth Circuit also defines persecution as
“the infliction of suffering or harm upon those who differ . . . in a way regarded as offensive,” at 23. See
D. Steinbock, “Interpreting the Refugee Definition,” (1998) 45 UCLA L. Rev. 733, at 758.
Begzatowski v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, (2002) 278 F.3d 665 (USCA, 7th Cir., Jan. 11,
2002), at 669. Interestingly, in Jiang v. Holder, (2010) 400 Fed. Appx. 859 (USCA, 5th Cir., Nov. 2, 2010),
the court seemed to combine these tests in stating that “[p]ersecution is defined as ‘[t]he infliction of
suffering or harm, under government sanction, upon persons who differ in a way regarded as offensive
(eg race, religion, political opinion etc), in a manner condemned by civilized governments’”: at 864, citing
Mikhael v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, (1997) 115 F.3d 299 (USCA, 5th Cir., Jun. 4, 1997), at
303 n. 2.
Negeya v. Gonzales, (2005) 417 F.3d 78 (USCA, 1st Cir., Jul. 27, 2005), at 83, citing Rodriguez-Ramirez
v. Ashcroft, (2005) 398 F.3d 120 (USCA, 1st Cir., Feb. 17, 2005), at 124; see also Nelson v. Immigration
and Naturalization Service, (2000) 232 F.3d 258 (USCA, 1st Cir., Oct. 27, 2000), at 263; Tesfu v. Ashcroft,
(2003) 322 F.3d 477 (USCA, 7th Cir., Mar. 14, 2003), at 481, citing Tamas-Mercea v. Reno, (2000) 222
F.3d 417 (USCA, 7th Cir., Jul. 28, 2000), at 424; Villarreal v. Attorney General, (2010) 375 Fed. Appx. 922
(USCA, 11th Cir., Apr. 20, 2010), at 925, and Gilca v. Holder, (2012) 680 F.3d 109 (USCA, 1st Cir., May
23, 2012), at 115.

10
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offensive”;25 that “persecution does not encompass all treatment that our society regards
as unfair, unjust, or even unlawful or unconstitutional”;26 and that the harm feared “must
rise above mere harassment.”27 Yet because each of these standards explains only what
is not serious enough to be persecution, one appellate judge cogently observed that “we
haven’t a clue as to what [the Board of Immigration Appeals] thinks religious persecution is.”28 Decision-makers are left largely to their own devices, determining on a “case
by case approach” whether a given risk is sufficiently serious to amount to a risk of being
persecuted.
While American jurisprudence no doubt represents the zenith of a fundamentally subjective approach to the identification of persecutory harms, other jurisdictions have sometimes
endorsed similar sentiments. It has been suggested in Australia, for example, that “the harm
or threat of harm will ordinarily be persecution only when . . . it is so oppressive or recurrent
that a person cannot be expected to tolerate it.”29 And there is Austrian authority for the
view that “[t]he term ‘persecution’ means an unjustified interference with an individual’s
personal sphere of considerable intensity” which “makes it unacceptable for the individual
to stay.”30
Under subjective approaches of these kinds, the question of whether harm is sufficiently
“intense,” “offensive,” “oppressive,” or “unjustified” is based on a given decision-maker’s
personal assessment of the severity of the harm feared.31 This has been said to amount to an

25

26

27
28

29

30

31

Esayas v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 8601 (USCA, 4th Cir., May
6, 1999), at 3, citing Ghaly (USCA, 9th Cir., 1995), at 1431. See also Zviagilsky v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 9762 (USCA, 10th Cir., May 20, 1999), at 4, and Xu Ming Li
v. Ashcroft, (2002) 312 F.3d 1094 (USCA, 9th Cir., Dec. 5, 2002), at 1101.
Esayas (USCA, 4th Cir., 1999), at 3, citing Fatin v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, (1993) 12 F.3d
1233 (USCA, 3rd Cir., Dec. 20, 1993), at 1240. See also Rupey v. Mukasey, (2008) 304 Fed. Appx. 453
(USCA, 7th Cir., Dec. 23, 2008), at 456, citing Firmansjah v. Gonzales, (2005) 424 F.3d 598 (USCA, 7th
Cir., Sept. 16, 2005), at 605, and see Ramos-Ortiz v. Ashcroft, (2003) 70 Fed. Appx. 68 (USCA, 3rd Cir.,
Jul. 9, 2003), at 69.
Kholyavskiy v. Mukasey, (2008) 540 F.3d 555 (USCA, 7th Cir., Aug. 28, 2008), at 557. See also Ruiz v.
Mukasey, (2008) 526 F.3d 31 (USCA, 1st Cir., May 21, 2008), at 36, cited in Anker, supra n. 19, at 170.
Sahi v. Gonzales, (2005) 416 F.3d 587 (USCA, 7th Cir., Jul. 25, 2005), at 588–89, cited in Kazemzadeh
v. Attorney General, (2009) 577 F.3d 1341 (USCA, 11th Cir., Aug. 6, 2009), at 1358, per Marcus J.,
concurring. In Mei Fun Wong v. Holder, (2011) 633 F.3d 64 (USCA, 2nd Cir., Feb. 1, 2011), the Second Circuit noted that although “persecution is the ‘fundamental concept at the core of the [INA’s]
refugee definition’ . . . courts have not ‘settled on a single, uniform definition’”: at 71–72 (citations
omitted).
Ibrahim (Aus. HC, 2000), at 20 [55]. McHugh and Kirby JJ. have said “it will constitute persecution only
if, by reason of its intensity or duration, the person persecuted cannot reasonably be expected to tolerate
it”: Appellant S395/2002 v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, (2003) 216 CLR 473 (Aus.
HC, Dec. 9, 2003), at 489 [40] and 486 [31].
E v. Federal Minister of the Interior, 95/20/0275 (Au. VwGH [Austrian Administrative Court], Sept. 4,
1996) (unofficial translation). German courts have also used the notion of “severity” or “intensity” to
mark out those violations of religious liberty which will constitute serious harm: see E. Geldbach, “Is there
a Minimum of Religious Existence?” in A. Kilp and A. Saumets (eds.), Religion and Politics in Multicultural
Europe: Perspectives and Challenges (2009), at 247.
As Geldbach notes in relation to the German requirement that violations of religious liberty be sufficiently
“severe” or “intense,” “[h]ow intensity or severity can be measured or what they include is nowhere
mentioned”: ibid., at 247. Rather the meaning is “vague and imprecise”: at 247. Further he notes that it
“is astounding that Courts would use this kind of language when a basic human right is in question”: at
247.
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“I know it when I see it” test,32 imposing on decision-makers “a most elusive and imprecise
task.”33 For example, American cases have grappled with whether it is necessary that a person
have lost teeth or suffered broken bones in a beating;34 whether an applicant’s hospital stay
was sufficiently lengthy to suggest that the harm suffered was serious;35 and whether a
relatively short period of confinement during which a highly invasive and degrading “rapelike” assault was inflicted on the applicant was too short to amount to serious harm.36
Application of the subjective approach tends to a near-fixation with physical harm,37 with
assessments often reading like a “grim exercise . . . in measuring the precise extent of human
32
33
34

35

36

37

Stanojkova v. Holder, (2011) 645 F.3d 943 (USCA, 7th Cir., Jul. 14, 2011), at 948.
Zviagilsky (USCA, 10th Cir., 1999), at 4, citing Balazoski v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, (1991)
932 F.2d 638 (USCA, 7th Cir., May 14, 1991), at 641.
For example in Dandan v. Ashcroft, (2003) 339 F.3d 567 (USCA, 7th Cir., Aug. 11, 2003) the court stated:
“We do not hold that lost teeth or broken bones are the sine qua non of persecution, but these specifics
indicate the severity of the beating and support its claim to be considered persecution”: at 574. In this
case, since these specifics were not present, the claim was rejected.
See Rupey v. Mukasey, (2008) 304 Fed. Appx. 453 (USCA, 7th Cir., Dec. 23, 2008), where the claim was
rejected because even though the applicant had been “attacked – kicked, punched and knocked down,”
none of the incidents “required him to be hospitalized for more than two days”: at 456–57. In Scurtul
v. Attorney General, (2012) 500 Fed. Appx. 806 (USCA, 11th Cir., Dec. 5, 2012), the claim was rejected
because the applicant was “treated on an outpatient basis”: at 808. In some cases, the fact that the applicant
required no medical treatment is grounds for finding no persecution: see He v. Holder, (2012) 502 Fed.
Appx. 430 (USCA, 6th Cir., Oct. 10, 2012), at 435.
See Xu Ming Li (USCA, 9th Cir., 2002), where the majority found that the applicant’s invasive forced
pregnancy examination “is hardly comparable to Prasad [in another case] being hit and kicked” and
“further, Prasad was detained for between four and six hours while Xu was detained for only half-anhour”: at 1101, whereas the dissenting judge strongly disagreed, adopting the applicant’s characterization
of the pregnancy examination as “rape-like” and criticizing the majority’s comparison with the Prasad
case: see at 1105. By contrast to the majority, in the en banc rehearing in the case reported as Xu v. Attorney
General, (2004) 356 F.3d 1153 (USCA, 9th Cir., Jan. 29, 2004), the court took a different approach, and
found that the examination was sufficiently offensive so as to constitute past persecution for the purpose
of the US statute: see at 1159. See also Baba v. Holder, (2009) 569 F.3d 79 (USCA, 2nd Cir., Jun. 19, 2009), at
86; the majority and dissenting judgments in Kornetskyi v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, (2005)
129 Fed. Appx. 254 (USCA, 6th Cir., Apr. 28, 2005), and Stanojkova (USCA, 7th Cir., 2011) (overturning
the restrictive approach below).
In Sirbu and Prodan v. Holder, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 10023 (USCA, 7th Cir., May 20, 2013), the court
explained that assessing persecution involves assessing: “How many times was the victim beaten? How
severe were the beatings? Were bones broken? Did the victim lose consciousness? How many teeth were
knocked out? Were there permanent injuries or scarring?”: at 10. Yet it is well established that it is not
necessary to prove “permanent injury to prove persecution”: see Sharma v. Immigration and Naturalization
Service, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 23247 (USCA, 9th Cir., Sept. 17, 1999), at 5. See also dissenting judgment
of Pregerson J. in Mansour v. Ashcroft, (2004) 390 F.3d 667 (USCA, 9th Cir., Dec. 6, 2004). Indeed, it is
generally acknowledged, even in the US, that physical harm is not required for a finding of persecution:
see e.g. De Malave v. US Attorney General, (2011) 427 Fed. Appx. 826 (USCA, 11th Cir., May 27, 2011):
“a lack of physical harm does not prevent a finding of persecution”: at 829, citing Jimenez v. US Attorney
General, (2007) 492 F.3d 1223 (USCA, 11th Cir., Jul. 17, 2007), at 1233–34, and Ngengwe v. Mukasey,
(2008) 543 F.3d 1029 (USCA, 8th Cir., Sept. 18, 2008), at 1037; Baba (USCA, 2nd Cir., 2009), at 85. See
also MZXRI v. Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, [2008] FCA 1613 (Aus. FC, Aug. 27, 2008), at
[26], for authority that non-physical harm can constitute persecution. We note also that the Qualification
Directive includes “physical or mental harm” in “acts of persecution”: Council Directive 2011/95/EU
of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons
as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for
subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted (recast), [2011] OJ L 337/9 (Dec. 20,
2011) (“Qualification Directive”), at Art. 9(2).

5

3.2.1 the subjective approach rejected

5

10

189

cruelty and misery”38 which impliedly constructs some kind of “table of maims.”39 In
practice, the only claims relatively certain to succeed are those predicated on harms that are
deemed severe,40 extreme,41 or lethal.42
In our view, the subjective approach to identifying persecutory harms is highly problematic, and should be rejected. Because analysis is not anchored in any objective or principled
framework it is difficult to achieve even a modicum of consistency as between different
courts, even within the same jurisdiction.43 As noted by Judge Posner, the subjective test
adopted in the United States has resulted in “capricious adjudication at both the administrative and judicial level, generating extraordinary variance both in grants of asylum in
similar cases at the administrative level and in reversals by courts of appeals of denials.”44
Indeed, what minimal principle can be identified in the US approach – requiring evidence
of harm “that this country does not recognize as legitimate”45 – runs counter to the duty to
38
39

40

41

42

43

44
45

Sirbu and Prodan (USCA, 7th Cir., 2013), at 10.
In Kord v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, [2001] FCA 1163 (Aus. FC, Aug. 24, 2001),
Hely J. noted that “[t]here is no room in the notion of persecution for something in the nature of a table of
maims to be rigidly or mechanically applied”: at [34]. This idea comes from workers’ compensation and
refers to a table which specifies the amount of compensation payable to a person for particular injuries,
such as the loss of a limb: see e.g. Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic).
See in particular Rupey (USCA, 7th Cir., 2008), where the Seventh Circuit listed previous cases in which
“kidnapping at gunpoint, interrogation and beating did not compel a finding of past persecution”: at 457,
citing Mema v. Gonzales, (2007) 474 F.3d 412 (USCA, 7th Cir., Jan. 11, 2007), at 417–18; and where no
past persecution was found even though “officials kicked, punched and used a brick to strike petitioner on
the head,” citing Zhu v. Gonzales, (2006) 465 F.3d 316 (USCA, 7th Cir., Sept. 29, 2006), at 319. Similarly,
in Nelson v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, (2000) 232 F.3d 258 (USCA, 1st Cir., Oct. 27, 2000)
the court cited previous authority establishing the very severe level of physical harm required, in noting
that in Ravindran v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, (1992) 976 F.2d 754 (USCA, 1st Cir., Sept.
30, 1992), at 756–60, “persecution [was] not found where [a] member of [a] minority ethnic group had
been interrogated and beaten for three days in prison and warned about pursuing political activities”:
Nelson at 263, and Kapcia v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, (1991) 944 F.2d 702 (USCA, 10th
Cir., Sept. 9, 1991), at 704, 708, where there was “no finding of past persecution where one petitioner
was ‘arrested four times, detained three times, and beaten once’, and another was ‘detained for a two-day
period during which time he was interrogated and beaten’”: Nelson at 263–64.
It is sometimes said that persecution is “an extreme concept”: see Ghali v. Immigration and Naturalization
Service, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 19156 (USCA, 9th Cir., Aug. 4, 2000), at 4; Li v. Ashcroft, (2004) 356 F.3d
1153 (USCA, 9th Cir., Jan. 29, 2004), at 1158 (en banc); Esayas (USCA, 4th Cir., 1999) at 3; Ramos-Ortiz
(USCA, 3rd Cir., 2003), at 69; Shah v. US Attorney General, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 12665 (USCA, 11th
Cir., Jun. 21, 2011), at 5, and He (USCA, 6th Cir., 2012), at 13. See also Babayan v. Gonzales, (2005) 136
Fed. Appx. 978 (USCA, 9th Cir., Jun. 29, 2005), at 979.
In Wackowski v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 26590 (USCA, 7th Cir.,
Oct. 19, 1999), the court said that persecution differs from discrimination in being “either official and
severe, or non-official but lethal and condoned”: at 5, citing Bucur v. Immigration and Naturalization
Service, (1997) 109 F.3d 399 (USCA, 7th Cir., Mar. 26, 1997) at 402, 403. See also Sizov (USCA, 7th Cir.,
2003), at 376.
As Anker, supra n. 19, notes, referring to US jurisprudence on persecution, “inconsistent, result-oriented
analysis by some courts and adjudicators continues to confuse the development of a meaningful framework
for analysing persecution”: at 168–69.
Stanojkova (USCA, 7th Cir., 2011), at 948.
Begzatowski (USCA, 7th Cir., 2002), at 669 (emphasis added). Even this standard appears to be assessed
in some cases from the perspective of what the judges view as legitimate. For example, in Sofinet v.
Immigration and Naturalization Service, (1999) 196 F.3d 742 (USCA, 7th Cir., Nov. 2, 1999), the court
reviewed previous case law concerning a deprivation of work rights, noting that in Urukov v. Immigration
and Naturalization Service, (1995) 55 F.3d 222 (USCA, 7th Cir., Apr. 17, 1995), at 228, “[the] Bulgarian
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interpret the Refugee Convention as “an international instrument created by the agreement
of contracting states as opposed to regulatory regimes established by national institutions.”46
More generally, other leading courts have rejected attempts to interpret the category
of serious harm by reference to subjective descriptors such as that persecution must be
“dramatic or appalling or horrendous”47 or “severe”48 or that “persecution is a strong
word,”49 observing that such an approach “is not of great assistance and is apt to mislead.”50
Lord Justice Sedley, for example, famously refused to confine the scope of serious harm by
reference to the need for some “minimum level of brutality”51 on the basis that “[s]peaking
for myself, I do not know what a minimum level of brutality is.”52

5

3.2.2 The literalist approach rejected
An alternative to subjectivity is to search for an understanding of persecutory harms by
referring to dictionary definitions of “persecution.” Some courts have chosen to rely on

46
47

48

49

50

51

52

government’s restriction of ethnic-Macedonian’s employment opportunities ‘does not rise to the level of
“infliction of harm” . . . that we find “illegitimate” to justify granting asylum’”: Sofinet, at 747 (emphasis
added). On the other hand, in a more recent case the Fifth Circuit has formulated the reference point
as “civilized governments”: Jiang (USCA, 5th Cir., 2010), at 864, citing Mikhael v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service, (1997) 115 F.3d 299 (USCA, 5th Cir., Jun. 4, 1997), at 303 n. 2, which would
appear to involve international standards.
R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex parte Adan, [2001] 2 AC 477 (UKHL, Dec. 19, 2000),
at 515, per Lord Steyn.
Khatib v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), (1994) 83 FTR 310 (Can. FC, Sept. 27,
1994), at [7]. McKeown J. therefore overturned the decision of the Immigration and Refugee Board
on the basis that the Board had inappropriately framed the relevant question as being whether “the
discrimination . . . experienced [is] so dramatic as to amount to persecution on a cumulative basis”: ibid.,
at [6]–[7].
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v. SZQOT, (2012) 206 FCR 145 (Aus. FFC, Oct. 12, 2012), at 156
[57], per Nicholas J. In Australia, the High Court has characterized persecution as involving “some serious
punishment or penalty or some significant detriment or disadvantage”: see Chan (Aus. HC, 1989), at 388,
per Mason C.J. The Full Federal Court of Australia has in some decisions not even required the “serious”
or “significant” test, holding that “persecution involves harm that is more than trivial or insignificant”:
Gersten v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, [2000] FCA 855 (Aus. FFC, Jul. 5, 2000); see
also Kanagasabai v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, [1999] FCA 205 (Aus. FC, Mar.
10, 1999). Even after the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) was amended to provide that persecution involves
“serious harm” (see s. 91R(1)), the Full Federal Court has held that to require “severe harm” is to apply
“an incorrect legal test”: SZQOT (Aus. FFC, 2012), at 156 [57] per Nicholas J.
This was invoked in R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex parte Binbasi, [1989] Imm AR 595
(Eng. HC, Jul. 25, 1989), at 599, per Kennedy J., but rejected by the Australian High Court in Appellant
S395/2002 (Aus. HC, 2003), at 497.
Appellant S395/2002 (Aus. HC, 2003), at 497. In New Zealand, the approach of asking whether a person’s
return to their home country would be “intolerable” has been “repeatedly identified by the Authority as a
misdirection in law”: see Re GJ, Refugee Appeal No. 1312/93, [1998] INLR 387 (NZ RSAA, Aug. 30, 1995),
at 16 and list of cases cited therein.
Svazas v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2002] 1 WLR 1891 (Eng. CA, Jan. 31, 2002), at 1905
[39]. Similarly, in Stanojkova (USCA, 7th Cir., 2011), Posner J. criticized the decision below which found
that the applicants had “not been subjected to the minimum amount of harm required for a finding of
persecution”: at 946, which in Posner J.’s view, essentially came down to a finding “that one can imagine
worse mistreatment than the [applicants] underwent”: at 948. As Posner J. noted, “[t]hat is not a reasoned
basis for rejecting a claim of persecution”: at 948.
Svazas (Eng. CA, 2002), at 1905 [39]. However, it is acknowledged that there remains discussion in the
jurisprudence as to whether there is some super-added requirement of “seriousness” in relation to the
human rights approach: see e.g. Amare v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2006] Imm AR 217
(Eng. CA, Dec. 20, 2005).
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(primarily English) dictionaries in order to understand the kinds of harm that should be
understood to fall within the notion of “being persecuted,”53 leading them to determine, for
example, that relevant harms must result from the persecutor’s “enmity and malignity.”54
Yet in overturning the dictionary-based “enmity and malignity” approach, a senior judge
lamented that he was “now inclined to see more clearly than before the dangers in the use
of dictionary definitions of the word ‘persecuted’ in the Convention definition.”55
Indeed, the literal approach is problematic for at least two key reasons. Most obviously,
reference to dictionaries will inevitably suggest a range of different definitions of the word
“persecution,”56 particularly when regard is had to definitions of the equally authentic
French text.57 Second and more fundamentally, a literalist tack cannot be reconciled to the
primary rule of treaty interpretation, namely, that a treaty “shall be interpreted in good
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their
context and in the light of its object and purpose.”58 Ordinary meaning cannot, in other words,
be identified in a decontextualized and absolutist way, but must be reconciled to a treaty’s
context, object, and purpose.59 Attempts to distil the meaning of persecutory harm purely
by resort to dictionaries will thus inevitably lead to “a sterile and mistaken interpretation.”60
A more sophisticated variant of the literalist approach is to search for guidance on the
ordinary meaning of “being persecuted” not in the abstract, but rather by considering
53

54

55
56

57

58
59

60

This is still prevalent in the UK, notwithstanding an early endorsement by the tribunal in Gashi v. Secretary
of State for the Home Department, [1997] INLR 96 (UKIAT, Jul. 22, 1996) of the human rights approach,
as well as endorsements by the House of Lords and Supreme Court. For example, in Horvath (UKHL,
2000) Lord Lloyd noted: “it has been settled law since the decision of Nolan J. in R v. Immigration Appeal
Tribunal, ex parte Jonah [1985] Imm AR 7, 13 that persecution should be given its ordinary dictionary
meaning”: at 503; see also Lord Clyde at 514. Interestingly, in Sepet (UKHL, 2003) reference is made to
dictionaries, but immediately following this is acceptance of the “sustained or systemic failure” standard
in Hathaway, Refugee Status: see at 862–63 [7], per Lord Bingham. However, Clayton states that the
dictionary approach “has been falling into disuse in favour of an emphasis on the acts or their effects
rather than the motive”: G. Clayton, Textbook on Immigration and Asylum Law Practice (2010), at 457.
For example, the Refugee Review Tribunal rejected claims where such malignity could not be established:
see e.g. V97/07049, [1997] RRTA 3341 (Aus. RRT, Sept. 3, 1997). However, this approach was ultimately
overturned by the High Court: Chen Shi Hai v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, (2000)
201 CLR 293 (Aus. HC, Apr. 13, 2000), at 312–13 [63]. In the context of critiquing this approach, Kirby
J. noted in Khawar (Aus. HC, 2002) that, “[a]ccording to such dictionary meanings ‘persecute’ means
‘to pursue with harassing or oppressive treatment; harass persistently’ and ‘to oppress with injury or
punishment for adherence to principles’”: at 35 [106].
Khawar (Aus. HC, 2002), at 35 [108].
As eloquently expressed by Rodger Haines of the New Zealand Refugee Status Appeals Authority, reliance
on dictionaries “is an approach which lends itself to an unseemly ransacking of dictionaries for the mot
juste appropriate to the case at hand. This does not assist in a principled analysis of the issues”: Refugee
Appeal No. 71427/99 (NZ RSAA, 2000), at [46].
See Refugee Convention, at Art. 46, and Vienna Convention, supra n. 8, at Art. 33(1). It is interesting to
note that Carlier appears to advocate reference to a dictionary, and yet his discussion of the dictionary
definitions in different languages shows the range of definitions produced: J.-Y. Carlier, “The Geneva
Definition and the Theory of the Three Scales,” in F. Nicholson and P. Twomey (eds.), Refugee Rights and
Realities (1999), at 44.
Vienna Convention, supra n. 8, at Art. 31.
Similarly, reliance on dictionaries to elucidate the meaning of “persecution” in the context of international
criminal law has been found to be inappropriate given the dissonance between the “non-legal” dictionary
meaning and the specific context of international criminal law. See Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al., Case
No IT-95-16-T, Trial Judgment (ICTY, Jan. 14, 2000), at [569], rejecting a “non-legal” or “common
understanding” based on dictionaries.
Refugee Appeal No. 71427/99 (NZ RSAA, 2000), at [46], per Rodger Haines.
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interpretations of “persecution” adopted in the field of international criminal law. No doubt
inspired by the increasing volume of criminal law jurisprudence explicating this notion, this
is an approach that has recently gained prominence in the academic literature.61
In contrast to purely dictionary-based interpretation, efforts to link refugee law’s “being
persecuted” standard to developments under the similar notion of “persecution” adumbrated in the only other branch of international law to employ such a comparable standard
make some sense. Indeed, it might be argued that, at least very broadly, jurisprudence in
other fields of public international law is part of the “context” of refugee law, and might
therefore legitimately be referenced. But on more careful reflection, efforts to import interpretations of criminal law’s notion of “persecution” to elucidate the meaning of refugee law’s
construct of “being persecuted” can be seen to be highly problematic.
First, there is no evidence whatever that the drafters of the Convention considered the
international criminal law standard in setting refugee law’s “being persecuted” standard,
much less that they intended to align refugee law with developments under that regime.
The drafters were very much aware of international criminal law and expressly adopted
its normative framework as the point of reference for exclusion under Art. 1(F)(a) of the
Convention.62 The fact that no comparable reference was made in relation to the “being
persecuted” standard surely discounts the superficial relevance of international criminal
law’s “persecution” standard as a guide to understanding refugee law’s “being persecuted”
test.
Second and more fundamentally, the object and purpose of the criminal and refugee
law regimes are simply not comparable – a critical consideration in the interpretive process
mandated by international law.63 As a regime designed to punish those found culpable,
international criminal law understandably sets the bar for “persecution” at a fairly high
level.64 Yet if every applicant for asylum were forced to adduce evidence to substantiate
criminal law’s mens rea requirement for “persecution,” it is clear that refugee status would
be routinely denied for reasons that have nothing to do with the presence or absence of a
need for protection.65
61

62
64

65

See e.g., G. S. Goodwin-Gill and J. McAdam, The Refugee in International Law (2007), who dedicate a
significant portion of their discussion of persecution to this issue: at 94–97. See also A. Edwards and
A. Hurwitz, “Introductory Note to the Arusha Summary Conclusions on Complementarities between
International Refugee Law, International Criminal Law, and International Human Rights Law,” (2011)
23 Intl. J. Ref. L. 856, at 857–58.
63
See infra Ch. 7.3.
See text supra, Introduction, at nn. 64–71.
The crime of persecution is defined differently in the jurisprudence and/or statutes of the different
tribunals, but in every case it is clearly a higher test than in refugee law. For example, the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court, adopted Jul. 17, 1998, entered into force Jul. 1, 2002, 2187 UNTS
90 (“Rome Statute”), defines it as a “crime against humanity” which means that it must be “committed
as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge
of the attack”: at Art. 7(1)(h). It is emphasized that not every impairment is included, but only “severe
deprivation of fundamental rights”; however, this is explained “as part of the effort to bring the dynamic
development of human rights into conformity with the principle of legality (nullum crimen sine lege)”:
G. Werle et al., Principles of International Criminal Law (2nd edn., 2009), at [893]. Also of course the issue
is that the gravity of the harm must be the same as those specifically listed underlying offences of crimes
against humanity: see G. Boas, J. L. Bischoff, and N. L. Reid, Elements of Crimes Under International Law
(Vol. II, 2009), at 90; Werle et al., supra this note, at [893].
A similar view was reached by an Expert Meeting on Complementarities between International Refugee
Law, International Criminal Law and International Human Rights Law, “Summary Conclusions,” (2011)
23 Intl. J. Ref. L. 860, where it was concluded that equating being persecuted in refugee law solely with
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It is thus unsurprising that the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
rejected the view that the criminal law notion of “persecution” should be informed by
interpretations of refugee law’s “being persecuted” standard, determining that “the net of
‘persecution’ is cast much wider [in refugee law] than is legally justified for the purposes of
imposing international criminal liability.”66 This holding sensibly implies that any refugee
claimant able to show that her persecutor actually did engage in acts deemed “persecution”
at international criminal law faces a risk of a sufficient gravity to amount to persecutory
harm for refugee law purposes, since the former is a subset of the latter. But it would be
both legally unjustified and dangerous to suggest any tighter connection than this based
upon little more than the superficial similarity of words used in treaties with dramatically
different objects and purposes.

3.2.3 Human rights as the benchmark
In line with the duty to interpret “being persecuted” in a manner that takes account of
context, object, and purpose, it is striking that human rights norms figure prominently in
the Convention’s preamble:
CONSIDERING that the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights . . . have affirmed the principle that human beings shall enjoy fundamental
rights and freedoms without discrimination,
CONSIDERING that the United Nations has, on various occasions, manifested its profound concern for refugees and endeavoured to assure refugees the widest possible
exercise of these fundamental rights and freedoms . . . 67
15

Acknowledging that a treaty’s preamble forms part of its context and can elucidate its object
and purpose,68 senior courts have observed that the Refugee Convention was “written
against the background of international human rights law,”69 and more specifically that
“[t]his overarching and clear human right object and purpose is the background against
which interpretation of individual provisions must take place.”70 The UNHCR has similarly

66

67
69

70

the international criminal law standard would “undermine the international protection objectives of the
1951 Refugee Convention, as this could be construed as meaning that persons would fall outside the
Convention definition even if they nonetheless face serious threats to their life or freedoms, broadly
defined”: at 863 [15]. Accord Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, supra n. 61, at 96.
Kupreškić (ICTY, 2000), at [589] (footnotes omitted). Similarly, in Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T,
Trial Judgment (ICTY, May 7, 1997) the tribunal noted that “[a]lthough there has been an attempt to
define the concept [of persecution] in asylum and refugee law this is a distinct area of municipal and
international law and thus its norms cannot readily be applied to customary international criminal law
entailing individual criminal responsibility”: at [694].
68
Refugee Convention, at Preamble.
See text supra, Introduction, at nn. 64–71.
Applicant A (Aus. HC, Feb. 24, 1997), at 296–99, per Kirby J. See also Wang v. Minister for Immigration
and Multicultural Affairs, (2000) 105 FCR 548 (Aus. FFC, Nov. 10, 2000), at 564–65 [74]–[81], per Merkel
J.; Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. Mohammed, (2000) 98 FCR 405 (Aus. FFC, May
5, 2000), at 421 [44]–[46].
Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] 1 SCR 982 (Can. SC, Jun. 4,
1998), at 1024. See also Fornah v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2007] 1 AC 412 (UKHL,
Oct. 18, 2006), at 429 [10], per Lord Bingham; and RT (Zimbabwe) v. Secretary of State for the Home
Department, [2012] 3 WLR 345 (UKSC, Jul. 25, 2012), at 357–58 [29]–[31], per Lord Dyson (with whom
Lord Hope, Baroness Hale, Lord Clarke, Lord Wilson, and Lord Reed agreed).
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explained that the “strong human rights language” in the Preamble confirms that “the aim
of the drafters [was] to incorporate human rights values in the identification and treatment
of refugees, thereby providing helpful guidance for the interpretation, in harmony with the
Vienna Convention, of the provisions of the 1951 Convention.”71
The logic of relying on human rights law to elucidate the meaning of serious harm
is, however, not simply a matter of fidelity to rules of treaty interpretation. International
human rights standards are rather uniquely suited to the task of defining which risks involve
unacceptable forms of serious harm in a manner that offers not only consistency, but also
normative legitimacy – these being precisely the standards that states themselves have established to define impermissibly serious harms.72 Assessing the existence of persecutory harm
by reference to widely ratified standards of international human rights law thus provides the
ideal alternative to reliance on decision-makers’ personal views about what is “intolerable,”
“offensive,” or “illegitimate” since such rights “by very definition . . . transcend subjective
and parochial perspectives and extend beyond national boundaries.”73 The objective lens
afforded by international human rights law has proven especially valuable in answering
assertions that the seriousness of a risk may be discounted because the harm feared is
“clearly accepted and/or regarded by the majority of the population of [the home country] . . . as traditional and part of the cultural life of its society as a whole.”74 Because international human rights law is predicated on the inalienable rights of all persons, wherever
situated,75 it provides a critical counterweight to culturally relativist objections to providing
protection.
An international human-rights-based framework is also an invaluable means of ensuring that the benchmark for the identification of relevant forms of serious harm does
not stagnate, but rather evolves in line with authoritative international consensus.76 Since
71
72

73
74

75
76

UNHCR, “The International Protection of Refugees: Interpreting Article 1 of the 1951 Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees,” (2001) 20(3) Ref. Survey Q. 77, at 78.
Reference to these widely ratified treaties is appropriate regardless of whether they are in practice complied
with because, as Lord Hoffmann has observed, “even if many state parties in practice disregard them,”
“the instruments show recognition that such rights ought to exist”: Sepet (UKHL, 2003), at 876 [41]. In
any event he goes on to say that “[t]he delinquent states do not normally deny this; they usually pretend
they comply”: ibid.
Chan v. Canada, [1995] 3 SCR 593 (Can. SC, Oct. 19, 1995), at [71], per La Forest J.
Fornah v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2005] 1 WLR 3773 (Eng. CA, Jun. 9, 2005), at 3787
[44], per Auld L.J., overturned by the House of Lords (Fornah (UKHL, 2006)), where Baroness Hale noted:
“It cannot make any difference that the practice is widespread and widely accepted in Sierra Leonean
society . . . There is no doubt that FGM is in breach of international human rights law and standards”: at
109 [466]. As this example suggests, this has been particularly prevalent in the context of claims by women
who fear a type of harm that is considered integral to the cultural and/or religious practices of their home
country. For an in-depth discussion of these issues, see the decision of the New Zealand Refugee Status
Appeals Authority in Re MN, Refugee Appeal No. 2039/93 (NZ RSAA, Feb. 12, 1996), at [60]–[70]. In HJ
(Iran) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2010] 3 WLR 386 (UKSC, Jul. 7, 2010), Lord Dyson
adopted the view of the New Zealand Refugee Status Appeals Authority as stated in Refugee Appeal No.
74665/03, [2005] NZAR 60 (NZ RSAA, Jul. 7, 2004), namely: “We do not accept that the domestic law of
the country of origin or cultural relativity can override international human rights norms in the refugee
determination context”: at 434 [129].
They are enjoyed “by virtue of being a human person”: R. Higgins, Problems and Process: International
Law and How We Use It (1994), at 96.
For a good example, see text infra Ch. 3.5.2.
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international human rights treaties are interpreted by supervisory bodies vested with the
authority to assess state compliance and to elucidate the meaning of treaty terms, there is
a body of reasoned analysis on which refugee decision-makers may draw.77 Access to this
regularly updated, state-sanctioned interpretive guidance ensures that refugee law remains
contextually relevant, dynamic, and sensitive to the contemporary drivers of involuntary
alienage.
Given its consistency with rules of treaty interpretation, its reliance on standards of
indisputable global authority, and its sensitivity to the importance of dynamic and evolving
interpretation, the human rights approach is ideally suited to the task of identifying serious
harm for purposes of knowing whether an individual faces the risk of “being persecuted.”
So long as the risk of denial of a broadly accepted international human right is sustained –
in the sense that, as a practical matter, it is ongoing;78 or systemic – in the sense that the risk
is endemic to the political or social system79 – it can reasonably be said that there is a risk of
“being persecuted” of the kind that may engage Convention obligations.

77

78

79

The “living instrument” approach is well established in interpretation of human rights treaties, including
at the regional level. As the European Court of Human Rights has recently explained in Bayatyan v.
Armenia, (2012) 54 EHRR 15 (ECtHR, Jul. 7, 2011), the court must “maintain a dynamic and evolutive
approach”: at [98], that it is “of crucial importance that the Convention is interpreted and applied in a
manner which renders its rights practical and effective, not theoretical and illusory”: at [98], and that the
Convention “is a living instrument which must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions and
of the ideas prevailing in democratic States today”: at [102].
The ongoing risk may be one that manifests in a single harm – for example death or severe torture – since,
as the New Zealand High Court has explained, the “wrongful act or acts directed against a complainant
may be different to the continuing actions of a state in failing to protect its citizen”: K v. Refugee Status
Appeals Authority (No. 2), [2005] NZAR 441 (NZHC, Oct. 5, 2004), at [19]. This is emphasized because
the phrase “sustained or systemic” has occasionally been misunderstood as necessarily requiring a risk
of repeated harm (hence excluding one-off harm such as death). However, this has mostly now been
understood to be an error. For example, although the Canadian courts continue to rely on the notion
that persecution requires “repetition and relentlessness” (Valentin v. Canada (Minister of Employment
and Immigration), [1991] 3 FC 390 (Can. FCA, Jun. 21, 1991), at 396; Rajudeen v. Canada (Minister of
Employment and Immigration), (1984) 55 NR 129 (Can. FCA, Jul. 4, 1984)), it is “settled law that, in some
instances, even a single transgression of the applicant’s human rights could amount to persecution”:
Muthuthevar v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1996] FCJ 207 (FCTD, Feb. 15,
1996), at [16]. In Australia, a similar approach is taken: see Petrov v. Vrachnas (Unreported, Aus. FC,
Apr. 7, 1997), a “single act of oppression may suffice”; Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs
v. Prathapan, (1998) 86 FCR 95 (Aus. FFC, Aug. 12, 1998), at 99, per Madgwick J. See also Doymus v.
Secretary of State for the Home Department, OO/TH/01748 (UKAIT, Jul. 19, 2000), where the UK Asylum
and Immigration Tribunal concluded that “while persistency is a usual characteristic of persecution, it is
not an inevitable one”; and the earlier decision of the Court of Appeal in Demirkaya v. Secretary of State
for the Home Department, [1999] Imm AR 498 (Eng. CA, Jun. 23, 1999), at [15]. In the US, see Dandan
(USCA, 7th Cir., 2003).
We note that the “sustained or systemic” phrase, first set out in Hathaway, Refugee Status, while widely
accepted (see supra n. 18) has sometimes been misunderstood as a conjunctive rather than disjunctive
phrase: see e.g. DG v. Refugee Status Appeals Authority, CP213/00 (NZHC, Jun. 5, 2001). Further, in some
early Australian case law the word systematic (rather than systemic) was adopted; but later courts came
to understand that this view is mistaken: Ibrahim (Aus. HC, 2000), at [99]–[100]. However, we note that
the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) has been amended to require “systematic and discriminatory conduct”: s.
91R(1)(c) (but see Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v. SZCWF, (2007) 161 FCR 441 (Aus. FFC,
Sept. 27, 2007)).
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This human rights approach is clearly predominant in the common law world,80 and
increasingly adopted in the civil law world,81 including in legislation codifying the Refugee
Convention in domestic law.82 Perhaps most significantly, the European Union’s Qualification Directive has explicitly adopted the human rights approach by defining an “act of
persecution” as an act that is “sufficiently serious by its nature or repetition as to constitute a severe violation of basic human rights, in particular the rights from which derogation cannot be made”83 or an “accumulation of various measures, including violations
of human rights.”84 The human rights approach is now endorsed by the UNHCR,85 and
80

81

82

83
85

In addition to the references cited at supra n. 18, in some US decisions there “are some promising
signs . . . of increased acceptance of a human rights approach to analysing the meaning of persecution,
consistent with the underlying purposes of the Refugee Convention”: Anker, supra n. 19, at 176. For
example, the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit observed in Stenaj that, “[w]hether the treatment
feared by a claimant violates recognized standards of basic human rights can determine whether persecution exists”: Stenaj v. Gonzales, (2007) 227 Fed. Appx. 429 (USCA, 6th Cir., Feb. 26, 2007), at [12]–[14],
citing Hathaway, Refugee Status, at 104–5. See also Abay v. Ashcroft, (2004) 368 F.3d 634 (USCA, 6th Cir.,
May 19, 2004), at 638–39. In the US Department of Homeland Security, “Asylum Officer Basic Training,
Female Asylum Applicants and Gender-Related Claims” (Mar. 12, 2009) (“Training Guidelines on Gender”),
it is recognized that “adjudicators must rely on guidance from various sources, including international
human rights norms, to evaluate whether harm constitutes persecution”: at 21. See also K. Jastram and
S. Cavalieri, “Human Rights in Refugee Tribunals,” (2005) 24 Ref. Survey Q. 6, at 11.
For an example of a human rights approach in Swiss jurisprudence, see WH, Äthiopien, 2006/32-336
(Sw. ARK/CRA [Swiss Asylum Appeal Commission], Oct. 9, 2006), where the Commission referred
to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UNGA Res. 217A (III), UN Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948)
(“Universal Declaration”), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19, 1966,
entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, 999 UNTS 171 (“Civil and Political Covenant”), and the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, adopted Dec. 18, 1979, entered into
force Sept. 3, 1981, 1249 UNTS 13, as well as the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, adopted Nov. 4, 1950, entered into force Sept. 3, 1953, 213 UNTS
221 (“European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights”). In STS 2781/2009 (Sp. TS [Spanish
Supreme Court], May 11, 2009), the Spanish Supreme Court noted that “[t]his third chamber has already
had the chance to declare on different occasions that a situation where there is a lack of protection
and social, political and judicial marginalization of women in their country, which clearly and seriously
violates human rights, is cause for asylum”: citing STS 4592/2005 (Sp. TS, Jul. 7, 2005) and AAP M
6401/2005 (Sp. AP, Madrid [Spanish Provincial Court, Madrid], Jul. 8, 2005) (unofficial translation).
See also D. Alland and C. Teitgen-Colly, Traité du droit de l’asile (2002), at 371; Zimmermann, supra
n. 19, which cites German cases for the proposition that the human rights approach is dominant; and
O. Arakaki, Refugee Law and Practice in Japan (2008), at 200–1. Finally, in NSA v. SA 1781/99 (Po. Sup.
AC [Polish Supreme Administrative Court], Aug. 24, 2000), the Polish Supreme Administrative Court
made clear its reliance on a human rights framework in explaining the need for reliance on a universal
framework because “human rights are universal rights . . . If the assessment of whether human rights
were violated is based on what is perceived as a violation in the country of origin, these rights would
be undermined”: reported in ECRE, “The Impact of the EU Qualification Directive on International
Protection” (Oct. 2008), at 144.
For example, the Guatemalan legislation provides that those entitled to refugee status include those who
“suffer persecution through sexual violence or other forms of gender persecution based on violations
of fundamental human rights in international instruments”: Acuerdo gubernativo N°383-2001 del 14 de
septiembre de 2001, reglamento para la protección y determinación del estatuto de refugiado en el territorio
del Estado de Guatemala, at Art. 11(d) (unofficial translation).
84
Qualification Directive, supra n. 37, at Art. 9.
Ibid.
The UNHCR clearly recognizes the link between “being persecuted” and human rights norms: see e.g.
UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection No. 1: Gender-Related Persecution within the context of
Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, UN Doc.
HCR/GIP/02/01 (May 7, 2002) (“Guidelines on International Protection No. 1”), at [5] and [9] (citing
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overwhelmingly approved by scholars.86 Even in many jurisdictions that have not yet explicitly adopted the human rights approach to the identification of persecutory harms, it is
often recognized that “[t]he denial of fundamental rights or freedoms otherwise enjoyed by
nationals of the country concerned may constitute such harm”87 – a position that tacitly
accepts the logic of the link between serious harm in refugee law and human rights norms.88
Despite the clear reasons in support of a human rights framework for interpretation of
persecutory serious harm, three questions are sometimes raised.89 First, can the international

86

87

88

89

various international instruments at n. 2); UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection: Religion-Based
Refugee Claims under Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of
Refugees (April 28, 2004) (“Guidelines on Religion-Based Claims”), at [2], [11], [15]–[16].
Nearly all scholars have adopted the approach: see Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, supra n. 61, at 91, 131–33;
Zimmermann, supra n. 19, at 346–47; Anker, supra n. 19, at 164–69; K. Hailbronner, EU Immigration and
Asylum Law: Commentary on EU Regulations and Directives (2010), at 1067; H. Battjes, European Asylum
Law and International Law (2006), at [289]. See also T. A. Aleinikoff, “The Meaning of Persecution in
United States Asylum Law,” (1991) 3 Intl. J. Ref. L. 5, at 21–22; Carlier, supra n. 57, at 38; Jastram and
Cavalieri, supra n. 80, especially at 9–12; A. Fischer-Lescano et al., “Border Controls at Sea: Requirements
under International Human Rights and Refugee Law,” (2009) 21 Intl. J. Ref. L. 256, where the authors
argue that the widespread practice since the 1990s that the Refugee Convention must be interpreted in
conformity with international human rights treaties is now “binding on the contracting states to the
Refugee Convention” following the formal recognition provided in the 2001 Declaration of States Parties
to the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees: see at 259–60. Storey
has recently concluded, following an exhaustive assessment, that “there is no respectable alternative to a
human rights approach”: H. Storey, “Persecution: Towards a Working Definition,” in V. Chetail and C.
Bauloz (eds.), Research Handbook on Migration and International Law (2014).
See Chan (Aus. HC, 1989), at 388, per Mason C.J., 430–31, per McHugh J.; Appellant S395/2002 (Aus.
HC, 2003), at 497 [66]; Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v. Guo, (1997) 191 CLR 559 (Aus.
HC, Jun. 13, 1997), at 570; Kord (Aus. FFC, 2002), at 72–79; Minister for Immigration and Multicultural
Affairs v. Zamora, (1998) 85 FCR 458 (Aus. FC, Aug. 5, 1998). It should be noted that notwithstanding the
introduction of s. 91R(2) into the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), which provides specific guidance as to the
type of acts that constitute “serious harm,” it is clear that the High Court’s jurisprudence remains relevant
to understanding “being persecuted” in the Australian context: see NBFP v. Minister for Immigration and
Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, [2005] FCAFC 95 (Aus. FFC, May 31, 2005), at [57]; SBBG v. Minister
for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, (2003) 199 ALR 281 (Aus. FFC, Jun. 6, 2003), at
287 [28], and SZMGR v. Minister for Immigration, [2009] FMCA 174 (Aus. FMC, Mar. 20, 2009), at [25].
In some cases, Australian courts have explicitly referred to international human rights law to assist in
assessing serious harm: for example in Wang (Aus. FFC, 2000), both Gray J. at 553 [20] and Merkel J. at
564–65 [74]–[81] explicitly referred to Art. 18(1) of the Civil and Political Covenant, supra n. 81, as did
Kirby J. in Applicant NABD of 2002 v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs,
(2005) 216 ALR 1 (Aus. HC, May 26, 2005), at [116]. See also Chen Shi Hai (Aus. HC, 2000), at 303 [29],
per Gleeson C.J., Gaudron, Gummow, and Hayne JJ.
Other concerns have occasionally been raised, but these are readily dismissed. For example, Martin
argues that asylum is a “scarce resource” and thus the definition should be read narrowly: see “The
Refugee Concept: On Definitions, Politics, and the Careful Use of a Scarce Resource,” in H. Adelman
(ed.), Refugee Policy: Canada and the United States (1991). See also Mohammed v. Keisler 507 F.3d 369
(USCA, 6th Cir., Nov. 2, 2007), at 370. For a convincing response to Martin see K. Jastram, “Economic
Harm as a Basis for Refugee Status and the Application of Human Rights Law to the Interpretation
of Economic Persecution,” in J. C. Simeon (ed.), Critical Issues in Refugee Status Determination (2010)
143, at 160–62. Such a “floodgates” concern is not a legal argument: see Chan (Can. SC, 1995), at [57],
per La Forest J.; Applicant A (Aus. HC, 1997), at 241, per Gummow J.; R v. Secretary of State for the
Home Department; Ex parte Jeyakumaran, [1994] Imm AR 45 (Eng. HC, Jun. 28, 1985), at 48. It has
conversely been argued by some that caution should be exercised in embracing too wholeheartedly the
human rights framework because it may produce an under-inclusive approach in that “it is possible that
all forms of persecution have not yet been identified or codified in international human rights law”:
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human rights framework accommodate the commitment of refugee law to respond to
particularized forms of vulnerability, or is its objective nature in some sense at odds with the
need to account for individuated concerns? Second, which standards of international human
rights law are appropriately relied upon to identify persecutory harms? In particular, does
it matter whether pertinent standards have been ratified by either or both of the state of
origin and the asylum state? And third and most complex, does the human rights approach
mean that a risk of denial of any human right constitutes a risk of serious harm? If not,
can a principled line be drawn between those human rights risks appropriately deemed
persecutory and those that fail to meet the standard? We consider each of these issues in
turn.
Perhaps the most basic question is whether the value of a more principled, objective
human rights framework is in some sense obviated by such a framework’s diminished
attention to individuated vulnerabilities. While an understandable concern, the truth is
that international human rights law not only allows, but actually requires, careful scrutiny
of particularized circumstances. For example, the question of whether particular actions
amount to “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment” will depend “on all the circumstances
of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in
some cases, the sex, age, and state of health of the victim.”90 In line with this approach,
courts relying on human rights norms to identify serious harm for refugee law purposes
have appropriately insisted, for example, that personal attributes such as “age and frailty”91
may have an impact on the seriousness of harm:
It is obvious that the impact and circumstances surrounding the application of a national
policy may impact differently on different persons so that in one instance the impact
may constitute persecution but in other cases the impact may not be so substantial as to
amount to Convention persecution.92

90

91
92

see A. Edwards, “Age and Gender Dimensions in International Refugee Law,” in E. Feller, V. Türk, and
F. Nicholson (eds.), Refugee Protection in International Law: UNHCR’s Global Consultations on International Protection (2003), at 50. However, this appears hypothetical, since no concrete examples are
provided, and in any event such concerns overlook the fact that the interpretation of core human rights
treaties is not static; rather they are subject to evolutionary interpretation by specialized adjudicatory
bodies, whose jurisprudence provides further helpful guidance in refugee law. Indeed, as Storey argues,
“[t]he time has surely come for the circumstantial approach [advocated by the UNHCR] to be abandoned.
It ill behoves UNHCR – the international body charged by Article 35 with supervision of the application
of the Refugee Convention – to be seen to be endorsing, even if only intermittently and ambiguously,
reliance on a residual area of meaning ungoverned by objective criteria drawn from international law.
Manifestly, of the two approaches the human rights approach is the only one that affords a real possibility
of achieving a common international understanding”: Storey, supra n. 86.
N v. United Kingdom, Application No. 26565/05 (ECtHR, May 27, 2008), at [29]. It is a well-established
principle in refugee law that individual circumstances must be assessed; we note for example that the
Qualification Directive, supra n. 37, requires that the individual’s particular characteristics be taken into
account: see at Art. 4(3)(c).
See SZBBP v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, [2005] FMCA 5 (Aus.
FMC, Jan. 18, 2005), at [35].
SZBQJ v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, [2005] FCA 143 (Aus. FC,
Feb. 28, 2005), at [21]. Thus the decision of Raphael F.M. in SZALZ v. Minister for Immigration and
Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, [2004] FMCA 275 (Aus. FMC, May 18, 2004) that the analysis is
purely an objective one such that the finding that harm is not sufficiently serious “cannot be changed
because of the more serious effects that it had on the applicant than it might have had on another person”
is incorrect: see at [8].
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Particular attention is routinely paid to the vulnerability and developmental needs of
children, which can of course affect the seriousness of a given denial of human rights.93
More specifically, it is understood that
[a]ctions or threats that might not reach the threshold of persecution in the case of an
adult may amount to persecution in the case of a child because of the mere fact that s/he
is a child. Immaturity, vulnerability, undeveloped coping mechanisms and dependency
as well as the differing stages of development and hindered capacities may be directly
related to how a child experiences or fears harm.94
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Similarly, ostracism and rejection by family and other support networks can exacerbate
and heighten the severity of harm likely to be suffered by a particular applicant.95 The
Australian tribunal therefore determined that “[i]n a context where the applicant would
be unable to rely on family support,” generalized stigmatization and the denial of social
and economic resources “would amount to serious harm.”96 Indeed, to the extent that
adoption of a human-rights-based approach to the assessment of serious harm has a
limiting effect, it may well be precisely because it is attentive to particularized circumstances. Thus, “[t]o take an extreme example, heterosexuals could not claim to be persecuted because they are prohibited from engaging in homosexual acts”97 – surely a sensible
conclusion.
A second question sometimes posed is whether a general policy of relying on international
human rights law to define relevant forms of serious harm is viable given that either or both
of the state of origin and asylum country may not be parties to the human rights treaty
93

94

95
96

97

Bueckert v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2011] FC 1042 (Can. FC, Sept. 1, 2011),
at [17]. We note that the Qualification Directive, supra n. 37, states that “[a]cts of persecution” include
“acts of a gender-specific or child-specific nature”: at Art. 9(2)(f).
UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection No. 8: Child Asylum Claims under Article 1(A)2 and 1(F) of
the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, UN Doc. HCR/GIP/09/08 (Dec.
22, 2009) (“Guidelines on International Protection No. 8”), at [15], see also [10]. See generally, UNHCR
Executive Committee Conclusion No. 107 (LVIII), “Conclusion on Children at Risk” (Oct. 5, 2007), and
the US Department of Justice, Guidelines for Children’s Asylum Claims (Dec. 10, 1998) (“Guidelines for
Children”), which state that “harm a child fears or has suffered . . . may be relatively less than that of an
adult and still qualify as persecution”: at 19. For clear judicial authority, see Nahimana v. Canada (Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration), [2006] FC 161 (Can. FC, Feb. 14, 2006); Mei Dan Liu v. Ashcroft, (2004)
380 F.3d 307 (USCA, 7th Cir., Aug. 17, 2004), at 315; Kholyavskiy v. Mukasey, (2008) 540 F.3d 555 (USCA,
7th Cir., Aug. 28, 2008), at 570; Hernandez-Ortiz v. Gonzales, (2007) 496 F.3d 1042 (USCA, 9th Cir., Aug.
8, 2007); Mendoza-Pablo v. Holder, (2012) 667 F.3d 1308 (USCA, 9th Cir., Feb. 7, 2012); Islam v. Minister
for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, (2000) 171 ALR 267 (Aus. FC, Mar. 27, 2000), and SBAS v.
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, [2003] FCA 528 (Aus. FC, May 30,
2003), at [63].
For a contra example, see SR (Iran) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2007] EWCA Civ 460
(Eng. CA, May 17, 2007).
V06/18399, [2006] RRTA 95 (Aus. RRT, Jun. 22, 2006). Importantly, the Federal Magistrates Court
has indicated that, in light of UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection No. 7: The Application of
Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees to Victims of
Trafficking and Persons at Risk of Being Trafficked, UN Doc. HCR/GIP/06/07 (Apr. 7, 2006) (“Guidelines
on International Protection No. 7”), the Refugee Review Tribunal ought to consider such possibilities
before concluding that a sex-trafficking victim would not be discriminated against, or otherwise seriously
harmed, to a degree constituting persecution: VXAJ v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and
Indigenous Affairs, (2006) 198 FLR 455 (Aus. FMC, Apr. 20, 2006), at 467.
Win (Aus. FC, 2001), at [19].
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in which the relevant standard is found. The implied suggestion is that it would in some
sense be wrong to assess the existence or absence of persecution by reference to a standard
that does not formally bind the states most directly involved.98 This worry is in our view
fundamentally misplaced.
It would, of course, be one thing if the human rights framework were to be relied upon to
impose a sanction or otherwise adjudicate whether a treaty obligation has been breached. But
in the refugee law context, reference to international human rights standards is made solely
for the purpose of seeking authoritative guidance on the interpretation of an otherwise
ambiguous term – “being persecuted” – not to engage in an assessment of liability for
breach of human rights law.99 Because it is agreed that the terms of the Refugee Convention
should be construed in a manner that facilitates their application across the range of state
parties, and which can be justified as a matter of principle, reliance on standards drawn
from international human rights law to inform the interpretation of the “being persecuted”
requirement is contextually appropriate. So long as the international human right to which
reference is made is sensibly understood to be one that is broadly agreed at international
law,100 its invocation as an interpretive tool ought not to be questioned.
This brings us to the third, and most difficult, question: is risk to any and every internationally agreed human right sufficiently serious to amount to the risk of a persecutory
harm? Or should an especially serious subset of human rights be authoritatively identified
as relevant to refugee law?
At the level of principle, one might argue against any effort to distinguish among agreed
human rights standards. As Gibney suggests,
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[h]uman rights are sometimes derided for being a utopian wish list of human desires;
however, the exact opposite is true. Human rights are not about luxuries, and they are
certainly not about mere desires either. Rather, human rights are better thought of as the
basic minimum that each individual has to have in order to live a human (rather than
inhuman) existence.101

On the basis of this principled reasoning, one might well question whether refugee decisionmakers ought to second-guess the list of human rights standards that have been agreed by
states. But as a matter of international law, it is difficult to ignore the fact that not all codified
human rights standards are created equal: some rights have long pedigrees, others are of
more recent vintage; some rights are nearly universally agreed, others enjoy only minimal
support; and some rights are clearly defined and unambiguously binding, while others are
more vague or framed as duties of process rather than result. Ought such differences to
be accorded no weight, particularly given the importance of retaining state support for a
progressive and evolving rights-based approach to interpretation of the “being persecuted”
requirement?
One possibility would thus be to focus analysis simply on the most basic of international
human rights standards, namely those found in the so-called International Bill of Rights:
the non-binding but widely referenced Universal Declaration of Human Rights,102 and the
two treaties implementing the Declaration as matters of binding law, the International
98
100
101
102

99
See e.g. N. Nathwani, Rethinking Refugee Law (2003), at 21.
See infra Ch. 4.2.2.
See text supra, Introduction, at nn. 51–57.
M. Gibney, International Human Rights Law: Returning to Universal Principles (2008), at 4.
Universal Declaration, supra n. 81.
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Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“Civil and Political Covenant”)103 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“Economic, Social and Cultural
Covenant”).104 More than any other gauge, the International Bill of Rights is essential to an
understanding of the minimum duty owed by a state to its nationals.105 The Covenants are
moreover widely ratified across the full range of states.106
But since the adoption of the Covenants in the 1960s, the international community has
agreed to additional treaties that elucidate in more depth the duties owed by states in a
range of specific settings. Many of these – including in particular the Convention on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination,107 the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women,108 the Convention on the Rights of the Child,109 and the
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities110 – are broadly subscribed to and
thus fairly understood to serve as authoritative points of reference, in much the same way
as the International Bill of Rights. In any event, the newer generations of treaties essentially
complement and contextualize the general rights set out in the International Bill of Rights,
showing how those generic standards apply in circumstances of specific vulnerability or need.
There can thus be little objection to drawing upon them as a means of understanding the
scope of serious harm presently recognized as impermissible. For example, it is increasingly
recognized that a “[c]ontemporary and child-sensitive understanding of persecution”111
requires that
103
104
105

106

107
108
109
110

111

Civil and Political Covenant, supra n. 81.
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, entered into
force Jan. 3, 1976, 993 UNTS 3 (“Economic, Social and Cultural Covenant”).
See Z v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, (1998) 90 FCR 51 (Aus. FC, Dec. 11, 1998),
at 60, per Katz J. In Win (Aus. FC, 2001), Madgwick J. stated that “the UDHR and the ICCPR are in
my view reliable, sufficiently contemporaneous guides” as to understanding what “civil and political
rights the States that made the Convention had in mind”: at [22], citing Shah (UKHL, 1999), per Lord
Hoffmann.
At the time of writing, the Civil and Political Covenant, supra n. 81, had 167 parties. There were 145
parties to the Refugee Convention, and 146 to the Refugee Protocol. Of the 145 parties to the Refugee
Convention, only nine had not acceded to the Civil and Political Covenant (Antigua and Barbuda, China,
Fiji, Holy See, Nauru, São Tomé and Principe, Solomon Islands, St Kitts and Nevis, and Tuvalu). Of
those nine, three had at least signed the Civil and Political Covenant (China, Nauru, and São Tomé and
Principe). At the time of writing, the Economic, Social and Cultural Covenant, supra n. 104, had 160
parties. Of the 147 parties to the Refugee Convention or Protocol, only thirteen had not acceded to the
Economic, Social and Cultural Covenant (Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Botswana, Fiji, Haiti, Holy See,
Mozambique, Samoa, São Tomé and Principe, South Africa, St Kitts and Nevis, Tuvalu, and the United
States of America), and of those, four had at least signed the Economic, Social and Cultural Covenant
(Belize, São Tomé and Principe, South Africa, and the United States of America).
Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, adopted Dec. 21, 1965, entered into force Jan.
4, 1969, 660 UNTS 195 (“Race Convention”).
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, adopted Dec. 18, 1979,
entered into force Sept. 3, 1981, 1249 UNTS 13 (“Women’s Convention”).
Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted Nov. 20, 1989, entered into force Sept. 2, 1990, 1577
UNTS 3 (“Children’s Convention”).
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, entered into force May 3, 2008, 2515 UNTS 3
(“Disability Convention”). These treaties all have very large, geographically diverse ratifications: Race
Convention, supra n. 107: 176 parties; Women’s Convention, supra n. 108: 187 parties; Children’s
Convention, supra n. 109: 193 parties; Disability Convention: 144 parties.
UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection No. 8, supra n. 94, at [13]. The Committee on the Rights
of the Child has similarly emphasized that the refugee definition “must be interpreted in an age and
gender-sensitive manner, taking into account the particular motives for, and forms and manifestations
of, persecution experienced by children”: Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment

202

3 serious harm

when determining whether a child claiming refugee status fits the definition . . . decision
makers must inform themselves of the rights recognized in the [Convention on the Rights
of the Child]. It is the denial of these rights which may determine whether or not a child
has a well-founded fear of persecution if returned to his or her country of origin.112

Perhaps because it does not make sense narrowly to define the range of international
human rights treaties pertinent to the assessment of serious harm for refugee law purposes,
an alternative sometimes suggested – for example, in the European Union’s Qualification Directive – is that the focus of analysis be limited to those human rights that are
“non-derogable.”113 Yet this approach makes little sense, since non-derogability does not
necessarily equate with normative importance or seriousness of harm.114 As the UN Human
Rights Committee has explained, “not all rights of profound importance . . . have in fact
been made non-derogable.”115 Derogability serves the quite distinct purpose of identifying
those rights that both practically and as a matter of principle may be suspended for limited
periods of time, during an officially declared national emergency. Some rights were made
non-derogable in international law (such as the right not to be imprisoned for non-payment
of debt) not because they are normatively superior to other rights but “because their suspension is irrelevant to the legitimate control of the state in a national emergency.”116

112

113

114

115

116

No. 6: Treatment of Unaccompanied and Separated Children Outside Their Country of Origin, UN Doc.
CRC/GC/2005/6 (Jun. 3, 2005) (“CRC General Comment No. 6”), at [74].
Kim v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2011] 2 FCR 448 (Can. FC, Feb. 12, 2010),
at 475. Indeed, the Canadian Federal Court has found legal error where the Immigration and Refugee
Board failed to assess separately the claim of a child, distinct from her mother, and failed to refer to
administrative guidelines on child refugee claimants: see SRH and NSH v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration), [2012] FC 1271 (Can. FC, Oct. 31, 2012), at [32]–[33]. For an excellent discussion of
these issues, see J. M. Pobjoy, “A Child Rights Framework for Assessing the Status of Refugee Children,”
in S. S. Juss and C. Harvey (eds.), Contemporary Issues in Refugee Law (2013) 91, at 121–29.
Qualification Directive, supra n 37, at Art. 9. We note that there is a worrying tendency in European
jurisprudence to equate the question of what is necessary to enliven an implied non-refoulement provision
in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, supra n. 81, with what is necessary to
establish being persecuted in the refugee context. For example, in the decision of the German Federal
Administrative Court in 10 C 19.09 (Ger. BverwG, Dec. 9, 2010), in explaining the need for a “severe”
violation of human rights to constitute an act of persecution, the court cited in support the ECtHR
jurisprudence concerning prevention of deportation under the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights: see at [23] and [35].
Indeed there is no derogation clause for emergencies in the Economic, Social and Cultural Covenant,
supra n. 104, nor in the Race Convention, supra n. 107, the Women’s Convention, supra n. 108, or the
Children’s Convention, supra n. 109. For a detailed discussion of the difficulties in according a higher
normative status merely on the basis of derogability, see I. D. Seiderman, Hierarchy in International Law:
The Human Rights Dimension (2001), at 67–89.
Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 24: Issues Relating to Reservations Made upon
Ratification or Accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols thereto, or in Relation to Declarations
under Article 41 of the Covenant, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (Nov. 4, 1994) (“HRC General
Comment No. 24”), at [1]. The Committee elaborates more fully on this point in its later General
Comment on derogations: Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 29: States of Emergency,
UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (Aug. 31, 2001) (“HRC General Comment No. 29”). Although some
rights are made non-derogable because they represent peremptory norms: HRC General Comment No.
24, at [1].
HRC General Comment No. 24, supra n. 115, at [10]. See further Human Rights Committee, General
Comment No. 31: Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant,
UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (May 26, 2004) (“HRC General Comment No. 31”). As McGoldrick
has noted, “[i]t is not easy to determine the criteria for express non-derogability. The ECHR has four
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Derogability thus does not provide a principled basis upon which to exclude a given right
from the ambit of standards relevant to refugee law’s assessment of serious harm.
An alternative to relying on derogability is to circumscribe the range of relevant rights by
reference to the fact that some rights, in particular those in the Civil and Political Covenant,
are generally framed as duties of immediate result whereas other rights, predominantly those
found in the Economic, Social and Cultural Covenant, are in most cases deemed subject to
progressive implementation.117 This argument may be framed as one of simple normative
hierarchy, that is, that those rights that attach immediately are more important than those
that are subject only to an obligation of progressive implementation. Alternatively, it may be
suggested that referencing rights not subject to a duty of result is simply too complex, with
the assessment of compliance with the progressive implementation standard ill-suited to the
expertise of most refugee decision-makers. In truth, neither of these arguments for ruling
out rights that are to be progressively implemented as relevant to serious harm analysis is
sustainable.
As a matter of law, it is now widely understood that the conditioning of social and
economic rights on progressive implementation was simply intended to recognize that such
rights will often take longer to put in place, not that they are any less important. Indeed,
an argument based on normative hierarchy is no longer defensible in light of the widely
accepted principle that “[a]ll human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent
and interrelated. The international community must treat human rights globally in a fair
and equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis.”118 The New Zealand
tribunal has thus appropriately rejected, in the context of refugee law, “the notion that
international human rights law is to be approached from a hierarchical perspective in which
civil and political rights take precedence over, or are a superior form of rights, to their
economic, social and cultural counterparts.”119
Nor is there force in the alternative argument for rejecting reference to economic, social,
and cultural rights on the basis that assessment of breach by reference to the duty progressively to implement such norms is a task ill-suited to the expertise of refugee decision-makers.
At the undisputed core of the duty of progressive, non-discriminatory implementation
is the prohibition on the act of withdrawal or withholding of rights to particular segments of the population. As such, whatever the duty of progressive implementation means,
it most certainly does not contemplate retrogression. Because risks of active withdrawal
or deprivation of socio-economic rights are precisely those most frequently advanced by

117

118
119

non-derogable rights, the ICCPR has seven, and the ACHR has at least eleven”: D. McGoldrick, “The
Interface between Public Emergency Powers and International Law,” (2004) 2 Intl. J. Const. L. 380,
at 414. See also UN High Commissioner for Refugees, “Statement on Religious Persecution and the
Interpretation of Article 9(1) of the EU Qualification Directive” (Jun. 17, 2011) (“UNHCR, Art. 9(1) of
the EU Qualification Directive”), at [4.1.2].
Some obligations are immediately binding, the most obvious being the obligation to “take steps” and
the duty of non-discrimination: see e.g. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General
Comment No. 3: The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations (Dec. 14, 1990) and Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 20: Non-Discrimination in Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/20 (Jul. 2, 2009) (“CESCR General Comment No. 20”).
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, approved by 171 states: UN Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (Jul.
12, 1993), at [5].
BG (Fiji), [2012] NZIPT 800091 (NZ IPT, Jan. 20, 2012), at [90], citing Refugee Appeal Nos. 75221
and 75225 (NZ RSAA, Sept. 22, 2005), at [80], and comparative authority from other jurisdictions,
at [91].
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persons seeking recognition of refugee status, the alleged complexity of referencing economic, social, and cultural rights is in practice generally a non-issue.120
In sum, in relying on international human rights law to understand forms of serious harm
relevant to refugee protection it is not appropriate to restrict analysis only to the standards
in the International Bill of Rights, nor to refuse to consider claims based on rights that
are either derogable or subject to a duty of progressive implementation. There is, in truth,
no convincing conceptual framework that is capable of distinguishing on an absolute basis
between those rights that are “basic,” “fundamental,” or “important” and those that are
not.121
The importance of refusing to buy into an ab initio, automatic screening out of certain
categories of internationally recognized human rights does not mean, however, that it is
enough merely to point to a relevant international human rights norm in order to ground
a finding of serious (and hence persecutory) harm. To the contrary, under the positivist
framework advocated here, a finding of serious harm requires careful consideration of
whether a generally accepted right as codified in international law is, on the facts of the case,
at risk of being violated. This analysis comprises three steps.
First, is the interest at stake within the ambit of a human rights norm as defined by a widely
ratified international human rights treaty? If not, it is unlikely to constitute serious harm in
refugee law since for the human right fairly to be considered a generally agreed interpretive
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While refugee decision-makers have sometimes dismissed claims based on blatant socio-economic
deprivation on the basis of inappropriate reliance on the progressive nature of Economic, Social and
Cultural Covenant obligations (see M. Foster, International Refugee Law and Socio-Economic Rights:
Refuge from Deprivation (2007), at 136–47), international criminal tribunals have not been distracted
by whether discriminatory violations of social and economic rights can be justified on the basis of their
progressive nature or resource constraints. Just as the Nuremberg Tribunal and the US Military Tribunal
after the Second World War convicted defendants of persecution on the basis, inter alia, of the denial
of employment, and the exclusion of Jews from the public service and from educational institutions
(see Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, Case No. IT-00-39, Trial Judgment (ICTY, Sept. 27, 2006), at [738]), so too
the modern tribunals have found such actions, as well as denial of available medical care, capable of
constituting the crime of persecution either alone or in conjunction with other acts when undertaken
for a discriminatory reason: Prosecutor v. Brđanin, Case No. IT-99-36, Trial Judgment (ICTY, Sept. 1,
2004), at [1046]–[1048]; Krajišnik (ICTY, 2006), at [740]–[741]. In none of these cases has it been
suggested or considered that the “progressive realization” standard in the Economic, Social and Cultural
Covenant, supra n. 104, in any way diminishes the capacity of such actions to constitute the crime of
persecution. We note that in Brđanin the defendants tried to argue that the mass dismissals were not for
discriminatory reasons but rather due to economic downturn. This was rejected by the court: at [1038].
Similarly, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia rejected the argument that an
absence of required medical care was caused by a general shortage of supplies; rather it was “deliberately
withheld from Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats by the Bosnian Serb authorities for the very reason
of their ethnicity”: Brđanin (ICTY, 2004), at [1048]. In Brđanin, the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia concluded that, “taking into account the cumulative effect” of the denial of the
rights of “employment, freedom of movement, proper judicial process, and proper medical care,” “these
rights cannot but be considered as fundamental rights for the purposes of establishing persecution”: at
[1049].
I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (6th edn., 2003), at 488. See also T. Meron, “On a
Hierarchy of International Human Rights,” (1986) 80 Am. J. Intl. L. 1. In respect of the Children’s
Convention, supra n. 109, a treaty that incorporates both civil/political and social/economic rights, the
Committee has emphasized that “there is no hierarchy of rights in the Convention”: Committee on the
Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 14: The Right of the Child to Have His or Her Best Interests
Taken as a Primary Consideration, UN Doc. CRC/C/GC/14 (May 29, 2013), at [4].
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benchmark for the “being persecuted” inquiry, one should expect to see the norm having
been ratified by a super-majority of states across a politically and geographically diverse
range of states.122 Not only the Covenants, but also the specialized treaties on race, women,
children, and persons with disabilities would easily meet this standard.
Second, even if the harm threatened is addressed by a broadly agreed human rights norm,
is the risk nonetheless one deemed acceptable by reference to the scope of the right as codified?
Human rights law provides valuable guidance not only in defining “the basic minimum that
each individual has to have in order to live a human (rather than inhuman) existence,”123
but also by identifying those aspects of human behavior that can be legitimately restricted
where critical to a more general social purpose.124 Some human rights are expressly defined
to be subject to limitation that reduces their scope,125 while others may be subject to lawful
derogation which permits a state to “suspend some of their obligations under human rights
treaties if a state of emergency requires them to do so.”126 The international human rights
framework thus contains an inbuilt flexibility which acknowledges, first, that not all rights
are absolute as their scope may need to be limited, for example, as “necessary to protect
public safety, order, health or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others”;127
and second, that in limited and closely circumscribed situations, it may be necessary to
disregard or suspend certain rights in the context of an emergency.128
Drawing on these express limitations and authorized forms of flexibility, international
human rights law positions refugee decision-makers to take a non-absolutist yet principled
approach to the identification of serious harm. While neither the existence of inbuilt limitations nor the possibility of emergency derogation should rule out reference to a given human
right in considering whether a particular risk is of persecutory harm, these considerations
may – on the facts of a given case – show why a particular alleged harm is not, in fact,
122

123
124
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We note with concern that the Qualification Directive, supra n. 37, refers only to a regional human rights
standard. Battjes argues that the reference to non-derogable rights in the Qualification Directive “serves
to place beyond doubt that severe violations of those rights constitute persecution, but does not restrict
the scope of basic human rights”: Battjes, supra n. 86, at [289]– [291]. One obvious problem is that there
are fewer non-derogable rights in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, supra
n. 81, than the Civil and Political Covenant, supra n. 81. Hence, if Art. 9(1) of the Qualification Directive
is interpreted exhaustively, this could put state parties in violation of the Refugee Convention. In the
UK there is some suggestion that Art. 9(1) is read in an exhaustive manner: see OO (Sudan) (Eng. CA,
2009), at [20], citing SH (Palestinian Territories) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2009]
Imm AR 306 (Eng. CA, Oct. 22, 2009), at [43].
Gibney, supra n. 101.
As the UNHCR explains, “[w]here restrictions against the practices of a particular religious group
or member thereof are justified, judged by international standards, there would be no human rights
violation, and hence no persecution”: UNHCR, Art. 9(1) of the EU Qualification Directive, supra n. 116,
at [4.2.2].
“Limitations do not grant states the ability to abuse rights; they simply define the actual scope of rights”:
F. Megret, “Nature of Obligations,” in D. Moeckli, S. Shah, and S. Sivakumaran (eds.), International
Human Rights Law (2010), at 141.
By contrast to limitations which define the scope of a right, derogations permit states to “suspend some
of their obligations under human rights treaties if a state of emergency requires them to do so”: ibid.,
at 143. Information about derogations under the Civil and Political Covenant in respect of individual
countries can be found at Rule of Law in Armed Conflict Project, “International Treaties Adherence,”
available at www.adh-geneva.ch/RULAC/international treaties.php?id state=3 (accessed Jul. 13, 2013).
This formulation is drawn from the Civil and Political Covenant, supra n. 81, at Art. 18(3) but is also
found in several other rights in the Covenant.
Ibid., at Art. 4.
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rights-violative and thus not appropriately deemed serious harm for purposes of the “being
persecuted” analysis. Specifically, a claim of relevant serious harm will not be made out
where the facts show that the harm feared was justified on the terms of the relevant human
rights norm – either because it followed from a textually permissible limitation or because
the risk would exist only in the context of a national emergency that would justify suspension
of the right in question. Because these considerations are inherent parts of the international
human rights framework, decision-makers can and should take them into account as part
of the assessment of whether the facts of the individual case bespeak serious harm sufficient
to ground a finding that there is a risk of being persecuted.
Third, there will occasionally be cases in which – despite the fact that the risk alleged
implicates a broadly subscribed international human rights norm and considerations neither
of internal limitation nor of emergency derogation apply – it may nonetheless be clear upon
thoughtful and conscientious reflection that the threat is so far at the margins of a rights
violation as to amount to a de minimis harm. In such exceptional cases, the risk need not
be treated as serious harm for refugee law purposes. Refugee decision-makers should, of
course, carefully consider the authoritative interpretation of the right in question rendered
by international bodies, including the explication of minimum core obligations. There must
be a clear and convincing basis to find that the sustained or systemic risk of denial of a
broadly subscribed international human right is truly de minimis in the circumstances of
a particular case, recalling of course that a risk of being persecuted may be founded on an
agglomeration of harms that, taken individually, might not rise to the level of persecution.
Care must be taken to “analys[e] . . . the cumulative effects of the discriminatory incidents
and explain why these incidents, in the aggregate, [do] not amount to persecution.”129 In
other words, it is not sufficient simply to state that the harm is de minimis, there must be
“critical analysis”130 of why this is so. Such a conclusion will, of course, be a rare exception
since, as Justice Sedley pointed out in Svazas, “[t]o say that particular ill-treatment falls
toward the bottom end of the scale of what amounts to persecution is not . . . to say anything
that matters legally.”131
In sum, reliance on international human rights law to identify serious harm relevant to
finding an individual to be at risk of “being persecuted” is both principled and practical.
129

130
131

Bledy v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2011] FC 210 (Can. FC, Feb. 22, 2011), at
[31]. See also Mete v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] FC 840 (Can. FC, Jun. 17,
2005), stating that “it is an error of law for the RPD not to consider the cumulative nature of the conduct
directed against a claimant”: at [6] and [10]. Further in Hegedüs v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration), [2011] FC 1366 (Can. FC, Nov. 25, 2011) the court explained that “[t]his Court has
repeatedly stated that a failure to provide any real explanation as to why the cumulative actions do not
amount to persecution is a reviewable error”: at [2]. See also Bali v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), [2013] FC 414 (Can. FC, Apr. 23, 2013), at [10].
Hegedüs (Can. FC, 2011), at [2].
Svazas (Eng. CA, 2002), at [39]. See also Yesus v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, (1996) 45
ALD 277 (Aus. FC, Jul. 9, 1996), where Madgwick J. noted that while there are examples of conduct that
“are obviously at the high end of the range of conduct that can amount to persecution,” the “range is
broad”: at 288; hence it is an error to restrict the meaning of persecution to “its comparatively more
serious forms”: at 290. See also Applicant A (Aus. HC, 1997), at 258, per McHugh J.; Kanagasabai (Aus.
FC, 1999): “the type of harm which can constitute persecution cannot be trivial or insignificant harm
but rather must be harm of significance”: at [27], per Branson J.; and Duarte de Guinac (USCA, 9th Cir.,
1999): “The suffering inflicted on Guinac because of his indigenous heritage was not simply a ‘minor
disadvantage or trivial inconvenience’”: at 1162.
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As the steps set out above make clear, this approach does not result in a mechanistic
exercise devoid of thoughtful analysis on the part of the decision-maker; much less does
it posit a process of a priori, rigid classification of relevant harms. The real value of the
human rights framework is that it frames the inquiry on the basis of principles agreed to be
relevant by states; which are regularly contextualized and updated by legally authoritative
general comments132 and jurisprudence;133 and which mandate attention to the particular
circumstances of the specific individuals seeking protection. The human rights framework
for analysis of persecutory harms thus strikes the perfect balance between ensuring fidelity
to objective standards of universal authority and empowering decision-makers to do justice
to the applicants appearing before them.
Having set out the rationale for, and general parameters of, a human-rights-based
approach to understanding persecutory harms, we now consider the application of that
framework to the sorts of claims most commonly made by persons seeking recognition
of refugee status. Our analysis is organized into three thematic categories: risks to physical
security, threats to liberty and freedom, and infringements of autonomy and self-realization.
Our reliance on these three broad categories of rights rather than traditional hierarchical
categories (in particular, civil and political rights vs. economic, social, and cultural rights) is
in line with the now-established principle that all human rights are equal and indivisible.134
The flexibility of this framework moreover allows us to consider human rights risks in a
more fluid way, reflecting the fact that categories of rights are not hermetically sealed, but
are rather quite permeable in practice. Indeed, few refugee claims will implicate only a single
132

133

134

The treaty bodies issue general comments, which elucidate the meaning and application of the treaty
terms. Keller and Grover note that “General Comments are central to understanding human rights
treaty obligations and have been described as ‘indispensable’ sources of interpretation”: H. Keller and L.
Grover, “General Comments of the Human Rights Committee and Their Legitimacy,” in H. Keller and
G. Ulfstein (eds.), UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies: Law and Legitimacy (2012) 116, at 117–18. See also
P. Alston, “The Historical Origins of the Concept of ‘General Comments’ in Human Rights Law,” in L.
Boisson de Chazournes and V. Gowland Debbas (eds.), The International Legal System in Quest of Equity
and Universality: Liber Amicorum Georges Abi-Saab (2001), at 763–76.
Many of the key human rights treaties allow for individual complaints, and in the case of four of the
widely ratified treaties, there is an established body of jurisprudence (Civil and Political Covenant,
supra n. 81; Race Convention, supra n. 107; Women’s Convention, supra n. 108; Children’s Convention,
supra n. 109), while other complaints procedures have more recently entered into force: see G. Ulfstein,
“Individual Complaints,” in Keller and Ulfstein, supra n. 132, at 73. As Ulfstein notes, “[t]he number of
states that have accepted the individual complaints procedure is particularly impressive as regards the
ICCPR and CEDAW, respectively 113 and 100. But also a considerable number of states have accepted
the procedure under the CERD (54), CAT (64) and CRPD (60). In comparison, 66 states have accepted
the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and 114 states are parties to the
Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute)”: ibid., at 74.
Other than commentaries on specific treaties (see e.g. M. Nowak, UN Convention on Civil and Political
Rights: CCPR Commentary (2nd rev. edn., 2005) and S. Joseph, J. Schultz, and M. Castan, The ICCPR:
Cases, Materials and Commentary (2005)) most modern human rights textbooks organize discussion of
substantive guarantees thematically: see e.g. W. Kalin and J. Kunzli, The Law of International Human
Rights Protection (2009), at 271; O. De Schutter, International Human Rights Law (2010). Nickel and
Reidy argue that human rights can be organized into “seven families”: security rights; due process rights;
fundamental freedoms; rights of political participation; equality rights; social rights; and minority and
group rights: J. Nickel and D. Reidy, “Philosophy,” in Moeckli, Shah, and Sivakumaran, supra n. 125, 39,
at 40–41. This is distinct from the attempt by some philosophers to explain the moral or ethical basis
of human rights by reference to a typology of basic human needs: see e.g. J. Griffin, On Human Rights
(2008).
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human right, requiring the decision-maker always to take account of the cumulative human
rights impact of the various harms alleged in order to arrive at a synthesized assessment of
the “totality of the claim.”135

3.3 Physical security
The quintessential refugee claim involves risks to the applicant’s physical security – most
commonly encompassing risks to life; torture; cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment; to slavery, including in its contemporary forms; or to other forms of physical
violence. As courts have recognized, however, physical security may also be threatened
by critical risks to socio-economic rights, including in particular those that require the
protection of core health concerns. In the sections that follow, we examine the relevance to
the “being persecuted” inquiry of each of these risks to physical security.

5

10

3.3.1 Life
Perhaps the most straightforward example of serious harm sufficient to ground a risk of
being persecuted is the risk to life,136 sensibly described as the non-derogable “supreme
right,”137 which is “basic to all human rights.”138 As the Full Federal Court of Australia
explained, “[i]t goes without saying that . . . killing . . . involve[s] serious harm.”139
Yet the specific formulation of the right to life as codified at international law does not
protect “life” in an absolute and unqualified way. The Civil and Political Covenant rather
prohibits only the “arbitrary deprivation”140 of life and makes it clear, for example, that
countries that have not abolished the death penalty do not breach the right to life so long
as the death penalty is carried out “pursuant to a final judgment made by a competent
court,”141 imposed “only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law,”142 and
is not imposed on children or pregnant women.143 Imposition of the death penalty must
not be “contrary to the provisions of the . . . Covenant,”144 thus clearly proscribing its use
to breach a right protected by the Covenant (for example, to punish homosexual conduct
135
136
137
138

139

140
143

144

Minister of Citizenship and Immigration v. Patel, [2009] 2 FCR 196 (Can. FC, Jun. 17, 2008), at [43]–[46].
Civil and Political Covenant, supra n. 81, at Art. 6(1); Children’s Convention, supra n. 109, at Art. 6(1).
Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 6: The Right to Life (Apr. 30, 1982) (“HRC General
Comment No. 6”), at [1].
Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 14: Nuclear Weapons and the Right to Life (Nov. 9,
1984), at [1]. It is one of the few rights in the Civil and Political Covenant, supra n. 81, to be described
as “inherent” (see also references to “inherent dignity of the human person” at Art. 10 and Preamble).
Similarly, the right to life in the Children’s Convention, supra n. 109, is also described as “inherent”: at
Art. 6(1); the only other references to inherent rights are to dignity (in Art. 37(c) and the Preamble). See
Nowak, supra n. 134, at 17.
SZCWF (Aus. FFC, 2007), at 448–49 [34]. Similarly, the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
straightforwardly explained, “[p]ut simply, attempted murder is persecution”: Jimenez (USCA, 11th
Cir., 2007).
141
142
Civil and Political Covenant, supra n. 81, at Art. 6(1).
Ibid., at Art. 6(2).
Ibid.
Ibid., at Art. 6(5). See Nowak, supra n. 134, at 138–53. However, note that there may be an independent
non-refoulement obligation derived from the Civil and Political Covenant, supra n. 81, which prevents
a state which has abolished the death penalty from sending a person to a country where he or she is at
serious risk of the death penalty.
Civil and Political Covenant, supra n. 81, at Art. 6(5).
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or apostasy).145 The critical question, then, in a refugee status application is whether there
is the forward-looking prospect of an arbitrary deprivation of life, in which case the risk of
persecutory harm is established.
In the context of civilians fearing loss of life during an international or internal armed
conflict,146 the requirement of arbitrary deprivation of life will ordinarily be met.147 This is
because international humanitarian law148 requires the protection of civilians and expressly
145

146

147

148

This is an issue in a range of cases, particularly those involving claims by homosexual men and women,
because Iran, Mauritania, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Yemen, as well as some parts of Somalia and Nigeria
presently maintain the death penalty for homosexual conduct: see J. C. Hathaway and J. Pobjoy, “Queer
Cases Make Bad Law,” (2012) 44 N. Y. U. J. Intl. L. & Pol. 315. Another example is that apostasy is an
offense punishable by the death penalty in Iran: see e.g. Kazemzadeh (USCA, 11th Cir., 2009), at 1354.
There can however be challenging issues of nexus in such cases. In Z v. Minister for Immigration and
Multicultural Affairs, (1998) 90 FCR 51 (Aus. FC, Dec. 11, 1998), Katz J. cited with approval a passage
from the decision of the Full Federal Court in Minister for Immigration v. Respondent A, (1995) 57 FCR
309, in which it was said: “a country might have laws of general application which punish severely,
perhaps even with the death penalty, conduct which would not be criminal at all in Australia. The
enforcement of such laws would doubtless be persecution, but without more it would not be persecution
for one of the reasons stated in the Convention”: at 56. Although see e.g. the decision of the Australian
Full Federal Court in Aala (Aus. FC, 2002) in which the court overturned the decision below on the
basis that new evidence established that the applicant’s risk of execution for economic crimes would
follow from an Iranian law stipulating the death penalty for an economic offense committed “with
an anti-government intention”: at [58]. Hence the court found that “the appellant’s fear of execution
is founded on his political opinion”: at [58]. See also WAEZ of 2002 v. Minister for Immigration and
Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, [2002] FCAFC 341 (Aus. FC, Nov. 8, 2002).
The right to life cannot be suspended due to a “public emergency which threatens the life of the nation”
(Civil and Political Covenant, supra n. 81, at Art. 4) and hence applies during wartime. Legal Consequences
of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, [2004] ICJ Rep
136 (ICJ, Jul. 9, 2004), at 178 [106]: “More generally, the Court considers that the protection offered by
human rights conventions does not cease in case of armed conflict.” The court cited its earlier decision
in Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, [1996] ICJ Rep 226 (ICJ, Jul. 8,
1996), at 239 [24], where certain states had argued that “the Covenant was directed to the protection
of human rights in peacetime, but that questions relating to unlawful loss of life in hostilities were
governed by the law applicable in armed conflict.” The court rejected this argument, stating that “the
protection of the International Covenant o[n] Civil and Political Rights does not cease in times of
war, except by operation of Article 4 of the Covenant whereby certain provisions may be derogated
from in a time of national emergency. Respect for the right to life is not, however, such a provision. In
principle, the right not arbitrarily to be deprived of one’s life applies also in hostilities”: at 240 [25]. See
also C. Greenwood, “Scope of Application of Humanitarian Law,” in D. Fleck (ed.), The Handbook of
International Humanitarian Law (2nd edn., 2008), at 74. See also HRC General Comment No. 6, supra
n. 137, at [2], and HRC General Comment No. 31, supra n. 116, at [11].
Accordingly, it is well established that “persecution for the purposes of the Convention . . . [may
arise] . . . in the course of a civil war, [or] during general civil unrest”: Ibrahim (Aus. HC, 2000), at
[18], per Gaudron J. The relevant test is helpfully adumbrated in the “Michigan Guidelines on WellFounded Fear (No. 3, 2004),” (2005) 26 Mich. J. Intl. L. 491.
Storey, supra n. 18, argues that “[w]hen the subject area is armed conflict, the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) has held that IHL [international humanitarian law] is the ‘lex specialis’”: at 14. Yet, as
Durieux correctly explains in a direct rejoinder to Storey’s position, “when a decision-maker is faced
with a claim to protection under the Refugee Convention, the subject matter is not armed conflict, it is
persecution. Persecution, as defined in the Convention, may occur in times of peace as well as in times
of war; in situations of disturbances and tensions as well as in non-international or international armed
conflicts; during declared emergencies or through the duration of repressive dictatorships; in the public
as well as in the private sphere etc. I do not suggest that these circumstances – the context if I may call it
thus – are irrelevant or do not matter. They do matter, but they are not and cannot be the ‘starting point’
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prohibits “the civilian population as such and individual civilians” from being the “object
of attacks.”149 Indeed, even an attack on a specific military objective is prohibited where the
“attacker does not, or cannot, adequately distinguish combatants or military objects from
civilians or civilian objects,”150 or where the weapon employed is indiscriminate151 or is used
in an indiscriminate way.152 Given these powerful constraints on the lawful use of armed
force even in wartime, risk to a civilian’s life will usually infringe the prohibition of arbitrary
deprivation of life, thus amounting to serious harm for refugee law purposes.153
Critically, the risk of arbitrary deprivation of life need not stem directly from the actions
of a state official; it is sufficient if the state is unable or unwilling to protect against privately
inflicted risks to life, including for example female infanticide,154 the burning of widows,
dowry killings,155 and so-called “honor killings.”156 Nor does the arbitrary deprivation of
life have to occur in such a direct or brutal way. To the contrary, both the Human Rights
Committee157 and courts adjudicating refugee claims have long recognized that life can be

149

150

151
153

154

155

156

157

of a refugee status inquiry”: J.-F. Durieux, “Of War, Flows, Laws and Flaws: A Reply to Hugo Storey,”
(2012) 31(3) Ref. Survey Q. 161, at 164. In our view, international humanitarian law may inform the
meaning of “arbitrary deprivation of life”: Nuclear Weapons (ICJ, 1996), at 240 [25]. See Nowak, supra
n. 134, at 124 n. 30.
S. Oeter, “Methods and Means of Combat,” in Fleck, supra n. 146, at 239–40 [502]. The only exception
is that “[c]ivilians present in military objectives are not protected against attacks directed at those
objectives”: ibid., at 186 [445]. There is a considerable body of case law involving members of the
military, but this is usually on the basis of conscientious objection: see infra Ch. 3.5.2.
Even attacks which are directed at military objectives may be prohibited where they are considered
“indiscriminate”: see T. D. Gill and D. Fleck (eds.), The Handbook of the International Law of Military
Operations (2010), at 255 [16.04]. See also V. Holzer, “The 1951 Refugee Convention and the Protection
of People Fleeing Armed Conflict and Other Situations of Violence,” UNHCR Division of International
Protection (September 2012), at 22.
152
Gill and Fleck, supra n. 150, at 255–56.
Ibid.
As Holzer observes, in German jurisprudence “there is no tendency discernible of distinguishing between
the notion of persecution during conflict and violence on the one hand and persecution in times of
peace on the other”: supra n. 150, at 18 n. 102. See also Re H, (1996) 21 I & N Dec. 337 (USBIA, May
30, 1996) and Matter of Villalta, (1990) 20 I & N Dec. 142 (USBIA, Feb. 14, 1990), cited by Holzer. Even
Storey admits that “decision-makers have virtually never applied an approach treating [international
humanitarian law] as the lex specialis when assessing whether return to armed conflict situations would
give rise to persecution”: supra n. 18, at 19. Indeed, the only example cited, in which the Asylum
and Immigration Tribunal held that “[c]ivilians caught in the crossfire between armed groups will not
normally face anything other than the ordinary incidents of civil war”: AM and AM (Armed Conflict: Risk
Categories) Somalia CG, [2008] UKAIT 00091 (UKAIT, Oct. 29, 2008), at [76], exhibits far too broad an
exception as a far more nuanced and context-specific analysis is required.
See M. Nowak, Article 6: The Right to Life, Survival and Development (A Commentary on the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child) (2005), at 30–31, for a discussion of the problem of
infanticide on discriminatory (often gender-based) grounds.
These examples are provided by Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 28: Equality of
Rights between Men and Women, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10 (Mar. 29, 2000) (“HRC General
Comment No. 28”), at [10].
For successful refugee cases involving the threat of honor killings, see Re MN (NZ RSAA, 1996), at 14–16,
19–40 and Refugee Appeal No. 76044, [2008] NZAR 719 (NZ RSAA, Sept. 11, 2008), at [61]. See also
DZ v. Federal Asylum Authority, E3-239.432-0/2008 (Au. AGH [Austrian High Court for Asylum], Jan.
12, 2009); 35751 (Bel. CCE [Belgian Council for Alien Law Litigation], Dec. 11, 2009); and 36561 (Bel.
CCE, Dec. 23, 2009).
For example, see HRC General Comment No. 28, supra n. 155, at [10]; HRC General Comment No. 6,
supra n. 137, at [5]; Joseph, Schultz, and Castan, supra n. 134, at 184–87. In the case of the Children’s
Convention, supra n. 109, Art. 6(2) states that: “States Parties shall ensure to the maximum extent
possible the survival and development of the child.” See also Committee on the Rights of the Child,
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indirectly threatened by subjection to grave socio-economic conditions, at least where such
actions “deprive [the applicant] of basic means of existence.”158 As observed by the US Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
[t]he denial of an opportunity to earn a livelihood . . . is the equivalent of a sentence to
death by means of slow starvation and none the less final because it is gradual. The result
of both is the same.159

3.3.2 Torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment
5

10

The risk of “torture or . . . cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”160 is
another classic form of serious harm of clear relevance to the “being persecuted” inquiry.161
The prohibition of such actions admits of no limitation and is non-derogable. There can
also be no issue of de minimis breach, since an action can amount to a form of torture or
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment only if it is adjudged to attain a minimum level
of gravity. As such, the only task facing a decision-maker in a relevant case is to determine
whether the facts found bespeak the risk of a form of prohibited conduct.
The Human Rights Committee has not considered it necessary to draw up a list of
prohibited acts or to “establish sharp distinctions between the different kinds of punishment
or treatment”;162 rather, “the distinctions depend on the nature, purpose and severity of the
treatment applied.”163 In general terms, however, torture is

158

159
160
161

162

163

General Comment No. 3: HIV/AIDS and the Rights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/GC/2003/3 (Mar. 17,
2003) (“CRC, General Comment No. 3”), at [11].
2006/19/0341 v. Independent Federal Asylum Board (UBAS) (Au. VwGH [Austrian Administrative Court],
Nov. 8, 2007). In that case the Austrian Administrative Court held that “subjecting members of an ethnic
or social group to economic hardship, depriving them of basic means of existence, may justify a claim
to asylum” (unofficial translation). See also E v. Federal Ministry of the Interior, 95/01/0529 (Au. VwGH,
Apr. 30, 1997) (unofficial translation), and Refugee Appeal No. 74665/03 (NZ RSAA, 2004), at [89]:
that “the right to life . . . in conjunction with the right to adequate food . . . should permit a finding of
being persecuted where an individual faces a real risk of starvation.” D. Alland and C. Teitgen-Colly cite
the decision of E 44 (Bel. CPRR [Belgian Permanent Refugee Appeals Commission], Dec. 10, 1992),
where it was held that economic measures “in themselves insufficient to be qualified as persecution,
can be considered as such if they render the applicant’s subsistence very difficult or impossible”: Traité
du droit de l’asile (2002), at 376 (unofficial translation). Arakaki, supra n. 81, notes that the Japanese
commentary on the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act in Japan states that “deprivation
of all means for life constitutes persecution”: at 168. In Australia, the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) now
explicitly recognizes the relevance of socio-economic harm in this context, providing that “serious harm”
specifically includes “significant economic hardship that threatens the person’s capacity to subsist”: s.
91R(2)(d), “denial of access to basic services, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist”:
s. 91R(2)(e), and “denial of capacity to earn a livelihood of any kind, where the denial threatens the
person’s capacity to subsist”: s. 91R(2)(f). See also Refugee Appeal No. 74665/03 (NZ RSAA, 2004), at
[89]: that “the right to life . . . in conjunction with the right to adequate food . . . should permit a finding
of being persecuted where an individual faces a real risk of starvation.”
Dunat v. Hurney, (1961) 297 F.2d 744 (USCA, 3rd Cir., May 29, 1961) as cited in Grahl-Madsen, supra
n. 2, at 88–89.
Civil and Political Covenant, supra n. 81, at Art. 7.
See also Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature Dec. 10 1984, entered into force Jun. 26, 1987, 1465 UNTS 85 (“Torture
Convention”).
Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 20: Replaces General Comment 7 Concerning Prohibition of Torture and Cruel Treatment or Punishment (Oct. 3, 1992) (“HRC General Comment No.
20”), at [4].
Ibid., at [4].
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any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally
inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or
is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or
for any reason based on discrimination of any kind.164

Where the imposition of severe suffering lacks one of the elements of torture it is properly
classified as “inhuman and/or cruel treatment,”165 whereas for degrading treatment, the
“severity of the suffering imposed is of less importance . . . than the humiliation of the
victim, regardless of whether this is in the eyes of others or those of the victim himself or
herself.”166 It has thus been recognized that a woman’s prior subjection to harm in the form
of rape or trafficking may, due to strong cultural tradition, result in ostracism and exclusion
rising to a risk of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. For example, in a case concerning
a woman who had been raped by Serbian forces, Baroness Hale noted that a refugee claim
might be made out despite the absence of a future risk of rape on the grounds that

5

[t]o suffer the insult and indignity of being regarded by one’s community . . . as “dirty like
contaminated” because one has suffered the gross ill-treatment of a particularly brutal
and dehumanizing rape . . . is the very sort of cumulative denial of human dignity which
to my mind is capable of amounting to persecution.167

Given the need to find overarching severe suffering or humiliation where the risk of
torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment is alleged, decisionmakers will often need to engage in a cumulative assessment of a range of measures or
treatment in disregard of human dignity. For example, Australian decisions have recognized
as persecutory the cumulative experiences of the victims of persistent indignities, such as
the plight of the Sabean Mandean religious minority in Iran:
If people are, from an early age, considered by the great majority of the people in the
society in which they live to be “dirty”, are positively treated as if they are dirty, and if
there is otherwise widespread and far reaching discrimination against them, it requires no
degree in psychology to accept that this may well be very harmful to mental well-being.168

A risk of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment can arise not only from direct forms of
physical harm, but also from severe deprivations of socio-economic rights. For example, the
Human Rights Committee has found states in violation of the prohibition on degrading
164

165
167

168

Torture Convention, supra n. 161, at Art. 1. Importantly, this is qualified in the Torture Convention by the
requirement that such act be carried out “by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence
of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity”: ibid. On the other hand, since there is
no such textual restriction in the Civil and Political Covenant, supra n. 81, a risk of “torture, or cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment” may be established, even when the relevant act will
be inflicted by persons acting “in a private capacity.” HRC General Comment No. 20, supra n. 162, at
[2]; Nowak, supra n. 134, at 161–62.
166
Nowak, supra n. 134, at 163.
Ibid., at 165.
R (Hoxha) v. Special Adjudicator, [2005] 1 WLR 1063 (UKHL, Mar. 10, 2005), at 1074 [36]. The US
guidelines concur with this approach, noting that: “In some countries a woman may experience severe
discrimination and social ostracization because she was raped. The ostracism is further harm after the
rape, and may itself be sufficiently serious to constitute persecution”: US Department of Homeland
Security, Training Guidelines on Gender, supra n. 80, at 19.
SCAT v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, (2003) 76 ALD 625 (Aus FFC,
Apr. 30, 2003), at 635 [21], per Madgwick and Conti JJ.
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treatment where they have subjected prisoners and detainees to deprivation of socioeconomic rights,169 including conditions that produce long-term mental health problems.170
Under the European regional cognate, inhuman and degrading treatment has been found
to exist when a victim was deprived “of means of shelter and support”171 when his
home was destroyed in the course of a security operation, as well as where an applicant “who was wholly dependent on State support, found herself faced with official
indifference in a situation of serious deprivation or want incompatible with human
dignity.”172
In the context of refugee law’s inquiry into the existence of serious harm, the prohibition
of torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment has proved especially important in
assessing claims based on the risk of rape or other sexual assault, female genital mutilation,
forcible abortion and sterilization, and the infliction of mental suffering and other forms
of extreme psychological harm.173 We turn now to examine how analysis by reference to
international human rights law can assist assessment of whether relevant serious harm is
established in such cases.
Sexual assault, including both rape and a broader range of sexually violent acts, is recognized as persecutory harm across a wide range of state parties to the Refugee Convention.174
As the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit observed, “[t]he scarring effects of rape
compare with ‘psychological sequelae of . . . survivors of abuse constituting torture under
international law.’”175 There is never any justification or excuse for sexual assault, including when committed within the family such as by a husband.176 As noted by the US
169

170
171
172
173

174

175
176

M. Foster, “Non-Refoulement on the Basis of Socio-Economic Deprivation: The Scope of Complementary
Protection in International Human Rights Law,” (2009) 2 NZ L. Rev. 257, at 286. See also Civil and
Political Covenant, supra n. 81, at Art. 10.
C v. Australia, UN Doc. CCPR/C/76/D/900/1999 (HRC, Nov. 13, 2002).
Dulas v. Turkey, Application No. 25801/94 (ECtHR, Jan. 30, 2001), cited in Foster, supra n. 169, at 302.
MSS v. Belgium and Greece, (2011) 53 EHRR 28 (ECtHR, Jan. 21, 2011), at [253], citing Budina v. Russia,
Application No. 45603/05 (ECtHR, Jun. 18, 2009).
Indeed, acts of “rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or
any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity” are defined as crimes against humanity in the
Rome Statute: see Rome Statute, supra n. 64, at Art. 7(1). This serves to emphasize the severity of such
human rights violations.
See e.g. In re D-V-, Interim Decision 3252 (USBIA, May 25, 1993); Shoafera v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, (2000) 228 F.3d 1070 (USCA, 9th Cir., Sept. 7, 2000); Angoucheva v. Immigration
and Naturalization Service, (1997) 106 F.3d 781 (USCA, 7th Cir., Feb. 11, 1997); Adjibi v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 219 FTR 54 (Can. FC, May 8, 2002), at [8]; Abebe v.
Commonwealth of Australia, (1999) 197 CLR 510 (Aus HC, Apr. 14, 1999), at 608 [296]; Chan (Aus.
HC, 1989). See also Australian Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, “Guidelines on
Gender Issues for Decision Makers” (Jul. 1996), at [4.6] (“Department of Immigration, 1996”) and
Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, “Gender-Related Persecution (Article 1A(2)):
An Australian Perspective,” in Interpreting the Refugees Convention – An Australian Contribution (Sept.
2002), at 93; Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, “Interpretation of the Convention Definition
in the Case Law” (Dec. 2005); UNHCR, “Note on Refugee Women and International Protection,” UN
Doc. EC/SCP/59 (Aug. 28, 1990), at [15]; UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusion No. 73 (XLIV),
“Refugee Protection and Sexual Violence” (Oct. 8, 1993).
Zubeda v. Attorney General, (2003) 333 F.3d 463 (USCA, 3rd Cir., Jun. 23, 2003), at 472.
For example, the US Immigration and Naturalization Service, in explaining that a state may be complicit
in or fail to protect against sexual violence, has noted that, “in some countries, there is no legal recognition
that sexual assault is a crime, if committed by a husband against his wife”: US Department of Homeland
Security, Training Guidelines on Gender, supra n. 80, at 13.
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government, “[r]ape is . . . based on a desire to degrade, control and/or terrorize a victim or her community.”177 While women are the primary victims of sexual assault, the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has sensibly observed that “[t]here is no reason
to believe that the trauma for male victims of rape is any less severe than for female
victims.”178
Another relevant form of torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment is female
genital mutilation (FGM).179 Although there are different types of FGM, almost all forms
involve the infliction of severe harm and thus clearly violate, in addition to the right not
to be tortured, a range of other human rights obligations, including the right to security of
the person, to the highest attainable standard of health,180 and in extreme cases, the right to
life.181 FGM thus constitutes persecution regardless of the “particular method of conducting
it,”182 due to “the serious mental and physical harm it inflicts on the women who endure
it.”183

177

178

179

180

181
182
183

US Department of Homeland Security, Training Guidelines on Gender, supra n. 80, at 9. See also the
excellent explanation of how this issue needs to be explored by decision-makers: at 10–11. For an
explanation as to how rape has been used as a political tool in Zimbabwe in recent years, see N. Valji,
L. De La Hunt, and H. Moffett, “Protecting the Invisible: the Status of Women Refugees in Southern
Africa,” in J. Handmaker, L. De La Hunt, and J. Klaaren (eds.), Advancing Refugee Protection in South
Africa (2008), at 221–22.
Hernandez-Montiel v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, (2000) 225 F.3d 1084 (USCA, 9th Cir.,
Aug. 24, 2000), at 1098. See also Boer-Sedano v. Gonzales, (2005) 418 F.3d 1082 (USCA, 9th Cir., Aug.
12, 2005).
The UNHCR defines FGM as “all procedures involving partial or total removal of the external female
genitalia, or other injury to the female genital organs, carried out for traditional, cultural or religious
reasons”: UNHCR, “Guidance Note on Refugee Claims Relating to Female Genital Mutilation” (May
2009), at [2]. The UN Special Rapporteur on Torture has classified it as torture: M. Nowak, Report of
the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
UN Doc. A/HRC/7/3 (Jan. 15, 2008), at [51]. See Committee Against Torture, General Comment No. 2:
Implementation of Article 2 by States Parties, UN Doc. CAT/C/GC/2 (Jan. 24, 2008), at [18]. The Human
Rights Committee also discusses FGM in the context of torture in HRC General Comment No. 28, supra
n. 155, at [11]. The European Court of Human Rights has also found FGM to constitute inhuman and
degrading treatment: see Collins and Akaziebie v. Sweden, Application No. 23944/05 (ECtHR, Mar. 8,
2007).
Economic, Social and Cultural Covenant, supra n. 104, at Art. 12. See also Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General Recommendation No. 14, UN Doc. A/45/38 (1990),
identifying FGM as “prejudicial to the health and well-being of women and children.” The Children’s
Convention, supra n. 109, at Art. 24(3) requires state parties “to take all effective and appropriate measures with a view to abolishing traditional practices prejudicial to the health of children.” See discussion
in Nowak, supra n. 134, at 33–34.
UNHCR, “Guidance Note on Refugee Claims Relating to Female Genital Mutilation,” supra n. 179, at
[7].
Kourouma v. Holder, (2009) 588 F.3d 234 (USCA, 4th Cir., Nov. 24, 2009), at 244.
Ibid., at 244. See also Benyamin v. Holder, (2009) 579 F.3d 970 (USCA, 9th Cir., Aug. 24, 2009), at 976,
citing Mohammed v. Gonzales, (2005) 400 F.3d 785 (USCA, 9th Cir., Mar. 10, 2005), at 795, where it
had held that even “Type I – the least severe classified form” is undoubtedly persecution. It should also
be noted that the same applies regardless of whether FGM has been “medicalized.” As the UNHCR
explains, where it is conducted by health professionals rather than traditional practitioners, “some of
the immediate consequences may be mitigated in certain circumstances,” but this “does not necessarily
make it less severe” because “there is no evidence that the obstetric or other long-term complications
associated with the practice are avoided or significantly reduced”: UNHCR, “Guidance Note on Refugee
Claims Relating to Female Genital Mutilation,” supra n. 179, at [5].
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It is therefore unsurprising that FGM has routinely been treated as a form of torture
or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment amounting to serious harm for refugee law
purposes.184 As early as 1991 the French Commission des recours des refugiés recognized
that FGM is “unquestionably a violation of international human rights law” and hence
persecutory.185 Similarly, the US Courts of Appeals for the Second and Sixth Circuits have
found that FGM amounts to serious harm, relying on the fact that “the practice of FGM has
been internationally recognized as a violation of women’s and female children’s rights.”186
And the House of Lords, in finding that FGM constitutes serious harm in refugee law,
observed that FGM “has been condemned as cruel, discriminatory and degrading by a
long series of international instruments, declarations, resolutions, pronouncements and
recommendations,”187 and that it “will almost inevitably amount either to torture or to
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.”188
Importantly, the fact that a woman has already undergone FGM may not negate a
fear of future harm, both because FGM “is capable of repetition”189 and because prior

184

185

186

187
188

189

For Canadian decisions which have recognized refugee claims based on a risk of FGM, see Immigration
Review Board, “Guideline 2: Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution: Update,”
Compendium of Decisions (Feb. 2003), at 31–35. In Australia, see e.g. SVFB v. Minister for Immigration
and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, [2004] FCA 822 (Aus. FC, Jun. 25, 2004), at [7]. In Spain, see
STS 5931/2006 (Sp. TS [Spanish Supreme Court], Oct. 6, 2006). In Belgium, see decision of the Belgian
Council for Alien Law Litigation in 979 (Bel. CCE [Belgian Council for Alien Law Litigation], Jul.
25, 2007), also referring to several cases by the Belgian Permanent Refugee Appeals Commission which
recognized that FGM could constitute persecution in the sense of Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention
(01-0089/F1374 (Bel. CPRR [Belgian Permanent Refugee Appeals Commission], Mar. 22, 2002); 010668/F1356 (Bel. CPRR, Mar. 8, 2002); and 02-0579/F2562 (Bel. CPRR, Feb. 9, 2007)). In Austria, see
2007/01/0284 v. Independent Federal Asylum Board (UBAS) (Au. VwGH [Austrian Administrative Court],
Sept. 23, 2009); and U431/08 v. High Court for Asylum (Au. VfGH [Austrian Constitutional Court], Nov.
30, 2009). In Germany, see e.g. 2 K 562/07 (Ger. VG Aachen [German Administrative Court, Aachen],
May 10, 2010); 3 UE 3457/04.A (Ger. VGH Hesse [German Higher Administrative Court, Hesse], Mar.
23, 2005; A 10 K 13121/03 (Ger. VG Stuttgart [German Administrative Court, Stuttgart], Jun. 10, 2005).
Mlle Diop Aminata, 164078 (Fr. CRR [French Refugee Appeals Commission], Sept. 18, 1991), available
at Refworld; reprinted in “Cases and Comments,” (1992) 4 Intl. J. Ref. L., at 92–94. More recent cases
recognizing FGM include Mlle B, 628346 (Fr. CNDA [French National Court of Asylum], May 7, 2009);
Mlle N, 574495 (Fr. CNDA, Apr. 23, 2008); Mlle D, 535997 (Fr. CRR, Nov. 2, 2007); Mlle HS, 492440 (Fr.
CRR, Jun. 16, 2005).
Abankwah v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, (1999) 185 F.3d 18 (USCA, 2nd Cir., Jul. 9, 1999),
at 23; Abay v. Ashcroft, (2004) 368 F.3d 634 (USCA, 6th Cir., May 19, 2004), at 639, citing a wide range
of international sources. For other US cases holding that FGM constitutes persecution, see Re Kasinga,
(1996) 21 I & N Dec. 357 (USBIA, Jun. 13, 1996); Haoua v. Gonzales, (2007) 472 F.3d 227 (USCA, 4th Cir.,
Jan. 5, 2007); Barry v. Gonzales, (2006) 445 F.3d 741 (USCA, 4th Cir., Apr. 19, 2006), at 745; Mohammed
v. Gonzales, (2005) 400 F.3d 785 (USCA, 9th Cir., Mar. 10, 2005), at 795; Abebe v. Gonzales, (2005) 432
F.3d 1037 (USCA, 9th Cir., Dec. 30, 2005): “It is well-settled that FGM constitutes persecution sufficient
to warrant a grant of asylum”: at 1042; Niang v. Gonzales, (2005) 422 F.3d 1187 (USCA, 10th Cir., Sept.
8, 2005).
Fornah (UKHL, 2006), at 428 [8], per Lord Bingham.
Ibid., at 454 [70], per Lord Rodger, and at [94], per Baroness Hale. In Fornah, the House of Lords also
emphasized that refugee claims “based on fear of FGM have been recognized or upheld in courts all
around the world,” citing decisions in England and Wales, the US, Australia, Austria, and Canada: at
438–39 [26] per Lord Bingham.
See Matter of A-T, (2009) 25 I & N Dec. 4 (USBIA, Jun. 4, 2009), noting the Attorney General’s basis for
vacating an earlier decision in this matter. See also Diallo Lugo v. Mukasey, (2008) 529 F.3d 99 (USCA,
2nd Cir., Jun. 11, 2008), at 114.
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subjection to FGM may in some cases expose an individual to a distinct form of persecutory
harm.190 Further, neither the fact that a young girl may believe FGM to be an important
rite of passage,191 nor the fact that those who carry out FGM may do so simply in the belief
that it is a means of initiating a girl into her culture in any way detracts from its purpose
in serving and preserving the inferior position of women in the society,192 and hence its
categorization as serious harm. As courts have correctly observed, there is a breach of international human rights law even in such circumstances given the duty of states to take “all
appropriate measures” to end cultural practices grounded in stereotyped roles for women
or the notion of their inferiority.193
A third contemporary concern of relevance is forcible abortion,194 as well as the sterilization of women and men without consent.195 Such practices frequently amount to violations

190
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192

193

194

195

See UNHCR, “Guidance Note on Refugee Claims Relating to Female Genital Mutilation,” supra n. 179,
at [14]–[15].
In the UNHCR Guidance Note it is explained that some girls may even be “looking forward” to going
through the procedure “as this is often a moment when they receive attention and gifts as the centre of an
important ritual”: UNHCR, “Guidance Note on Refugee Claims Relating to Female Genital Mutilation,”
supra n. 179, at [10]. However, the UNHCR explains that this is irrelevant because FGM is undoubtedly
objectively a form of persecution. Hence, it is irrelevant whether the past or future FGM is “forced”:
see Bah v. Attorney General, (2006) 462 F.3d 637 (USCA, 6th Cir., Sept. 8, 2006): “the IJ [immigration
judge] made a legal error in assuming that Bah had to prove that she forcibly resisted FGM at the time
the procedure was performed”: at 643, per Gibbons J. (concurring).
Fornah (UKHL, 2006), at 461 [93], per Baroness Hale, finding that women who have not been subjected
to FGM may face social exclusion and be denied the possibility of marriage and family life. “Women
themselves are brought up to believe this as strongly as men. Sometimes and not surprisingly, women
themselves perform the operation as part of an elaborate initiation ceremony”: at [93].
Women’s Convention, supra n. 108, at Art. 5. As recognized by the House of Lords, FGM is a practice
that is uniquely experienced by women and is difficult to compare to male circumcision (the removal
of a boy’s foreskin), since FGM is “a manifestation of deep-rooted gender inequality that assigns them
an inferior position in society and has profound physical and social consequences” (Fornah (UKHL,
2006), at 461 [93], citing UNICEF, “Innocenti Digest – Changing a Harmful Social Convention: Female
Genital Mutilation/Cutting” (2005)), whereas this is not the case for men. Indeed, the World Health
Organization notes that male circumcision is associated with a variety of important health benefits and is
usually quick and painless (World Health Organization, “Information Sheet on Male Circumcision and
HIV Prevention” (Dec. 2006)). It is possible, however, that where there is a risk that male circumcision will
be carried out against a man’s will and “undertaken in unhygienic conditions by inexperienced providers
with inadequate instruments, or with poor after-care,” which can result in “very serious complications,
including death”: World Health Organization, “Information Package on Male Circumcision and HIV
Prevention” (Dec. 2007), that a claim may be made out on this basis.
In Lidan Ding v. Ashcroft, (2004) 387 F.3d 1131 (USCA, 9th Cir., Nov. 8, 2004) the immigration judge had
rejected the applicant’s claim in regard to her past forced abortion on the basis that as “she had not been
physically restrained during the procedure,” the abortion was “voluntary”: at 1136. The Court of Appeals
overturned the Board of Immigration Appeal’s affirmation of the immigration judge’s decision on the
basis that “‘forced’ is a much broader concept, which includes compelling, obliging, or constraining by
mental, moral, or circumstantial means, in addition to physical restraint”: at 1140. This decision was
interpreting a domestic statute that makes persons “forced to abort a pregnancy” statutorily eligible for
asylum: 8 USC § 1101(a)(42). For background to this provision, see S. Legomsky and C. Rodriguez,
Immigration and Refugee Law and Policy (5th edn., 2009), at 913–15. But see Xia v. Mukasey, (2007) 510
F.3d 162 (USCA, 2nd Cir., Dec. 7, 2007).
For a case where past persecution was established on the part of the male claimant in relation to an
“attempted sterilization,” see Jie Hin Shu v. Mukasey, (2008) 282 Fed. Appx. 879 (USCA, 2nd Cir., Jun.
27, 2008).
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of the right not to be tortured or subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment,196 as well
as implicating other rights such as to security of the person197 and to autonomy over one’s
own body inherent in the right to privacy.198 Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Canada
determined in Chan that
whatever technique is employed, it is utterly beyond dispute that forced sterilization
is in essence an inhuman and degrading treatment involving bodily mutilation, and
constitutes the very type of fundamental violation of basic human rights that is the
concern of refugee law.199
5

10

Related actions – for example, the involuntary insertion and continued usage of an IUD,200
or subjection to an invasive forced pregnancy examination201 – may also amount to inhuman
or degrading treatment,202 and hence to relevant serious harm.203
Decision-makers have, however, sometimes been distracted by the fact that measures such
as sterilization and forced abortion may be imposed not with any form of particularized
animus, but rather pursuant to “a law of general application” that has a neutral and arguably
justifiable goal – most commonly, population control.204 There is, however, no acceptable
196

197

198
199

200

201
202

203
204

Civil and Political Covenant, supra n. 81, at Art. 7. The Human Rights Committee cites forced abortion as another measure which violates Art. 7: see HRC General Comment No. 28, supra n. 155,
at [11].
Chan (Can. SC, 1995): “the sanction of forced sterilization against the appellant in the present case
would constitute a gross infringement of the security of the person and readily qualify as the type of
fundamental violation of basic human rights that constitutes persecution”: at [72], per La Forest J. (in
dissent).
HRC General Comment No. 28, supra n. 155, at [20].
Chan (Can. SC, 1995), at [73], per La Forest J. (in dissent, though the judges in the majority also assumed
that forced sterilization was persecution); Chan v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration),
[1993] 3 FC 675 (Can. FCA, Jul. 21, 1993), at 686, per Heald J.; Cheung v. Canada (Minister of Employment
and Immigration), [1993] 2 FC 314 (Can. FCA, Apr. 1, 1993), at 324. See also Applicant A (Aus. HC,
1997), where Dawson J. explained that “[t]he appellants claim, and the respondents do not dispute, that
forcible sterilization is persecution and that they have a well founded fear of being forcibly sterilized if
returned to China”: at 239. See also VTAO v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous
Affairs, (2004) 81 ALD 332 (Aus. FC, Jul. 17, 2004), at 348 [45], per Merkel J., citing Cheung (Can. FCA,
Apr. 1, 1993).
See Lin v. Mukasey, (2008) 517 F.3d 685 (USCA, 4th Cir., Feb. 20, 2008), at 693; Cheng v. Attorney
General, (2010) 623 F.3d 175 (USCA, 3rd Cir., Oct. 6, 2010), at 193; Mei Fun Wong (USCA, 2nd Cir.,
2011), at 77. But see Matter of MFW and LG, (2008) 24 I & N Dec. 633 (USBIA, Oct. 6, 2008), in
which the USBIA decided that “the insertion of an IUD does not rise to the level of harm necessary to
constitute ‘persecution’, absent some aggravating circumstances”: at 642, but this was based in part on
the particular statutory regime in US law: see at 641. See also Bi Hua Weng v. Mukasey, (2007) 257 Fed.
Appx. 983 (USCA, 6th Cir., Dec. 19, 2007), at 988.
Xu Ming Li (USCA, 9th Cir., 2002).
Mei Fun Wong (USCA, 2nd Cir., 2011), noting that “[a]ny involuntary IUD insertion, even one conducted
according to the same medical procedures as a voluntary IUD insertion, involves a serious violation of
personal privacy and deprives a woman of autonomy in making decisions about whether to bear a child”:
at 72. See Chan (Can. SC, 1995); Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, supra n. 174, and SZNCK
v. Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, (2009) 109 ALD 551 (Aus. FMC, May 28, 2009).
As the Second Circuit noted in Mei Fun Wong (USCA, 2nd Cir., 2011), “an act that may be voluntarily
undertaken can become persecutive where consent is absent”: at 76.
In Cheung the Board had rejected the claim initially on the basis that there was no “persecutory intent
on the part of the Chinese government, simply a desperate desire to come to terms with the situation
that poses a major threat to its modernization plans. It is not a policy borne out of caprice, but out of
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justification under international human rights law for any action that amounts to torture
or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment and hence no question of
weighing up the relative merits of government objectives and an individual’s basic rights.205
Canadian jurisprudence has thus rightly insisted that “[c]loaking persecution with a veneer
of legality does not render it less persecutory.”206 This does not mean that a state may
not pursue important goals, such as population control.207 But as explained by Justice
Barnes,

5

[t]hat the state is able to legislate in the area of family planning and population control
is not the issue. It is the means by which the state’s objectives are achieved that must be
critically examined.208

A fourth context in which the right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment has proven especially relevant is where the refugee claim is based on the risk
of “acts that cause mental suffering to the victim.”209 As the prohibition on inhuman and
degrading treatment protects “both the dignity and the physical and mental integrity of the
individual,”210 it is appropriate to recognize as serious harm action that is likely to cause
serious psychological harm to the applicant.211 The risk will be most acute, of course, where

205

206

207

208
209
211

economic logic”: extracted in Cheung (Can. FCA, 1993), at 319. But this was overturned by the Federal
Court of Appeal. See also Jin Xia Zheng v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2009] FC
327 (Can. FC, Mar. 30, 2009), at [13], where the court was reciting the findings of the Board below. See
also the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal, overturned on appeal in SZNCK (Aus. FMC, 2009).
In particular, it is not clear whether it is possible to establish a right to reproduce per se: see e.g. Re ZWD,
Refugee Appeal No. 3/91 (NZ RSAA, Oct. 20, 1992), at 37–46; Applicant A (Aus. HC, 1997), at 244. In
Australia, the courts consider “that whether the application of a law constituted persecution ultimately
depended upon whether the treatment afforded on the basis of the law is appropriate and adapted to
achieving some legitimate object of the country concerned”: SZNCK (Aus. FMC, 2009), at [23], citing
“settled law” from the High Court (Applicant S v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs,
(2004) 217 CLR 387 (Aus. HC, May 27, 2004)). For a critique of this approach, see text infra, at nn.
366–69.
Cheung (Can. FCA, 1993), at 323. Accordingly, courts have correctly concluded that “[t]he practice of
forcing women to undergo sterilization is such an extreme violation of their basic human rights as to be
persecutory, even though this was thought to advance the modernization of China”: Cheung at 325. See
also Re ZWD (NZ RSAA, 1992): “[C]ompulsory abortion and compulsory sterilization may in certain
circumstances constitute torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and be properly
stigmatized as persecution”: at 57. The difficulty in such cases however is linking serious harm to a
Convention ground: see e.g. in Applicant A (Aus. HC, 1997); Re ZWD (NZ RSAA, 1992), in which lack
of nexus was the basis for the failure of the claim.
Even in a public emergency, a state can only derogate from obligations “to the extent strictly required
by the exigencies of the situation”: Civil and Political Covenant, supra n. 81, at Art. 4(1); HRC General
Comment No. 29, supra n. 115, at [2]. The adoption of extreme measures such as forced sterilization
or abortion could not be considered “strictly required” when other far less intrusive measures are also
available, such as economic incentives. As Linden J.A. explained in Cheung (Can. FCA, 1993): “[t]he
forced sterilization of a woman is a serious and totally unacceptable violation of her security of the
person”: at 323.
Jin Xia Zheng (Can. FC, Mar. 30, 2009), at [13].
210
HRC General Comment No. 20, supra n. 162, at [5].
Ibid., at [2].
Switzerland’s Asylum Act SR 142.31 (Loi sur l’asile (Sw.), RS 142.31) defines a refugee (in Article 3) to
include a person “subject to serious disadvantages” where such disadvantages include “measures that
exert intolerable psychological pressure”: at Art. 3(1) and (2). The Qualification Directive, supra n. 37,
states that “[a]cts of persecution” can include “acts of physical or mental violence, including acts of sexual
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the applicant is particularly vulnerable as in the case of children, recognized by the UNHCR
to be “more likely to be distressed by hostile situations, to believe improbable threats, or to
be emotionally affected by unfamiliar circumstances.”212
Exposure to extreme psychological harm has also been asserted as persecution in the
context of cases where the applicant would be exposed to the infliction of physical harm on
a loved one.213 This “persecution by proxy”214 has been recognized, for example, where a
parent will be forced to witness a severe form of physical harm inflicted on a child, including
subjection of a daughter to FGM. In Abay and Amare, for example, the US Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit held that refugee status was warranted
in cases where a parent and protector is faced with exposing her child to the clear risk of
being subjected against her will to a practice that is a form of physical torture causing grave
and permanent harm . . . [A] rational factfinder would be compelled to find that Abay’s
fear of taking her daughter into the lion’s den of female genital mutilation in Ethiopia
and being forced to witness the pain and suffering of her daughter is well-founded.215

10

Much the same approach has also been adopted in the cases of children forced to endure the
visiting of physical harm upon a parent,216 and to a husband who would be exposed to the
infliction of physical harm on his wife.217

212
213

214
215

216

217

violence”: at Art. 9(2)(a). In Stanojkova (USCA, 7th Cir., 2011) the court recognized that psychological
harm alone can constitute persecution: see at 948.
UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection No. 8, supra n. 94, at [16].
As explained by Posner J., “This is to be distinguished from cases in which the persecution of your
relative is evidence that the persecutor is gunning for you as well”: Gatimi v. Holder, (2009) 578 F.3d 611
(USCA, 7th Cir., Aug. 20, 2009), at 16.
Ni v. Holder, (2011) 635 F.3d 1014 (USCA, 7th Cir., Mar. 25, 2011), at 1017. In SCAT (Aus. FFC, 2003),
the court noted that “[t]o harm a child may also be to harm its custodial parents”: at 635 [23].
Abay (USCA, 6th Cir., 2004), at 642–43. This principle was affirmed (although factually distinguished) in
Lo v. Holder, (2012) 698 F.3d 866 (USCA, 6th Cir., Nov. 8, 2012), at 874. See also UNHCR, “Guidance Note
on Refugee Claims Relating to Female Genital Mutilation,” supra n. 179. For more recent affirmation of
the possibility of such claims in this context, see also Benyamin (USCA, 9th Cir., 2009); Kone v. Holder,
(2010) 596 F.3d 141 (USCA, 2nd Cir., Feb. 25, 2010), at 33; Abebe (USCA, 9th Cir., 2005), at 17. But
see Kane v. Holder, (2009) 581 F.3d 231 (USCA, 5th Cir., Aug. 26, 2009), at 17 and 24. For a fascinating
Canadian decision finding that a mother could found her claim based on the risk to her daughter of FGM
(on basis of psychological trauma for the mother) as well as the fact that her children would be forcibly
removed because of discriminatory custody laws, see CRDD T93-12198 (Can. IRB, Jul. 13, 1994).
See e.g. Camara v. Attorney General, (2009) 580 F.3d 196 (USCA, 3rd Cir., Sept. 4, 2009), where a
daughter’s witnessing of the abduction of her father amounted to past persecution because it caused
her “actual suffering and harm including forcing her to flee her home”: at 204–5. See also UNHCR,
Guidelines on International Protection No. 8, supra n. 94, at [17]. The Committee on the Rights of the
Child has similarly recognized that “[p]ersecution of kin” may amount to persecution in refugee law in
the context of children: see CRC General Comment No. 6, supra n. 111, at [74].
In Gatimi (USCA, 7th Cir., 2009), the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that: “Genital
mutilation of one’s wife, unless one happens to be a supporter of the practice, is a way to punish one, and
so the menace to Mrs Gatimi is a legitimate component of Mr Gatimi’s case. To send her back to Kenya
to face female genital mutilation would be to enable persecution of him”: at 16. In Katrinak v. Secretary
of State for the Home Department, [2001] EWCA Civ 832 (Eng. CA, May 10, 2001), the English Court of
Appeal noted that “a man may be persecuted by what is done or threatened to his wife” (at [22]) and
“it is possible to persecute a husband or a member of a family by what you do to other members of his
immediate family” (at [23]).
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Extreme psychological harm amounting to torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment may also arise from threats of violence or murder. As explained
by the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, “[t]o live, day after day, knowing that
government forces might secretly arrest you is itself a form of mental anguish that can
constitute persecution.”218
In sum, the prohibition of torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment is a critical
benchmark for a range of contemporary forms of serious harm relevant to the “being
persecuted” assessment. Particularly because the prohibition of such actions admits of no
limitation, is non-derogable, and is not amenable to consideration of de minimis breach, it
has proved an important means of ensuring that a broad range of contemporary concerns –
including sexual assault, female genital mutilation, forced abortion and sterilization, and
exposure to extreme psychological harm – can fairly be understood to evince the serious
harm required for a finding that a person is at risk of being persecuted.

5
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3.3.3 Slavery, including trafficking and forced marriage
Traditional forms of slavery persist in many regions of the world, including in particular
chattel slavery systems still found in parts of Africa,219 and the debt bondage systems
prevalent in South Asia.220 Despite the clearly egregious serious harm entailed by subjection
to slavery,221 few refugee claims are made by the victims of such systems, due no doubt to
the “complete coercive control”222 that makes it difficult, if not impossible, to escape from
slavery.
In contrast, two forms of modern slavery – trafficking for the purpose of labor and sexual
exploitation, and forced or underage marriage – are generating an increasing number of
refugee claims.

218
219

220
221

222

Pathmakanthan v. Holder, (2010) 612 F.3d 618 (USCA, 7th Cir., Jul. 16, 2010), at [11]–[12].
J. C. Hathaway, “The Human Rights Quagmire of ‘Human Trafficking’,” (2008) 49 Va. J. Intl. L. 1, at 16.
See also G. Shahinian, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Slavery, Including
its Causes and Consequences, UN Doc. A/HRC/15/20 (Jun. 18, 2010), at [28]–[29].
Hathaway, supra n. 219, at 16.
The right not to be held in slavery or servitude is absolute since it admits of no internal limitation:
Civil and Political Covenant, supra n. 81, at Art. 8(3), nor is it capable of derogation in times of
public emergency: at Art. 4(2). See also International Labour Organization, Convention (No. 182)
on the Worst Forms of Child Labour, adopted Jun. 17, 1999, entered into force Nov. 19, 2000, 2133
UNTS 161 (“Convention (No. 182)”), at Art. 3(a)–(c). The right not to be “held in slavery” (Civil
and Political Covenant, supra n. 81, at Art. 8(1)) or “servitude” (Art. 8(2)) includes the right not to
be “required to perform forced or compulsory labour” (Art. 8(3)(a), although an exemption is made
for prison labor: see Art. 8(3)(b); and for national service or work required in a national emergency
or “normal civil obligations”: see Art. 8(3)(c)). Insight into contemporary manifestations of slavery is
provided by Conference of Plenipotentiaries convened by Economic and Social Council resolution 608
(XXI) of April 30, 1956, Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and
Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, adopted Sept. 7, 1956, entered into force Apr. 30, 1957
(“Supplementary Slavery Convention”), which expressly defines as prohibited forms of servile status
debt bondage, serfdom, and systems for the delivery of women for marriage or inheritance without their
consent, and of children for exploitation (at Art. 1; see Hathaway, supra n. 219, at 9).
K. Bales, Disposable People: New Slavery in the Global Economy (1999), at 25.
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In cases involving the risk of being trafficked or re-trafficked, or of being subjected
to forced prostitution or other forms of forced labor or domestic servitude, the seriousness of the harm alleged is rarely contested.223 The Australian tribunal has, for example,
straightforwardly concluded that refugee status is appropriately recognized where “a real
chance exists that the applicant could be forced back into sexual servitude.”224 It is generally
understood that in addition to the risk of enslavement as such, trafficked persons are often
exposed to deprivation of liberty, forced to perform dangerous and debasing labor, and
subjected to physical, sexual, and psychological violence.225 Special human rights protections apply in the case of children,226 ensuring the right to be free from, for example, child
prostitution and child pornography,227 which if not respected also amount to serious harm
for refugee law purposes.
Claims grounded in the risk of forced marriage228 have proved to be somewhat less
straightforward. On the one hand, it is generally accepted that forced marriage can constitute serious harm sufficient to amount to persecution, even if not likely to lead also
223

224

225

226
227

228

For positive cases, in France, Alland and Teitgen-Colly, supra n. 158, note the decision of Mamadou
Birahim (Fr. CRR [French Refugee Appeals Commission], Jun. 30, 2000), where a woman from Mauritania had been placed in quasi-slavery, and made the object of bullying, hard labour, and sexual abuse:
at 374. In Belgium, the Belgian Council for Alien Law Litigation has granted refugee status in several
cases involving a risk of trafficking: see 49821 (Bel. CCE, Oct. 20, 2010); and see also decision of the
former Belgian Permanent Refugee Appeals Commission 03-0582/F1611 (Bel. CPRR, Feb. 5, 2004). In
Germany, see e.g. 3 K 1465/09 WI.A (Ger. VG Wiesbaden [German Administrative Court, Wiesbaden],
Mar. 14, 2011). In Australia, see e.g. V01/13868, [2002] RRTA 799 (Aus. RRT, Sept. 6, 2002); N03/45573,
[2003] RRTA 160 (Aus. RRT, Feb. 24, 2003); N03/47757, [2004] RRTA 355 (Aus. RRT, May 11, 2004).
Importantly, the Department of Immigration and Citizenship acknowledges that rape and other forms
of sexual assault inflict severe pain and suffering (physical and mental) and obviously constitute cruel,
inhuman, and degrading treatment as well as torture: Department of Immigration, 1996, supra, n. 174,
at 92–93.
N03/47757, [2004] RRTA 355 (Aus. RRT, May 11, 2004); see also 1009355, [2011] RRTA 120 (Aus.
RRT, Feb. 8, 2011): “The Tribunal is satisfied that the sexual servitude already endured by the applicant
involves serious harm, including deprivation of liberty, physical and mental harassment and economic
hardship”: at [89].
See generally, A. Dorevitch and M. Foster, “Obstacles on the Road to Protection: Assessing the Treatment of Sex-Trafficking Victims Under Australia’s Migration and Refugee Law,” (2008) 9(1) Melb. J.
Intl. L. 1; and A. Rieger, “Missing the Mark: Why the Trafficking Victims Protection Act Fails to Protect
Sex Trafficking Victims in the United States,” (2007) 30 Harv. J. L. & Gender 231, at 241–43. See also
UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection No. 7, supra n. 96, where it is noted that “[i]nherent
in the trafficking experience are such forms of severe exploitation as abduction, incarceration, rape,
sexual enslavement, enforced prostitution, forced labour, removal of organs, physical beatings, starvation . . . [and] the deprivation of medical treatment. Such acts constitute serious violations of human
rights which will generally amount to persecution”: at [15].
Children’s Convention, supra n. 109, at Arts. 19(1), 32(1), 34, 35. See also UNHCR, Guidelines on
International Protection No. 8, supra n. 94, at [24]–[30].
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution
and Child Pornography, UN Doc. A/RES/54/263, adopted May 25, 2000, entered into force Jan. 18, 2002.
At the time of writing it had 163 parties.
This is an endemic issue in some countries. For example, “[a]ccording to the UN, as of 2008, 70 to 80
percent of marriages in Afghanistan were forced, taking place without full and free consent or under
duress”: Human Rights Watch, “I Had to Run Away: The Imprisonment of Women and Girls for ‘Moral
Crimes’ in Afghanistan” (2012), at 30, citing United Nations Development Fund for Women, “UNIFEM
Afghanistan Fact Sheet” (2008).
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to domestic violence, rape,229 or a threat to life.230 This is a sensible view, given that
international human rights law clearly codifies the right not to enter marriage “without
the free and full consent of the intending spouses”231 and provides for related guarantees under both the Supplementary Slavery Convention232 and international humanitarian
law.233 In determining whether marriage is likely to be entered into without “free and full
consent” the Human Rights Committee has explained that the “minimum age for marriage”
should not only be equal for men and women,234 but that states must moreover “ensure
women’s capacity to make an informed and uncoerced decision.”235 The Committee has
warned that “full and free consent” can be compromised where, for example, a (typically
male) guardian is allowed by law to consent to the marriage instead of the woman herself, as
well as by laws allowing a rapist to have his criminal responsibility extinguished or mitigated
if he marries the victim.236

229

230

231

232

233
234

235

Cases of forced marriage will of course often involve a range of other human rights violations, typically
violence and sexual assault: for an example, see the decision of the Swiss Asylum Appeal Commission
in WH, Äthiopien, 2006/32-336 (Sw. ARK/CRA, Oct. 9, 2006), in which an Ethiopian woman who had
been forced to marry an older man who had beaten and raped her was granted refugee status.
The Committee on the Rights of the Child notes that “the female child is often subject to harmful
traditional practices, such as early and/or forced marriage, which violate her rights and make her more
vulnerable to HIV infection, including because such practices often interrupt access to education and
information”: CRC, General Comment No. 3, supra note 157, at [11]. Further, as Nowak notes, an early
age of marriage for girls (which often also involves forced marriage) “threatens the rights of both the
child-mother and the newly born child to life and to maximum survival and development under Article
6” of the Children’s Convention, supra n. 109: Nowak, supra n. 154, at 33. The reference to “women”
belies the fact that a great percentage of forced marriages are inflicted on the girl child, a practice which
violates a range of rights including non-discrimination (Children’s Convention, supra n. 109, Art. 2),
the principle that in all actions concerning children “the best interests of the child shall be a primary
consideration” (Art. 3(1)), the right not to be “separated from his or her parents against their will”
(Art. 9(1)), to protection against “all forms of physical or mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect or
negligent treatment, maltreatment or exploitation” (Art. 19(1)) and the “right of the child to education”
(Art. 28).
Civil and Political Covenant, supra n. 81, at Art. 23(3). The equivalent in the Women’s Convention,
supra n. 108, at Art. 16(1)(b) provides to women “the same right freely to choose a spouse and to enter
into marriage only with their free and full consent.” See also Economic, Social and Cultural Covenant,
supra n. 104, at Art. 10.
Supplementary Slavery Convention, supra n. 221, at Art. 1, defining “institutions and practices similar
to slavery” to include “(c) Any institution or practice whereby: (i) A woman, without the right to refuse,
is promised or given in marriage on payment of a consideration in money or in kind to her parents,
guardian, family or any other person or group; or (ii) The husband of a woman, his family, or his clan,
has the right to transfer her to another person for value received or otherwise; or (iii) A woman on the
death of her husband is liable to be inherited by another person.”
See cases cited in C. Dauvergne and J. Millbank, “Forced Marriage as a Harm in Domestic and International Law,” (2010) 73(1) MLR 57, at 60 n. 8.
HRC General Comment No. 28, supra n. 155, at [23]. Nowak observes that a General Assembly resolution
adopted in implementation of the Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage
and Registration of Marriages, UNGA Res. 1763 A (XVII), adopted Nov. 7, 1962, entered into force Dec.
9, 1964, 521 UNTS 231, set the lower limit for capacity to marry at the age of fifteen: Nowak, supra n.
134, at 528. On the other hand, the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of slavery, including its
causes and consequences, calls for a minimum age of eighteen: see G. Shahinian, Thematic Report on
Servile Marriage, UN Doc. A/HRC/21/41 (2012), at [14]. The UNHCR recognizes under-age marriage
as persecution: see UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection No. 8, supra n. 94, at [18].
236
HRC General Comment No. 28, supra n. 155, at [23].
Ibid.
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Numerous courts – including, for example, those in Australia,237 Belgium,238 Canada,239
France,240 Germany,241 Spain,242 the United Kingdom,243 and the United States244 – have
thus appropriately recognized that the risk of forced marriage amounts to serious harm
for refugee law purposes.245 As the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit succinctly
framed the point, “lifelong, involuntary marriage” constitutes persecution.246
The more challenging situation is where the marriage is “arranged” rather than “forced.”
On the one hand, if a marriage is arranged and is carried out contrary to the clear wishes
of one of the spouses,247 there is a breach of international human rights norms and hence
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MZXFJ v. Minister for Immigration, [2006] FMCA 1465 (Aus. FMC, Oct. 10, 2006), at [42].
In Belgium, the Belgian Permanent Refugee Appeals Commission, in 02-2230/F1623 (Bel. CPRR, Mar.
25, 2004), found that refugee status was appropriate in relation to a young Russian woman of Chechen
origin, whose father forced her into marriage with a Turkish citizen. See also 01-0668/F1356 (Bel. CPRR,
Mar. 8, 2002). In addition, the Belgian Council for Alien Law Litigation has accepted claims based on a
risk of forced marriage: see 29226 (Bel. CCE, Jun. 29, 2009) and 60662 (Bel. CCE, Apr. 29, 2011).
The Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board was one of the first to determine that the risk of
subjection to forced marriage is presumptively serious enough to amount to persecution, and this has
now been affirmed by the Federal Court of Canada: see Vidhani v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), [1995] 3 FC 60 (Can. FCTD, Jun. 8, 1995), at 65.
There is ample authority in French jurisprudence for the proposition that forced marriage constitutes
persecution: see decisions cited in Cour Nationale du Droit d’Asile [National Court of Asylum], Les
grandes decisions du Conseil d’État et de la CNDA sur l’asile (2009) and the Recueils de jurisprudence
1999–2005: Mlle T, 519803 (Fr. CRR [French Refugee Appeals Commission], Jul. 29, 2005); Mme B,
620881 (Fr. CNDA [French National Court of Asylum], Dec. 5, 2008); Mlle N, 574495 (Fr. CNDA, Apr.
23, 2008).
A 11 K 553/10 (Ger. VG Stuttgart [German Administrative Court, Stuttgart], Mar. 14, 2011); 1 A 3954/06
(Ger. VG Hanover [German Administrative Court, Hannover], Jan. 13, 2010); M 23 K 05.50461 (Ger.
VG München [German Administrative Court, Munich], Apr. 11, 2007).
For example, the Spanish Supreme Court noted in STS 2781/2009 (Sp. TS, May 11, 2009) that: “a
situation of harassment and threats against a woman to oblige her to marry is of a protectable nature and
certainly fits in with this social group persecution”: at 3 (citing STS 1172/2006 (Sp. TS, Feb. 28, 2006),
STS 938/2007 (Sp. TS, Feb. 15, 2007), STS 277/2008 (Sp. TS, Jan. 31, 2008)) (unofficial translation).
In the recent decision of AM and BM (Trafficked Women) Albania CG, [2010] UKUT 80 (UKUT, Mar.
18, 2010), the Upper Tribunal of the Immigration and Asylum Chamber held that “[b]eing forced into
marriage is certainly capable of amounting to persecution”: at [171]. See also BB (Guinea) v. Secretary of
State for the Home Department, [2007] EWCA Civ 129 (Eng. CA, Jan. 31, 2007), which involved the claim
of a young woman who was at risk of being forced to enter an arranged marriage if returned to Guinea
where the immigration judge had held: “I am satisfied that this appellant is a member of a particular
social group, namely, a woman who is being forced, against her will, to enter into an arranged marriage
and to this end I rely upon appeal number TB (PSG – Women) Iran [2005] UKIAT 00065”: at [11]. The
persecution issue was not challenged on appeal.
Infra, at n. 246.
Various administrative guidelines also support this approach. See generally Dauvergne and Millbank,
supra n. 233, at 60–61 for discussion of gender guidelines in different jurisdictions. See also UNHCR,
Guidelines on International Protection No. 1, supra n. 85, at [36]. It should be noted however that despite
the clear acceptance in principle that forced marriage constitutes persecution, Dauvergne and Millbank
have identified a disturbing trend among common law countries whereby “threatened or actual forced
marriage is rarely held to trigger protection obligations”: Dauvergne and Millbank, supra n. 233, at 57.
Gao v. Gonzales, (2006) 440 F.3d 62 (USCA, 2nd Cir., Mar. 3, 2006), at 70 (vacated on procedural grounds
by Keisler v. Gao, (2007) 552 US 801 (USSC, Oct. 1, 2007)). See also Ngengwe v. Mukasey, (2008) 543
F.3d 1029 (USCA, 8th Cir., Sept. 18, 2008), at 1036.
Shahinian, supra n. 234, explains that consent is the key, noting that “[a]rranged marriages, which exist
in many parts of the world, are based on the consent of both parties”: at [20].
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serious harm. But what of a case where a person feels that her ability to consent, while not
vitiated completely, is nonetheless severely compromised by societal or familial pressure?
This issue has sometimes arisen in claims brought by homosexuals who fear that in
order to avoid disclosing their sexuality, they will be “compelled” to marry. In SZANS, the
Australian Federal Magistrates Court found that a homosexual man from Bangladesh had
made out a claim to face persecutory harm on the basis that he had “a well-founded fear
of being potentially forced into a heterosexual marriage”248 given the strong familial and
societal pressure that would be brought to bear on his return. Citing to human rights norms,
it was determined that

5

[t]he right to refrain from entering into a marriage, except as an act of free choice, is
an internationally recognised and fundamental human right . . . [T]he consequences of
a homosexual being forced to participate in a heterosexual marriage not freely entered
into constitutes “serious harm.”249

On appeal, the recognition of refugee status was overturned on nexus grounds, namely that
the pressure to marry in Bangladesh “falls on all single men, and it did not appear that it
was applied differentially as between homosexuals and others.”250 In truth, this reasoning
is flawed, as it fails to identify the true human rights risk at stake. For a gay man or lesbian,
being forced to enter a heterosexual marriage does not implicate only the right freely to
consent to marriage, but more fundamentally infringes the right to an intimate life, to
sexual expression, and effectively to “be who he is.”251 The risk to such legally protected
privacy rights is causally related to sexuality, and ought reasonably to have been recognized
as such.
More generally, even in the context of marriage between heterosexuals, it is important
not to assume that there is no infringement of the requirement of “full and free consent”
to marriage just because coercion takes a non-physical form.252 A more nuanced approach
to assessing whether a person is at risk of forced marriage is appropriate, taking account
of the “traditional, cultural or religious beliefs”253 that can underpin societal coercion,
wider societal attitudes including that girls and women are “viewed as commodities,”254
and the threat of social and economic ostracism that often accompanies resistance to forced
marriage.255
It is thus subjection not only to classic slavery, but also to modern forms of slavery –
including trafficking and forced marriage – that may ground a claim to fear serious harm
for refugee law purposes. Even the risk of subjection to an “arranged” marriage should be
carefully scrutinized to ensure that a refusal to marry by an intended spouse will ultimately
be respected, failing which there is a relevant risk given the duty at international law to
ensure that marriage is predicated on the “full and free consent” of those to be married.
248
249
250
251
252

253
255

Cited in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v. SZANS, (2005) 141 FCR
586 (Aus. FFC, Mar. 17, 2005), at 590 [22].
Cited in ibid., at 590–91 [27].
MMM v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, (1998) 90 FCR 324 (Aus. FC, Dec. 22, 1998),
at 327, adopted and applied in SZANS (Aus. FFC, 2005), at 591 [33].
See infra Ch. 3.5.6.
Dauvergne and Millbank, supra n. 233, at 74–76. For an example of a failure to take account of vitiated
consent, see In re AT, 24 I & N Dec. 296 (USBIA, Sept. 27, 2007), at 302–3. See also UNHCR, “Guidance
Note on Refugee Claims Relating to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity” (Nov. 21, 2008), at [13].
254
Shahinian, supra n. 234, at [18].
Ibid., at [16].
Dauvergne and Millbank, supra n. 233, at 76.
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The risk of beatings or other physical violence, whether perpetrated by state or non-state
actors, engages the right to “security of the person,”256 and is thus a classic basis on which
a refugee claim may be founded. As the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal noted, “beating”
is a “prime example[] of ‘persecution’.”257
The risk of unlawful violence often arises in the context of otherwise lawful detention
by state authorities. Even if the home state has legitimate reasons to arrest and detain
an individual, it is not the case that any treatment that follows from that lawful arrest
is also lawful or justified. Rather, where there is a real risk that arrest and detention will
lead to violations of other rights, a person may establish a risk of serious harm based on
consequential risks standing alone.258 As the Australian Full Federal Court explained, “[a]ny
mantle of legitimacy is lost”259 where a state engages in, for example, the torture or extortion
of arrested persons. This is true even where allegations of terrorism are made. In Khatib,
the Federal Court of Canada rightly insisted that “[a]lthough the Syrian and Lebanese
authorities may be justified in detaining persons . . . to determine if they are terrorists, they
are not justified in beating such persons.”260 In the words of Justice Linden in an earlier
decision, “[b]rutality in furtherance of a legitimate end is still brutality.”261
The same considerations apply even where the right to freedom from arbitrary arrest
or detention has been lawfully suspended in consequence of an official declaration of a
national emergency. The prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment
256

257
258

259

260

261

As the Human Rights Committee states in Draft General Comment No. 35: Article 9: Liberty and Security
of the Person (Jan. 28, 2013) (“HRC Draft General Comment No. 35”), “Security of person concerns
freedom from injury to the body, or bodily integrity”: at [3]. See also Refugee Appeal No. 71404/99 (NZ
RSAA, Oct. 29, 1999).
Chan (Can. FCA, 1993), at 723, per Desjardins J.
See Tuhin v. Ashcroft, (2003) 60 Fed. Appx. 615 (USCA, 7th Cir., Mar. 18, 2003): “[a]lthough the charges
lodged against Tuhin might have been legitimate, the beatings he suffered at the hands of police were
not”: at 619. See also Bandari v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, (2000) 227 F.3d 1160 (USCA,
9th Cir., Sept. 26, 2000), where the court found that the applicant was initially detained on suspicion of
violating the criminal law, yet the ensuing physical attacks “were clearly based on Bandari’s religion”: at
1168.
Paramananthan v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, (1998) 94 FCR 28 (Aus. FFC, Dec.
21, 1998), at 57 (per Merkel J.); see also at 38–39 (per Wilcox J.) and 43 (per Lindgren J.). See also
Nagaratnam v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, (1999) 84 FCR 569 (Aus. FC, Mar. 5,
1999), at 579 [25]–[27], and NALZ v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs,
(2004) 140 FCR 270 (Aus. FC, Dec. 2, 2004), at 272 [3] and 275 [14] per Madgwick J. (in dissent).
Khatib v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), (1994) 83 FTR 310 (Can. FC, Sept. 27, 1994),
at [9]. Although see the contra decision of Muldoon J. in Naguleswaran v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration) (Unreported, Can. FCTD, Apr. 19, 1995), at [10]–[15]; and again in Nithiyanathan v.
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (Unreported, Can. FCTD, Aug. 19, 1997), at [4], [7]. In
Balasubramaniam v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), (1994) 88 FTR 86 (Can. FCTD,
Sept. 12, 1994), Muldoon J. revealed his true concern about these cases: “Canada would be obliged to
receive within its borders a large proportion of the world’s population, if all those who have been beaten
in all those countries where the police beat detained persons, were to come where? Canada of course,
claiming to be refugees”: at [14]. See also Abu El Hof v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
[2005] FC 1515 (Can. FC, Nov. 7, 2005), at [5]. Even in the US, where the standard applied is often one
that requires “extreme” conduct, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has accepted that “even a
‘minor’ beating in detention may rise to the level of persecution”: Vafaev v. Mukasey, (2008) 298 Fed.
Appx. 51 (USCA, 2nd Cir., Oct. 28, 2008), at 54, citing Beskovic v. Gonzales, (2006) 467 F.3d 223 (USCA,
2nd Cir., Oct. 24, 2006), at 226.
Cheung (Can. FCA, 1993), at 323, per Linden J.A.
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or punishment continues to apply in such circumstances,262 as does the obligation to treat
all persons deprived of their liberty “with humanity and with respect for the inherent
dignity of the human person.”263 As such, a violation of either of these guarantees, even
during a national emergency, amounts to serious harm for refugee law purposes. Further,
the fact that lawful derogation must not involve any actions “inconsistent with [a state’s]
other obligations under international law”264 means that states cannot invoke a state of
emergency as justification for acting “in violation of humanitarian law or peremptory
norms of international law, for instance, by taking hostages, [or] by imposing collective
punishment,”265 or through “abductions or unacknowledged detention.”266
Recognizing the importance of ensuring that even a genuine emergency situation
does not provide cover for unlawful actions, the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal in
Thirunavukkarasu rejected a finding that the applicant’s arrest and subjection to “beating”
were part of the Sri Lankan government’s “perfectly legitimate investigations into criminal
and/or terrorist authorities.”267 To the contrary, the court determined that “beatings of
suspects can never be considered ‘perfectly legitimate investigations,’ however dangerous
the suspects are thought to be,”268 concluding that
the state of emergency in Sri Lanka cannot justify the arbitrary arrest and detention as
well as beating and torture of an innocent civilian at the hands of the very government
from whom the claimant is supposed to be seeking safety.269

The legal impermissibility of physical violence applies equally where the violence occurs
in a family setting (so-called “domestic violence”). Refugee law decision-makers embracing
the human rights approach have thus recognized that subjection to “domestic violence”
262

263
264
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As recognized by MacKay J. of the Federal Court of Canada in Alfred v. Canada (Minister of Employment
and Immigration), (1994) 76 FTR 231 (Can. FCTD, Apr. 7, 1994) in the context of another Sri Lankan
case, where the judge explained that the appeal was being allowed, inter alia, because: “[t]he tribunal did
not assess the physical mistreatment of the applicant by Colombo police in terms of persecution. Under
the [Civil and Political Covenant] Articles 7 and 4 make clear that no one shall be subjected to torture
or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment even in times of public emergency”: at [8].
See also Bragagnini-Ore v. Canada (Secretary of State), [1994] FCJ 143 (Can. FCTD, Feb. 4, 1994), at [4].
HRC General Comment No. 29, supra n. 115, at [13(a)].
The Civil and Political Covenant, supra n. 81, at Art. 4(1) states that a derogation measure must not be
“inconsistent with [a state’s] other obligations under international law.” Hence, in addition to the rights
listed in Art. 4(2) which cannot be derogated from, a state is also prohibited from derogating from the
requirement in Art. 10 that all persons deprived of their liberty “shall be treated with humanity and with
respect for the inherent dignity of the human person”: HRC General Comment No. 29, supra n. 115, at
[13(a)].
266
HRC General Comment No. 29, supra n. 115, at [11].
Ibid., at [13(b)].
Thirunavukkarasu v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1994] 1 FC 589 (Can. FCA,
Nov. 10, 1993), at [17].
Ibid., at [17].
Ibid., at [21]. There are many subsequent decisions applying this principle: see e.g. Joseph v. Canada
(Secretary of State) (Unreported, Can. FCTD, Nov. 18, 1994), at [10]–[12]; Iramachanthiran v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (Unreported, Can. FCTD, Apr. 24, 1996), at [8]; Wickramasinghe v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] FCT 470 (Can. FCTD, Apr. 26, 2002),
at [8]. In Wickramasinghe, the Trial Division, following Thirunavukkarasu, held “that beatings, arbitrary
arrests and detention of suspects, even in a state of emergency, can never be justified or considered a
legitimate part of investigations into criminal or terrorist activities, however dangerous the suspects are
thought to be.”
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amounts to a risk of serious harm relevant to the “being persecuted” inquiry.270 As in the
case of other human rights violations, the fact that violence against women or children is
“common, widespread and culturally accepted in a particular society”271 is irrelevant in
assessing whether it amounts to persecution.272 There is thus no merit in the view, advanced
by the Spanish Attorney General in a 2011 case, that the asylum claim of an Algerian woman
fleeing domestic violence should be rejected because to recognize it would result in every
battered woman being entitled to asylum. As observed by the Spanish Supreme Court in
categorically rejecting this argument, the only relevant question is whether the applicant
does “not enjoy effective legal protection against serious acts of sexual violence or domestic
violence that threaten dignity and physical and moral integrity.”273 This focus of analysis
echoes the approach taken in Canadian guidelines that
[t]he fact that violence, including sexual and domestic violence, against women is universal is irrelevant when determining whether rape, and other gender-specific crimes,
constitute forms of persecution. The real issues are whether the violence – experienced
or feared – is a serious violation of a fundamental human right for a Convention ground
and in what circumstances can the risk of that violence be said to result from a failure of
state protection.274
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20

The same reasoning applies with particular force in the case of violence against children, with the Committee on the Rights of the Child having determined that there are no
exceptions or justifications for violations of the duty to “protect the child from all forms of
physical or mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, maltreatment
or exploitation,”275 meaning that “all forms of violence against children, however light, are
unacceptable.”276
In sum, freedom from physical violence is a central component of the right to security
of the person. Violence cannot lawfully be employed by the police or security apparatus of
the state, even consequent to an otherwise lawful arrest and detention. This is true in both
ordinary circumstances, and when rights are subject to a national emergency derogation.
Nor is the right to physical security restricted to the public sphere. To the contrary, the
risk of violence against spouses, children, and others in the so-called private sphere may
270

271
272
273
274
275
276

See Shah (UKHL, 1999); Khawar (Aus. HC, 2002). For a more recent tribunal decision, see 0802332,
[2008] RRTA 547 (Aus. RRT, Jul. 17, 2008). For a list of Canadian decisions recognizing various
forms of domestic violence as persecution, see Immigration and Refugee Board, “Guideline 4: Women
Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution: Update,” Compendium of Decisions (Feb.
2003) (“Immigration and Refugee Board, Guideline 4”), at 40–44. This has been recognized in civil
jurisdictions as well, e.g. in 13874 (Bel. CCE [Belgian Council for Alien Law Litigation], Jul. 9, 2008),
the Belgian Council for Alien Law Litigation granted asylum to a Russian woman who feared domestic
violence at the hands of her husband; see also 45742 (Bel. CCE, Jun. 30, 2010). See e.g. C. Harvey, Seeking
Asylum in the UK: Problems and Prospects (2000), at 682; D. Anker, “Refugee Law, Gender and Human
Rights Paradigm,” (2002) 15 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 133.
UK Border Agency, “Gender Issues in the Asylum Claim” (Sept. 2010), at 6.
Ibid. See also US Department of Homeland Security, Training Guidelines on Gender, supra n. 80.
STS 4013/2011 (Sp. TS [Spanish Supreme Court], Jun. 15, 2011). See also WH, Äthiopien, 2006/32-336
(Sw. ARK/CRA [Swiss Asylum Appeal Commission], 2006).
Immigration and Refugee Board, Guideline 4, supra n. 270, under “B. Assessing the Feared Harm.”
Children’s Convention, supra n. 109, at Art. 19(1).
Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 13: Right of the Child to Freedom from
all Forms of Violence, UN Doc. CRC/C/GC/13 (Apr. 18, 2011), at [17]. See also UNHCR, Guidelines on
International Protection No. 8, supra n. 94, at [32]–[33].
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readily ground a claim to face the risk of being persecuted given the duty on states to protect
effectively against such risks.

3.3.5 Adequate standard of living
Physical integrity may by compromised as much by the deprivation of an adequate standard
of living as by more direct threats to life or physical well-being. Refugee jurisprudence thus
now sensibly recognizes that the risk of violation of socio-economic rights may be understood
to amount to a risk of serious harm.277 Where a person is denied access to “the necessities
of life”;278 where the harm threatened amounts to the “deliberate imposition of substantial
economic disadvantage”;279 or where there is evidence of the “deliberate imposition of severe
economic disadvantage or the deprivation of liberty, food, housing, employment or other
essentials of life,”280 there is evidence of precisely the sort of serious human rights abuse that
is at the core of the notion of “being persecuted.”
As the preceding formulations suggest, persecution based on the denial of socio-economic
rights is most likely to be understood to amount to the denial of the right to an adequate standard of living – and hence to be persecutory – where there is evidence that the accumulation
of socio-economic harms has a clearly debilitating impact on the person concerned.281 This
277

278

279

280

281

This is well established in Australian law, notwithstanding Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s. 91R. See SZGUW
v. Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, [2008] FCA 91 (Aus. FC, Feb. 21, 2008), at [53]; NBFP
(Aus. FFC, 2005), at [54]–[62]; VTAO (Aus. FC, 2004), at [62]; Khan v. Minister for Immigration and
Multicultural Affairs, [2000] FCA 1478 (Aus. FC, Oct. 18, 2000), at [31]; Htun v. Minister for Immigration
and Multicultural Affairs, (2001) 194 ALR 244 (Aus. FFC, Dec. 18, 2001). In New Zealand, “refugee law
recognise[s] the relevance of ICESCR rights to the ‘being persecuted’ inquiry”: BG (Fiji) (NZ IPT, 2012),
at [90]; see also at [91], citing jurisprudence from courts in other jurisdictions. In the UK, while neither
the House of Lords nor Supreme Court have dealt with a case directly raising these issues, in Horvath
(UKHL, 2000) the Lords were content to assume that “level 3” rights could be relevant. This is clearly the
approach taken by the tribunal: see MK (Lesbians) Albania v. Secretary of State for the Home Department
CG, [2009] UKAIT 00036 (UKAIT, Sept. 9, 2009), at [353] and [354]; AM and AM (UKAIT, 2008), at
[78]–[79], and SA (Divorced Woman – Illegitimate Child) Bangladesh CG, [2011] UKUT 00254 (UKUT,
Jul. 11, 2011), at [53]. In the US, cases have been successful on the basis that a range of socio-economic
deprivations amount to persecution: see e.g. Levitskaya v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, (2002)
43 Fed. Appx. 38 (USCA, 9th Cir., Jul. 25, 2002); Baballah v. Ashcroft, (2003) 335 F.3d 981 (USCA, 9th
Cir., Jul. 11, 2003); El Himri v. Ashcroft, (2004) 378 F.3d 932 (USCA, 9th Cir., Aug. 2, 2004); Ouda
v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, (2003) 324 F.3d 445 (USCA, 6th Cir., Mar. 31, 2003); Li v.
Attorney General, (2005) 400 F.3d 157 (USCA, 3rd Cir., Mar. 10, 2005).
Minister of Citizenship and Immigration v. Patel, [2009] 2 FCR 196 (Can. FC, Jun. 17, 2008), at [39]–[57].
See also the decisions of the New Zealand Refugee Status Appeals Authority in Refugee Appeal No.
71193/98 (NZ RSAA, Sept. 9, 1999) and Refugee Appeal No. 71336/99 (NZ RSAA, May 4, 2000).
This was the test set out in the seminal decision in Kovac v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,
(1969) 407 F.2d 102 (USCA, 9th Cir., Jan. 29, 1969), at 106–7, and it has been adopted in many other
Circuit Courts of Appeals: see list of cases cited in Li (USCA, 3rd Cir., 2005), at 167. See also Liao v. US
Department of Justice, (2002) 293 F.3d 61 (USCA, 2nd Cir., Jun. 20, 2002), at 69–70.
Shi Chen v. Holder, (2010) 604 F.3d 324 (USCA, 7th Cir., Apr. 28, 2010), at 334, citing Xiu Ling Chen
v. Gonzales, (2007) 489 F.3d 861 (USCA, 7th Cir., Jun. 11, 2007), at 863. See also Ngengwe v. Mukasey
(USCA, 8th Cir., 2008), at 1036.
The vulnerability of certain groups, especially children, must be considered in this context. The Children’s
Convention, supra n. 109, provides in Art. 27(1) that “States Parties recognize the right of every child to
a standard of living adequate for the child’s physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social development.”
For an excellent example of this principle, see Refugee Appeal Nos. 76226 and 76227 (NZ RSAA, Jan. 12,
2009), at [111]. See also Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 7: Implementing
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is to be distinguished, in particular, from claims grounded in purely financial grievances,282
which will not ordinarily ground a claim to face the risk of being persecuted.283
Thus, for example, the High Court of Australia recognized that
[o]rdinarily, denial of access to food, shelter, medical treatment and, in the case of
children, denial of an opportunity to obtain an education involve such a significant
departure from the standards of the civilised world as to constitute persecution.284

282

283

284

Child Rights in Early Childhood, UN Doc. CRC/C/GC/7/Rev.1 (Sept. 20, 2006), at [10], and UNHCR,
Guidelines on International Protection No. 8, supra n. 94, at [34]–[36].
There is no right to property per se in international law. Hence for example, the claim was appropriately
rejected in Hao v. Attorney General, (2010) 363 Fed. Appx. 857 (USCA, 3rd Cir., Feb. 3, 2010), where
the applicant was unable to establish that the seizure of personal property (sewing machine, television,
and clothes closet) amounted to serious harm. Similarly, in Ling v. Canada (Minister of Employment
and Immigration), [1993] 66 FTR 207 (Can. FC, May 20, 1993), the Canadian Federal Court held that
“economic sanction, as a means to enforce compliance with the law, does not amount to persecution”
at least insofar as the applicant is not deprived of his right to earn a living: at [6].
There are exceptions, for example, where deprivation of private property amounts in the facts of a
particular case to a human rights violation such as the right to work (in the case of a business or farm).
In Cheng (USCA, 3rd Cir., 2010) the court found that the confiscation of property in the form of assets
such as the family farm and truck, which “served as the exclusive source of the family’s livelihood,”
constituted an economic sanction “so severe that it jeopardized the family’s freedom and possibly their
lives”: Pang v. Holder, (2012) 665 F.3d 1226 (USCA, 10th Cir., Jan. 6, 2012), at 4, describing with approval
the decision in Cheng. See also Kadiroglu v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous
Affairs, [1998] FCA 1656 (Aus. FC, Dec. 15, 1998), at 4. Another example is where deprivation of
property threatens the right to adequate housing, see e.g. the eloquent dissent of Gregory J. in Mirisawo
v. Holder, (2010) 599 F.3d 391 (USCA, 4th Cir., Mar. 17, 2010): “Fundamentally it is without support
in the law to hold that the destruction of the most significant investment a person has ever purchased,
which is also a necessity of life, does not constitute persecution”: at 403. This is a particular issue for
women in respect of whom discriminatory laws regarding inheritance can have a severe impact on the
availability of housing, and other essential rights. Some cases have failed to appreciate the relationship
between property and vital socio-economic rights: see e.g. Ramirez v. Canada (Solicitor General), (1994)
88 FTR 208 (Can. FCTD, Dec. 9, 1994), at [5]–[12]. On the other hand, in Vanchurina and Radisavlevic
v. Holder, (2010) 619 F.3d 95 (USCA, 1st Cir., Sept. 8, 2010) a claim based on extortion in relation to the
applicant’s business was appropriately dismissed since this “did not deprive [the applicant] of housing
or employment”: at 99. Finally, the imposition of exorbitant fines may result in a violation of rights
such as to education and health care. This has most frequently arisen in the context of China’s one-child
policy, where parents who violate the policy often have a very large fine imposed which, in light of their
incapacity to pay, can lead to a violation of the right to education and health care for their children: see
e.g. Li (USCA, 3rd Cir., 2005) at 168–69, approved in Pang (USCA, 10th Cir., 2012), at 4. But in many
cases the fine has been held not to be sufficiently high as to amount to a risk of serious harm: see Yan
Fang Chen v. Attorney General, (2010) 389 Fed. Appx. 879 (USCA, 11th Cir., Jul. 8, 2010). While in some
cases the applicant is able to pay the fine (hence allowing his or her child to receive a state education
etc.) (see e.g. Yong Hao Chen v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, (1999) 195 F.3d 198 (USCA, 4th
Cir., Oct. 20, 1999)) this is a matter of fact and decision-makers should be cautious in assuming without
sufficient evidence that a fine will not impede the ability of children born outside of the policy to obtain
education or health care.
Chen Shi Hai (Aus. HC, 2000), at 303, per Gleeson C.J., Gaudron, Gummow, and Hayne JJ. In separate
reasons, Kirby J. stated that the severe disadvantages imposed on the applicant “would deny the appellant
basic entitlements enjoyed by other children in [China] and fundamental rights internationally enshrined
in standards accepted as universal and basic, including in Australia”: at 310 [55]. This has continued to
be applied in Australia, notwithstanding the introduction of Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s. 91R(2): see
e.g. the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal in 071945034, [2008] RRTA 146 (Aus. RRT, Mar. 28,
2008). See also Cheung (Can. FCA, 1993), where the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal held that: “if
Karen Lee were sent back to China, she would, in her own right, experience such concerted and severe
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Similarly, the UK tribunal in Gudja determined that persecution may be constituted by “a
concatenation of individual denials of rights; for example to the right to work, to education,
to health or to welfare benefits to such an extent that it erodes the very quality of life in
the result that such a combination is an interference with a basic human right to live a
decent life.”285 Indeed, even though the European Union’s Qualification Directive makes
explicit reference only to infringement of civil and political rights in its definition of “acts
of persecution,”286 it goes on to provide also that serious harm may be constituted by
“an accumulation of various measures, including violations of human rights,”287 a notion
understood by Germany’s Federal Administrative Court to require, where appropriate,
consideration of not only “discrimination . . . in respect of access to education or health
facilities, but also occupational or economic restrictions on earning a living.”288
This is not to suggest, of course, that the relevance of socio-economic rights to the
refugee inquiry means that everyone who is poor289 or who leads a life with few material
advantages290 can successfully advance a claim to refugee status. The focus is rather on
whether the risk to socio-economic rights can be said to deny the person concerned that
which is required for an “adequate” standard of living.291 Yet it is of course true that those who
are already poor can less readily bear the burdens of the failure to respect socio-economic
rights than can those who are more financially secure – meaning that they will sooner face
“inadequacy” than others, and hence more readily be able to demonstrate that their standard
of living has fallen below the baseline of “adequacy.”292

285
286
288
289
290

291

292

discrimination, including deprivation of medical care, education and employment opportunities and
even food, so as to amount to persecution”: at 323. See also Shi Chen (USCA, 7th Cir., 2010), at 333–34,
and Li (USCA, 3rd Cir., 2005).
Gudja, CC/59626/97 (UKIAT, Aug. 5, 1999), at 2.
287
See Qualification Directive, supra n. 37, at Art. 9(1)(a).
Ibid., at Art. 9(1)(b).
10 C 23.12 (Ger. BverwG [German Federal Administrative Court], Feb. 20, 2013) at [36] (unofficial
translation).
See e.g. DH v. Refugee Applications Commissioner, [2004] IEHC 95 (Ir. HC, May 27, 2004), at 24.
As the Supreme Court of Canada explained in Ward (Can. SC, 1993), “the international community
did not intend to offer a haven for all suffering individuals. The need for ‘persecution’ in order to
warrant international protection, for example, results in the exclusion of such pleas as those of economic
migrants ie individuals in search of better living conditions, and those of victims of natural disasters,
even when the home state is unable to provide assistance”: at [85]. See also R v. Secretary of State for the
Home Department; Ex parte Jammeh, [1998] INLR 701 (Eng. HC, Jan. 28, 2010), at 705: “Destitution
and poverty are not a basis for applying for or being granted asylum.” On the other hand, in some
cases claims have been summarily dismissed even where there was a strong case for discriminatory
deprivation of socio-economic rights: see e.g. Pascual v. Mukasey, (2007) 514 F.3d 483 (USCA, 6th
Cir., Dec. 19, 2007), where the court held that notwithstanding evidence that the Mayan indigenous
people of Guatemala are “outside the country’s political, economic, social and cultural mainstream” and
have “limited educational opportunities and fewer employment opportunities,” “economic stratification
and deficient government support, regrettable though they are, do not establish a cognizable case of
persecution”: at 488.
The right “to an adequate standard of living” combines a number of relevant factors including ‘adequate
food, clothing . . . housing’ (Economic, Social and Cultural Covenant, supra n. 104, at Art. 11(1)) and
the right to water (Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 15, The
Right to Water, UN Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20, 2003): “The right to water clearly falls within the
category of guarantees essential for securing an adequate standard of living, particularly since it is one
of the most fundamental conditions for survival”: at [3]).
This issue arose in Chen Shi Hai (Aus. HC, 2000), where the High Court of Australia refused to accept
one of the primary contentions in that case, namely that the negative consequences of being a “black
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How, then, should a decision-maker determine whether the right to an adequate standard of living is infringed in a given case, such that the risk of being persecuted may be
established?
It is important to emphasize that while international human rights law does not, of
course, provide a right to a comfortable or affluent existence, neither is the right to an
adequate standard of living merely a right to minimum survival. Simply put, the right
to an adequate standard of living is not violated only when life is threatened.293 In the
US, for example, while some appellate courts unhelpfully insist on evidence of “severe”
socio-economic risk,294 there has been a long-standing recognition that no more than the

293

294

child” were really a result of the parents’ poverty in that were they wealthy they could have offset the
harm. The court rejected this: “To say that the consequences that are likely to befall him in China will
result from his parents’ financial situation is simply to say that neither he nor his parents have the
means to mitigate the consequences of his adverse treatment”: at 305 [36], per Gleeson C.J., Gaudron,
Gummow, and Hayne JJ. This was also implicitly recognized by the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit in Shi Chen (USCA, 7th Cir., Apr. 28, 2010), where it noted that the applicant’s “father testified
via affidavit that as a result of these fines [imposed for violation of the one-child policy in China], the
family – already very poor – often went hungry”: at 333.
This is so even in Australia where the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) has been amended so that “serious
harm” is said to include (inter alia) “significant economic hardship that threatens the person’s capacity
to subsist”: s. 91R(2)(d)), and “denial of access to basic services, where the denial threatens the person’s
capacity to subsist”: s. 91R(2)(e)). In VTAO (Aus. FC, 2004) the Australian Federal Court held that s.
91R(2) does not “provide an exhaustive statement of what amounts to ‘serious harm’”: at 351 [57], hence
the RRT was in error in assuming that it was necessary to establish a threat to the applicant’s capacity
to subsist: see 351–52. See also MZWPD v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous
Affairs, [2006] FCA 1095 (Aus. FC, Aug. 18, 2006) in which the Australian Federal Court emphasized
that, notwithstanding s. 91R(1) and (2), “it is by no means certain that a well-founded fear of racial
or religious discrimination in relation to matters such as education, employment and housing cannot
amount to ‘serious harm’ within the meaning of that expression in s. 91R(2)”: at [80]. Not only does s.
91R(2) provide “a non-exhaustive list of ‘instances of serious harm’”: at [82], but the notion of “serious
harm” “plainly has a residual meaning beyond the examples given”: at [83], citing NBFP (Aus. FFC,
2005).
In re T-Z-, (2007) 24 I & N Dec. 163 (USBIA, May 9, 2007), at 172–73. This case resulted from a highly
critical decision of the Second Circuit which remanded the case to the Board of Immigration Appeals
“for clarification of the standard governing economic persecution claims” because the Board had not
been consistent, applying at least three different standards: see Mirzoyan v. Gonzales, (2006) 457 F.3d
217 (USCA, 2nd Cir., Jul. 20, 2006), at 221–23. For further background to the US case law on economic
persecution, see Jastram, supra n. 89, at 149–51. Jastram also sets out different academic positions on the
US case law at 159–62. The US position is complicated by the fact that the Board of Immigration Appeals
posited two tests: the Kovac (USCA, 9th Cir., 1969) test where an applicant “has suffered a severe loss of
an existing economic/vocational advantage” and the stricter test adopted from Re Acosta, (1985) 19 I &
N Dec. 211 (USBIA, 1985), namely, that economic deprivation or restrictions must be “so severe that
they constitute a threat to an individual’s life or freedom” in situations of more generalized economic
disadvantage: see Vicente-Elias v. Mukasey, (2008) 532 F.3d 1086 (USCA, 10th Cir., Jul. 11, 2008), at
1088–89; Aranyi v. Mukasey, (2008) 527 F.3d 737 (USCA, 8th Cir., May 28, 2008), at 740–41. The Eighth
Circuit continues “to require a showing that allegations of economic hardship threaten the petitioner’s
life or freedom in order to rise to the level of persecution”: Makatengkeng v. Gonzales, (2007) 495 F.3d
876 (USCA, 8th Cir., Aug. 3, 2007), at 883. Although acknowledging that “it might be appropriate for
our court to revisit the standard for proving economic persecution,” it has not done so: Makatengkeng
at 883. Although see Ngengwe v. Mukasey (USCA, 8th Cir., 2008), at 1036. For a similarly strict approach
in the Sixth Circuit, see El Assadi v. Holder, (2011) 418 Fed. Appx. 484 (USCA, 6th Cir., Apr. 25, 2011),
although a decision issued just one month later affirmed the lower test: Stserba v. Holder, (2011) 646
F.3d 964 (USCA, 6th Cir., May 20, 2011), at 976.
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“deliberate imposition of substantial economic disadvantage” need be shown.295 Under
this standard, it is not necessary to establish “total deprivation of livelihood,”296 “total
deprivation of livelihood or a total withdrawal of all economic opportunity,”297 or to offer
“evidence of near-starvation.”298 To the contrary, “[g]overnment sanctions that reduce an
applicant to an impoverished existence may amount to persecution even if the victim retains
the ability to afford the bare essentials of life.”299
The emphasis on overall impact inherent in the international human right to an “adequate
standard of living” is in our view a helpful means of guarding against the trivialization of
claims as “mere discrimination,”300 or as implicating only “lower order rights.”301 It requires
attention to the fact that an attempt to exclude segments of the population from economic
and social life302 can be a more subtle yet nonetheless very powerful and effective method of
producing the “slow suffocation of a minority group.”303 The Canadian Federal Court has
thus insisted that it is incumbent on decision-makers not only to consider the cumulative
nature of a range of denials of socio-economic rights, but to provide a reasoned analysis of
why a person who has “lived with discrimination and insecurity all of his life”304 is not at
risk of serious harm.305 For example, in the context of a claim by a Palestinian man who
295
296

297
299
300
301

302
303

304
305

Kovac (USCA, 9th Cir., 1969), at 107.
Shi Chen (USCA, 7th Cir., 2010), at 334, citing Koval v. Gonzales, (2005) 418 F.3d 798 (USCA, 7th Cir.,
Aug. 16, 2005), at 805–7. See also Borca v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, (1996) 77 F.3d 210
(USCA, 7th Cir., Feb. 29, 1996): “By requiring Borca to show a deprivation of all means of earning a
livelihood, the BIA failed to heed Congress’s intent, as expressed in the 1965 Amendment, to lessen the
burden needed to show persecution”: at 217. See also Stserba (USCA, 6th Cir., 2011), at 976.
298
In re T-Z- (USBIA, 2007), at 173–74.
Li (USCA, 3rd Cir., 2005), at 168.
In re T-Z- (USBIA, 2007) at 173–74. This principle has recently been affirmed in Pang (USCA, 10th Cir.,
2012), at 3.
See analysis set out in Foster, supra n. 120, at 213. See also R. Dowd, “Dissecting Discrimination in
Refugee Law: An Analysis of its Meaning and its Cumulative Effect,” (2011) 23 Intl. J. Ref. L. 28.
There are many examples, but see e.g. the decision at tribunal level in Horvath v. Secretary of State for
the Home Department, [1999] 1 INLR 7 (UKIAT, Dec. 4, 1998), where social and economic harms are
referred to as “discriminatory measures”: at 28, infringing “lower order ‘rights’”: at 34. This is despite
the fact that in Horvath the evidence suggested precisely the type of “slow suffocation of a minority”
which has characterized many of the most persecutory regimes in history: see at [48]–[49].
See e.g. Kupreškić (ICTY, 2000), discussing economic discrimination pursued by the Nazis against
German Jews: policy designed to “force them out of economic life in Europe”: at [630].
N. Ghanea, “Repressing Minorities and Getting Away with It? A Consideration of Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights,” in N. Ghanea and A. Xanthaki (eds.), Minorities, Peoples and Self Determination (2004),
at 194. In V01/13122, [2003] RRTA 764 (Aus. RRT, Aug. 19, 2003), the Australian Refugee Review Tribunal
noted that public and private universities continue to deny admittance to Baha’i students, “a particularly
demoralizing blow to a community that traditionally has placed a high value on education. Denial of
access to higher education appears aimed at the eventual impoverishment of the Baha’i community.”
The same can be said about some of the ethnic minorities in Burma. This was also the case for women
living under Taliban rule in Afghanistan in which the discriminatory policies imposed “undermine[d]
the health, well-being and economic survival of their female citizens,” leading one widow interviewed to
state that “she preferred the rocket attacks of the civil war to life under the Taliban: ‘A rocket or a bomb
may kill all members of a family at once, but this is a slow death, which is more painful’”: N. Boustany,
“Wretched Art They Amongst Women,” Washington Post (Aug. 5, 1998), at 16.
Mohammed v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), (2009) 348 FTR 69 (Can. FC, Jul. 27,
2009), at [9].
Regrettably, some decisions engage conclusory reasoning in this regard. For example, in Yadegar-Sargis
(USCA, 7th Cir., 2002), the Board of Immigration Appeals had acknowledged that the applicant “had
been forced to wear the Muslim garb for fear of being attacked, that she had suffered discrimination
with respect to food rationing because she was Armenian, and that her son was forced to go abroad to
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had spent his whole life in a refugee camp where he experienced “extremely dispiriting
discrimination”306 – in particular, in obtaining access to housing, medical care, education,
and work – it was held that
[t]he reasons need to articulate why the long history of appalling discrimination by the
State of Lebanon against the Applicant as a stateless Palestinian does not amount to
persecution.307
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While the composite nature of the notion of denial of “an adequate standard of living”
frequently means that refugee decision-makers examine the cumulative impact of a range
of socio-economic deprivation,308 in at least some cases the right to an adequate standard
of living may alternatively be infringed by the deprivation of only one particular facet of the
right.
In respect of the right to food, for example, while not every disadvantage in relation to the
procurement of food, such as being “denied such perquisites as discounts on food,”309 will
be rights-violative, it has been recognized that “denial of famine relief in anti-government
areas”310 may constitute persecution; that the “taking of harvests of those perceived as
‘enemies,’ rather than those perceived as allies might found a conclusion of persecution
for a Convention reason”;311 and that “discriminatory exclusion from access to food aid is
capable itself of constituting persecution.”312 In a decision in which denial of food was used
as a weapon, for example, the UK tribunal recognized refugee status on the grounds that
the government of Zimbabwe has used its control of the distribution of food aid as
a political tool to the disadvantage of those thought to be potential supporters of the
MDC. This discriminatory deprivation of food to perceived political opponents, taken
together with the disruption of the efforts of NGOs to distribute food by means of the
ban introduced in June 2008, amounts to persecution of those deprived access to this
essential support.313
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study his native language and culture”: at 600. Notwithstanding this, the Board of Immigration Appeals
held that though “deplorable,” the “incidents constituted harassment, not persecution”: ibid.
Mohammed v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), (2009) 348 FTR 69 (Can. FC, Jul. 27,
2009), at [64].
Ibid., at [67].
The UNHCR has long taken a similar view, stating in its Handbook that persecution may be established
where “measures of discrimination lead to consequences of a substantially prejudicial nature for the
person concerned, eg serious restrictions on his right to earn a livelihood, his right to practise his
religion, or his access to normally available educational facilities”: UNHCR, Handbook, supra n. 1, at
[54].
Saballo-Cortez v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, (1984) 761 F.2d 1259 (USCA, 9th Cir., Dec.
21, 1984), at 1264.
Chan (Can. FC, 1993), at 724. For an early decision along these lines, see Vidya Ajodhia, IABD M851709 (Can. IAB, Nov. 12, 1987), involving the state-condoned racially discriminatory allocation of
basic foodstuffs in Guyana. In accepting the claim to refugee status of an Indo-Guyanese citizen, the
Board noted: “It may be argued that the unfair distribution of food to Indo-Guyanese is a situation of
discrimination rather than persecution. However, in my opinion, the withholding of essential food on a
daily basis is clearly indicative of persecution”: at 4.
Hagi-Mohamed v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, [2001] FCA 1156 (Aus. FFC, Aug.
23, 2001), at [7].
RN (Returnees) Zimbabwe CG, [2008] UKAIT 00083 (UKAIT, Nov. 19, 2008), at [249].
Ibid., at [250]. This analysis is consistent with the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’
explanation that a violation of the right to food under the Economic, Social and Cultural Covenant,
supra n. 104, can occur when there is, inter alia, a “denial of access to food to particular individuals or
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Given the centrality of food to survival, its denial – even standing alone – may clearly have
the very sort of devastating effects that bespeak failure to ensure the right to an “adequate
standard of living.”
Similarly, while relegation to inferior accommodation is unlikely to be sufficiently serious
as to constitute a deprivation of the right to an adequate standard of living,314 forced eviction
will almost certainly be so considered.315 While it is true that many countries do not have
the resources to ensure that everyone enjoys adequate housing – meaning that the simple
continuation of inadequate housing will not necessarily be per se in breach of the right to
housing – forced eviction is properly understood to be a “gross violation of human rights”
that is “prima facie incompatible with” duties under the Economic, Social and Cultural
Covenant.316 Not only is the active evisceration of a right impossible to reconcile to any
understanding of progressive implementation of that right, but the complete loss of shelter
may, like denial of the right to food, be so devastating that it will readily be understood to
amount in and of itself to the denial of the right to an adequate standard of living. Indeed, the
Human Rights Committee has recently determined that the related human right to be free
from arbitrary interference with one’s home317 was infringed when Bulgarian authorities
proposed to evict a Roma community from their traditional land, noting that the eviction
posed “the risk of their becoming homeless, in a situation in which satisfactory replacement
housing is not immediately available to them.”318
Despite the clear salience of the notion of persecution by the denial of socio-economic
rights, it is sometimes suggested that such claims may not be entertained in the context of refugee claims made by a stateless person against her country of former habitual
residence.319 Because under Art. 2(3) of the Economic, Social and Cultural Covenant “developing countries” may decide “to what extent they [will] guarantee . . . economic rights . . . to
non-nationals,”320 the UK tribunal reasoned that the exclusion of a stateless Palestinian
from a range of social and economic rights, including “access to Lebanese government
hospitals,” was not serious harm because “the differential treatment of Palestinian refugees
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groups”: Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 12: The Right to
Adequate Food, UN Doc. E/C.12/1999/5 (May 12, 1999), at [19] (“CESCR General Comment No. 12”).
See Hathaway, Refugee Status, at 120, nn. 166–69.
For example, a Human Rights Watch report stated that “[a]s noted in Chapter V of this report, which
examined the political context of the forced evictions beyond the reasons nominally provided by the
government for them, the circumstances of the evictions suggest that at least one of the reasons why they
took place was because ZANU-PF was concerned about a potential uprising in urban areas against the
government which would have challenged the government’s power”: Human Rights Watch, “Neighbors
in Need: Zimbabweans Seeking Refuge in South Africa” (Jun. 2008), at 75.
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 4: The Right to Adequate Housing (Dec. 13, 1991), at [18], and Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
General Comment No. 7: Forced Evictions, and the Right to Adequate Housing (May 20, 1997), at
[9].
Civil and Political Covenant, supra n. 81, at Art. 17(1).
Naidenova v. Bulgaria, Communication No. 2073/2011, UN Doc. CCPR/C/106/D/2073/2011 (HRC, Oct.
30, 2012), at [14.7].
There are, however, cases that appropriately recognized status in such circumstances: see El Himri v.
Ashcroft, (2004) 378 F.3d 932 (USCA, 9th Cir., Aug. 2, 2004), at 937; Ouda (USCA, 6th Cir., 2003), at
448; and Mohammed (Can. FC, 2009), at [64]–[67]. See also Krayem v. Secretary of State for the Home
Department, [2003] EWCA Civ 649 (Eng. CA, Apr. 4, 2003).
Economic, Social and Cultural Covenant, supra n. 104, Art. 2(3).
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stems entirely from their statelessness”321 and was thus “in accordance with international
norms.”322
Yet in truth, Art. 2(3) was conceived as “a measure of affirmative action in favour of historically underprivileged nationals,”323 not as a justification for entrenching disadvantage and
oppression of historically disadvantaged minority groups.324 The Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights has moreover made clear that Art. 2(3) is a narrow exception to
the general duty of non-discriminatory access to rights, which extends to “everyone including non-nationals, such as refugees, asylum-seekers, stateless persons, migrant workers and
victims of international trafficking, regardless of legal status and documentation.”325 And
in any event the scope of Art. 2(3) is significantly more limited than is often assumed. Not
only is it an exemption available only to a limited subset of countries, but it applies only
to economic rights – not social or cultural rights – and hence may not apply to the right
to an adequate standard of living, much less to more specific rights related to health or
education.326 It moreover permits a country to determine only “to what extent” economic
rights will be guaranteed to non-nationals, thus providing no justification for a blanket or
wholesale denial of a range of economic rights to all or some non-nationals.327
In sum, threats to core socio-economic entitlements will frequently give rise to a risk to
the internationally guaranteed right “to an adequate standard of living.” While neither the
existence of financial grievances nor even poverty per se infringes this standard, there will
be cases in which either an accumulation of risks, or – especially in relation to such core
entitlements as the rights to food and shelter – the risk to a single core interest standing
alone, will infringe this fundamental human right. Where the essentials of life are threatened
in these ways, refugee law appropriately recognizes the risk to be of sufficient gravity to be
persecutory.

3.3.6 Health
25

Some threats to health amount to risks of torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. This right prohibits subjection “without . . . free consent to medical or scientific
experimentation,”328 thus justifying a decision that recognized a risk of persecutory harm

321

322

323

324
325
326
327

MM and FH (Stateless Palestinians – KK, IH, HE reaffirmed) Lebanon v. Secretary of State for the Home
Department, [2008] UKAIT 00014 (UKAIT, Feb. 25, 2008), at [143]. This decision affirmed the previous
decision of KK, IH and HE (Palestinians – Lebanon – camps) Jordan CG, [2004] UKIAT 00293 (UKIAT,
Oct. 29, 2004), in which the tribunal had also relied on Art. 2(3).
Ibid. See also Refugee Appeal Nos. 73952–58 (NZ RSAA, May 26, 2005) for extensive consideration of
the Economic, Social and Cultural Covenant, supra n. 104, at Art. 2(3); Ahmed (USCA, 3rd Cir., 2003);
Faddoul v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, (1994) 37 F.3d 185 (USCA, 5th Cir., Oct. 25, 1994),
at 189; Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, (2001) 257 F.3d 1262 (USCA, 11th Cir., Jul. 18, 2001), at 1292–3.
B. G. Ramcharan, Judicial Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Cases and Materials (2005),
at 23. See also “The Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,” (1987) 9 Hum. Rts. Q. 122, at 127 [42]–[44].
See M. M. Sepulveda, The Nature of the Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (2003), at 414–15.
CESCR General Comment No. 20, supra n. 117, at [30].
See E. V. O. Dankwa, “Working Paper on Article 2(3) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights,” (1987) 9 Hum. Rts. Q. 230, at 239–40.
328
Ibid., at 248.
Civil and Political Covenant, supra n. 81, Art. 7.
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where lesbians were subjected to electro-shock “treatment,”329 as well as a finding in favor
of an autistic boy from Pakistan who was subjected to a series of “degrading and dangerous
mystical treatments” on the grounds that he was perceived to have the “curse of Allah.”330
More commonly, physical security can be threatened by the denial of critical forms of
health care or medical treatment.331 Indeed, in extreme cases the “systematic denial of
medical services . . . amounts to a de facto death sentence.”332 But serious harm may also be
established where the consequences are less severe.333 This is not to say that there is a risk of
being persecuted merely because access to, or the quality of, medical treatment in the home
country is inferior to that available in the asylum state.334 But where there is a sustained
or systemic risk of deprivation, withdrawal, or denial of critical or essential health care or
medical treatment, harm relevant to the “being persecuted” inquiry is established.335
329

330

331

332
333

334

335

Pitcherskaia v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, (1997) 118 F 3d 641 (USCA, 9th Cir., Jun. 24,
1997). See also N02/43487, [2003] RRTA 911 (Aus. RRT, Sept. 29, 2003) for a case concerning enforced
health treatment on the basis of religion.
“INS Grants Asylum to Autistic Child Persecuted Due to Disability,” (2001) 78(13) Interpreter Releases
604. See also O v. Independent Federal Asylum Board (UBAS), 2006/19/0521 (Au. VwGH [Austrian Administrative Court], Sept. 26, 2007), involving the threat of enforced subjection to psychiatric treatment for
Convention reasons.
A denial of access to health care normally available to others in society is a clear violation of the nondiscrimination guarantee in the Civil and Political Covenant, supra n. 81, at Art. 2; the Economic,
Social and Cultural Covenant, supra n. 104, at Arts. 2(2) and 12; and potentially the non-discrimination
provisions in the Race Convention, supra n. 107, at Art. 2; Women’s Convention, supra n. 108, at Arts. 2
and 12; Children’s Convention, supra n. 109, at Art. 2.
N03/45504, [2003] RRTA 627 (Aus. RRT, Jul. 1, 2003), at 5.
This is particularly so where a claim, as is often the case, involves the denial of health care or medical
treatment as well as other violations of socio-economic rights: see Chen Shi Hai (Aus. HC, 2000); SBAS
(Aus. FC, 2003), at [54]–[59]; Tchoukhrova v. Gonzales, (2005) 404 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir., Apr. 21, 2005)
(although the court noted in that case that “most of these harms could rise to the level of persecution
independently”: at 1192); Cheung (Can. FCA, 1993); Shi Chen (USCA, 7th Cir., Apr. 28, 2010), at 333–34.
Germany’s Federal Administrative Court has explained that it is appropriate to consider, in assessing
serious harm in refugee law, “discrimination . . . in respect of access to education or health facilities,
but also occupational or economic restrictions on earning a living”: 10 C 23.12 (Ger. BverwG [German
Federal Administrative Court], Feb. 20, 2013), at [36] (unofficial translation).
For example, in Kholyavskiy (USCA, 7th Cir., 2008), the claim of having a well-founded fear of future
persecution was appropriately rejected on the basis that the applicant’s medical claim was based on his
inability to obtain necessary medication in Russia but there was “no evidence in the record to suggest
that the unavailability of the medication is the result of the Russian government’s attempt to injure
[him]”: at 574. See also Ixtlilco-Morales v. Keisler, (2007) 507 F.3d 651 (USCA, 8th Cir., Nov. 2, 2007), at
656. Similarly, in Refugee Appeal No. 76015 (NZ RSAA, Nov. 14, 2007), the New Zealand Refugee Status
Appeals Authority appropriately rejected the claim of a Bolivian man with a physical disability on the
basis that any inadequate health care in his home country was due to lack of resources and not due
to any discrimination against the applicant: see at [42]–[43]. However, in Paredes v. Attorney General,
(2007) 219 Fed. Appx. 879 (USCA, 11th Cir., Mar. 5, 2007), the Eleventh Circuit’s affirmation of the
Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision is questionable, given that the accepted evidence was that the
Venezuelan government’s prioritization of health care to HIV-infected women and children meant that
“homosexual men were usually left without medical treatment”: at 888. In light of the background of
homophobia established in the record, this is arguably more than “regrettable”: at 888. In particular, it
can be contrasted with the opposite view of the Federal Court of Canada in Diaz v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), [2009] 3 FCR 395 (Can. FC, Nov. 6, 2008).
This has been accepted in a range of jurisdictions. In Australia, see Chen Shi Hai (Aus. HC, 2000); Kuthyar
v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, [2000] FCA 110 (Aus. FC, Feb. 11, 2000), at [79].
In Ireland, see EMS v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, [2004] IEHC 398 (Ir. HC, Dec.
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In practice, however, claims raising such issues have not always been understood to
bespeak a violation of basic human rights norms, due in part to misunderstandings already
discussed about the implications of the duty to implement socio-economic rights progressively, and to the maximum of available resources. While it is true that the “right of everyone
to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health,”336 like
most other socio-economic rights, is not a duty of immediate result, it is equally true that
efforts actively to deny or reduce access to health care cannot on any reading be reconciled
to the duty “to take steps . . . with a view to achieving progressively the full realization” of
this right.337 For these reasons, a US appellate court was right to question the refusal of
protection to a Russian child with cerebral palsy who was “denied rights afforded to all
other citizens”338 on the basis of his disability. Specifically, the child “was never given any
treatment for his cerebral palsy and had difficulty obtaining routine medical care afforded
to other Russians as a matter of course.”339 The court categorically rejected the immigration
judge’s view that the Russian government’s actions could be “excused” because Russia “does
not have the resources to provide medical attention to individuals at the same standards as
in developed nations”:340
It is true generally that a country’s failure to provide its citizens with a particular level of
medical care or education due to economic constraints is not persecution . . . However,
claims of financial difficulties cannot be used to justify the deprivation of services essential to human survival and development, if the deprivation is based on the recipient’s
membership in a statutorily protected group . . . [W]here the denial seriously jeopardizes
the health or welfare of the affected individuals, a finding of persecution is warranted.341

20

This conclusion accords with the core obligation of states to “ensure the right of access to
health facilities, goods and services on a non-discriminatory basis, especially for vulnerable
or marginalized groups,”342 a duty with which a “State party cannot, under any circumstances
whatsoever, justify its non-compliance.”343 Accordingly, claims based on denial of medical
treatment for reasons of religion, disability, and HIV status have all been recognized as
persecutory.344 For example, the fact that a country is poor and undeveloped was held not

336
338
339

340
342

343

344

21, 2004), at 11. In the Netherlands, the Judicial Division of the Council of State in A v. Staatssecretaris
van Justitie, 200805681/1 (Neth. RvS [Dutch Council of State], May 19, 2009) held that discriminatory
exclusion from medical care can amount to persecution. See further analysis in Foster, supra n. 120, at
226–28. See also UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection No. 8, supra n. 111, at [35].
337
Economic, Social and Cultural Covenant, supra n. 104, at Art. 12.
Ibid., at Art. 2(1).
Tchoukhrova v. Gonzales, (2005) 404 F.3d 1181 (USCA, 9th Cir., Apr. 21, 2005), at 1194.
Ibid. This case has a complicated procedural history as it was later vacated by the US Supreme Court,
although on a different and unrelated point: see Gonzales v. Tchoukhrova, (2006) 549 US 801 (USSC,
Oct. 2, 2006).
341
Ibid.
Ibid., at 1194–95.
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest
Attainable Standard of Health, UN Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000) (“CESCR General Comment
No. 14”), at [43(a)].
Ibid., at [47]. We note that differentiation is not the same as discrimination. See also Committee on the
Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 15: The Right of the Child to the Enjoyment of the Highest
Attainable Standard of Health, UN Doc. CRC/C/GC/15 (Apr. 17, 2013), at [1], [8]–[11]. Art. 2(3) does
not apply to the right to health, it not being an “economic right”: see above discussion at notes 319–327.
See e.g. Diaz (Can. FC, 2008), at [32], [37]; Gorzsas v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
(2009) 346 FTR 169 (Can. FC, May 6, 2009), at [26]. Alland and Teitgen-Colly, the authors of the leading
French textbook, note that discrimination can rise to the level of persecution through “repetitious
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to undercut a claim to fear persecution where, for example, “people infected with HIV may
be denied even the low level of care available to others on account of their membership
of a particular social group.”345 As the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal explained in
Covarrubias:
[W]here a country makes a deliberate attempt to persecute or discriminate against a
person by deliberately allocating insufficient resources for the treatment and care of that
person’s illness or disability, as has happened in some countries with patients suffering
from HIV/AIDS, that person may qualify . . . [for refugee status], for this would be refusal
to provide the care and not inability to do so.346

The High Court of Ireland took much the same view, finding that a risk of being persecuted
might be established where there is a policy that “AIDS sufferers are, having regard to the level
of resources available within South Africa, [to be] treated in a discriminatory manner.”347
A risk to health may thus ground a claim to face the risk of persecutory harm in a number
of ways. While the most straightforward cases are those that threaten the right to life or which
amount to a threat of torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, the duty of states
progressively to implement a more broad-ranging right to health care means that a wider
range of claims involving a sustained or systemic risk of deprivation, withdrawal, or denial
of critical or essential health care or medical treatment may also evince the required risk of
serious harm. Nor is it the case that human rights law sees resource insufficiency as grounds
to excuse the failure to allocate available resources without discrimination. To the contrary,
where there is evidence that whatever resources are available are deliberately skewed in a
way that disfranchises a relevant sub-group of the population, the risk of persecutory harm
is established.
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10

15

3.4 Liberty and freedom
To this point, we have examined the circumstances in which a human-rights-based approach
to the serious harm requirement of refugee law would see various threats to physical integrity –
risks to life; of torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; of enslavement, including trafficking and forced marriage; of physical violence; of denial of an adequate

345

346

347

character,” such as through refusal of access to medical care or children’s enrollment in schooling:
Alland and Teitgen-Colly, supra n. 158, at 376–77 (unofficial translation). See also Foster, supra n. 120,
at 226–31.
N94/04178, [1994] RRTA 1149 (Aus. RRT, Jun. 10, 1994). In Diaz v. Canada (Can. FC, 2008), at [35]–[36],
the court quashed the Board’s decision and remitted it on the basis that the Board had failed properly
to consider the applicant’s claim that “he would experience persecution and risk as an HIV positive
Mexican without meaningful family support, with the potential for systemic barriers to employment,
and with the potential for discrimination in health care delivery”: at [37]. See also Gorzsas (Can. FC,
2009), at [39].
Covarrubias v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] 3 FCR 169 (Can. FCA, Nov.
10, 2006), at 189 [39]. While this was a case concerning s. 97(1)(b)(iv) of the Canadian Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act 2001, rather than that part of the Act concerned with refugee status, the
court made it clear that it envisaged that such a claim may qualify for refugee status: at 187 [32]. This
understanding has been subsequently adopted by the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board: see
e.g. TA5-11242 (Unreported, Can. IRB, Mar. 9, 2007).
EMS (Ir. HC, Dec. 21, 2004), at 12. See also Msengi (Ir. HC, 2006), at 4–6. This is supported by the
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ explanation that: “Inappropriate health resource
allocation can lead to discrimination that may not be overt”: CESCR General Comment No. 14, supra
n. 342, at [19].
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standard of living; and to health – as persecutory harms. We now turn to cases in which the
main right at stake is a liberty or freedom interest, with a focus on the rights to be free from
arbitrary arrest and detention, to enjoy freedom of movement, and to work. In practice,
many cases in which liberty or freedom concerns predominate will also implicate physical
integrity issues of the kind previously discussed (especially where violence accompanies
arbitrary arrest and detention) or the rights of self-realization and autonomy discussed
in the next section (for example, in relation to the right to work). Given the interdependence and connectedness of human rights, intersections of this kind are, of course, to be
expected.

3.4.1 Arrest and detention
10
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20

25
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Persecution often takes the form of “detention, arrest, interrogation, prosecution, [and]
imprisonment”348 – whether by way of police or other officially mandated custody,
house arrest, “involuntary hospitalization,”349 or even “being involuntarily transported.”350
Importantly, though, not every constraint on free movement amounts to a violation of an
internationally guaranteed human right: international human rights law requires only that
any deprivation of liberty be “on such grounds and in accordance with such procedures as
are established by law,”351 and – assuming this first requirement is met – expressly disallows
only “arbitrary” arrest or detention.352 It follows, for example, that ordinary policing efforts
do not normally infringe this standard, assuming that they are conducted in accordance
with valid criminal law and are not arbitrarily conceived or enforced. Beyond the basic
requirements of lawfulness and avoidance of arbitrary action, international human rights
law requires further that “[a]ll persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.”353 Taken together, these
three requirements provide a sound and workable basis for the assessment of persecutory
harm under refugee law.
In assessing whether subjection to arrest and detention amounts to the risk of serious
harm, the first critical benchmark is therefore whether the arrest and/or detention are truly
“on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law.” Because
of this requirement, persons facing arrest or detention at the hands of non-state actors will
almost always face the risk of persecutory harm.
Second, even where the arrest and/or detention takes place within a genuine legal framework, it must not be “arbitrary.” The notion of arbitrariness is not synonymous with
“against the law,”354 but prohibits even arrest and detention authorized by law which
is discriminatory,355 or which shows “elements of inappropriateness, injustice, lack of
predictability, and due process of law.”356 This includes, for example, the “detention of
348

349
350
351
354
356

This is often stated to be a description of obvious persecution in US jurisprudence: see e.g. He (USCA,
6th Cir., 2012), at 13, citing Gilaj v. Gonzales, (2005) 408 F.3d 275 (USCA, 6th Cir., May 9, 2005), at 285
and De Leon v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, (2004) 99 Fed. Appx. 597 (USCA, 6th Cir., May
12, 2004), at 598.
HRC Draft General Comment No. 35, supra n. 256, at [6].
Ibid., citing R 12/52 Saldias de Lopez v. Uruguay, Communication No. 52/1979, UN Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1
(HRC, Jul. 29, 1981), at [13].
352
353
Civil and Political Covenant, supra n. 81, at Art. 9(1).
Ibid.
Ibid., at Art. 10(1).
355
HRC Draft General Comment No. 35, supra n. 256, at [13].
Ibid., at [17].
Ibid., at [13]. The due process of law may be informed by Civil and Political Covenant, supra n. 81, Art.
9(2)–(4), as well as other provisions such as Art. 14.
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innocent family members of alleged criminals, the holding of hostages, and arrests for the
purpose of extorting bribes.”357 More generally, resort to arrest or detention as a means
of deterring the exercise of internationally guaranteed human rights such as freedom of
opinion and expression,358 freedom of assembly,359 freedom of association,360 freedom of
religion,361 and the enjoyment of privacy rights362 is fairly understood to be arbitrary,363
and hence to amount to serious harm for refugee law purposes.
Third, even if the arrest or detention is both lawful and not arbitrary, it must be effected
in a manner that comports with the duty of states to ensure that all persons deprived of their
liberty are “treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human
person.”364 Where there is evidence, for example, that the result of an otherwise permissible
arrest or detention is subjection to truly undignified conditions, even if falling short of
inhuman or degrading treatment, the situation bespeaks a risk of breach of international
human rights norms, and is thus serious harm relevant to the assessment of refugee status.
Despite the clarity of this three-part standard, courts have often struggled to assess
whether there is evidence of persecution where the risk of arrest or detention occurs in the
context of a difficult security situation in the home country. Decision-makers have been
understandably concerned not to take an absolutist approach to such cases, recognizing
that both national security and the importance of ensuring the security of their population often motivate governments to order preventive detention and other deprivations of
liberty.365
Some states seek to strike this balance by reference to standards other than international
human rights law. Australian courts, for example, have relied instead on a standard derived
from that country’s domestic law, namely whether the law under which the applicant will
be arrested or detained is “appropriate and adapted to achieving some legitimate object of
the country of the refugee.”366 The amorphous notion of “some legitimate object of the
country of the refugee” has been interpreted to justify arrest and detention predicated on
the equally malleable notion of protecting and promoting “the general welfare of the state
and its citizens.”367 The requirement that the actions of the home state be “appropriate and
adapted” has proved equally elusive.

357
358
360
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364
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367

HRC Draft General Comment No. 35, supra n. 256, at [16].
359
Civil and Political Covenant, supra n. 81, at Art. 19.
Ibid., at Art. 22.
361
362
Ibid., at Art. 22.
Ibid., at Art. 18.
Ibid., at Art. 17.
HRC Draft General Comment No. 35, supra n. 256, at [17].
Civil and Political Covenant, supra n. 81, at Art. 10(1).
The Human Rights Committee has made it clear that preventive detention is permitted pursuant to Art.
9. The usual safeguards apply, however, in that “it must not be arbitrary, and must be based on grounds
and procedures established by law . . . information of the reasons must be given . . . and court control
of the detention must be available . . . as well as compensation in the case of a breach”: Human Rights
Committee, General Comment No. 8: Right to Liberty and Security of Persons (Jun. 30, 1992), at [4].
The fact that this test is taken directly from domestic constitutional interpretation is made clear in
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v. SZNWC, (2010) 190 FCR 23 (Aus. FFC, Dec. 20, 2010), at
254 [54], per Perram J., citing Lange v. ABC, (1997) 189 CLR 520 (Aus. HC, Jul. 8, 1997) and Roach v.
Electoral Commissioner, (2007) 233 CLR 162 (Aus. HC, Aug. 30, 2007).
See Balan v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, (2000) 171 ALR 7 (Aus. FC, Mar. 31,
2000). Although this is particularly prevalent in Australian case law, a similar analysis is sometimes found
elsewhere: see e.g. Brar v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), (1993) 68 FTR 57 (Can.
FCTD, Sept. 8, 1993), at [6]; Papu v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (Unreported,
Can. FCTD, Aug. 15, 1994), at [5]–[6], referring to a “valid social objective.”
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In contrast, analysis grounded in international human rights law is likely to lead to more
principled results. As the right not to be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention is, at
international law, subject to no internal limitation, the only question is whether it can be
justified by reference to the standard of permissible derogation in the context of a “public
emergency which threatens the life of the nation.”368 Even in this clearly exceptional context,
international human rights law requires further that measures taken derogate only “to the
extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation.”369 Taken together, it is clear that
the only “legitimate object” is an “emergency which threatens the life of the nation” (not, for
example, promotion of the “general welfare”), and that the means chosen must be “strictly
required” (rather than merely “appropriate and adapted”).
It follows more generally that the view sometimes taken that a person is not at risk
of “being persecuted” where the home state is acting both reasonably and under color of
law is not sustainable. Applying the human rights framework, a decision-maker should
rather assess whether the risk of otherwise impermissible arrest and detention is taking
place in a country that has validly suspended its duties under international human rights
by “officially proclaim[ing]” the existence of a national emergency that “threatens the life
of the nation” and by acting in response to that threat in a manner that comports with
the obligation to take only measures that “are limited to the extent strictly required by the
exigencies of the situation”370 and which do not involve “discrimination solely on the ground
of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin.”371 In reviewing compliance with
these requirements, for example, the Human Rights Committee determined that Israel’s
administrative detention laws derogate from the right not to be subjected to arbitrary arrest

368

369

370

371

Civil and Political Covenant, supra n. 81, at Art. 4(1). The Human Rights Committee has explained that
“[m]easures derogating from the provisions of the Covenant must be of an exceptional and temporary
nature” and that, in order to invoke Art. 4(1), “two fundamental conditions must be met: the situation
must amount to a public emergency which threatens the life of the nation, and the State party must
have officially proclaimed a state of emergency”: HRC General Comment No. 29, supra n. 115, at [2].
It should be noted that while Art. 9 is subject to derogation, the Human Rights Committee has taken
the view that the requirement of court review over the lawfulness of detention forms a non-derogable
element in Art. 9: HRC General Comment No. 29, supra n. 115, at [27]. According to the UN Special
Rapporteur on the Question of Human Rights and States of Emergency, Art. 9 is “one of the rights
most frequently affected by this type of situation, to the point that it is rare for a state of emergency
not to involve the suspension of this right”: L. Despouy, Report by the UN Special Rapporteur on the
Question of Human Rights and States of Emergency, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/19 (Jun. 23, 1997), at
[161].
In de Montejo v. Colombia, Communication No. 64/1979, UN Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 (HRC, Mar. 24, 1982)
the Human Rights Committee noted that: “In the specific context of the present communication there
is no information to show that article 14(5) was derogated from in accordance with article 4 of the
Covenant; therefore the Committee is of the view that the State party, by merely invoking the existence
of a state of siege, cannot evade the obligations which it has undertaken by ratifying the Covenant.
Although the substantive right to take derogatory measures may not depend on a formal notification
being made pursuant to article 4(3) of the Covenant, the State party is duty bound, when it invokes
article 4(1) of the Covenant in proceedings under the Optional Protocol, to give a sufficiently detailed
account of the relevant facts to show that a situation of the kind described in article 4(1) of the Covenant
exists in the country concerned”: at [10.3].
HRC General Comment No. 29, supra n. 115, at [4]. Of course there will be severe limits on a refugee
decision-maker’s ability to closely analyze this: see e.g. A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department,
[2005] 2 AC 68 (UKHL, Dec. 16, 2004).
Civil and Political Covenant, supra n. 81, at Art. 4(1).
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or detention “more extensively than what in the Committee’s view is permissible,”372 casting
doubt on the validity of the Australian tribunal’s finding that arrest and detention in that
country were not persecutory because they were “appropriate and adapted to achieving a
legitimate object of the country concerned (Israel).”373
The issue of valid suspension of the usual rules regarding permissible arrest and detention
was frequently considered by decision-makers in the context of the claims of Tamils fleeing
the Sri Lankan civil war. Confronted with evidence in many cases that the government
arrested, detained, and questioned Tamils (or a subset of Tamils) in response to specific
or general threats to safety and security, it was sometimes assumed that short periods of
arrest and/or detention were lawful and hence not evidence of persecution.374 The analysis
was often too facile, since valid derogation at international law requires compliance with
an additional constraint, namely that even an emergency suspension of rights may not
“involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social
origin.”375 As noted by the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal, it follows that where the Sri
Lankan arrests “were motivated by the simple fact of the appellant’s being a Tamil”376 one
cannot assume without careful analysis of the question of discrimination that the particular
risk of arrest and detention was valid under international law, and thus non-persecutory.377
In sum, while states have a duty to protect the population as a whole by engaging in
ordinary policing – and may, of course, in most cases arrest and detain persons on the
basis of their criminal law authority – they must act on grounds and in accordance with
procedures established by law.378 Even where the arrest and/or detention take place within
372

373

374

375
376
377

378

See Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations, Israel, UN Doc. CCPR/CO/78/ISR (Aug.
21, 2003), at [12]. See also Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations, Israel, UN Doc.
CCPR/C/ISR/CO/3 (Sept. 3, 2010), at [7].
SZKUG v. Minister for Immigration, [2008] FMCA 1 (Aus. FMC, Feb. 22, 2008), at [28], where Driver
F.M. set out the Refugee Review Tribunal’s reasoning. The magistrate found no reviewable error in this
case: at [36].
Although see Velluppillai v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (Unreported, Can. FCTD,
Mar. 9, 2000), where the Canadian Federal Court held that while it may generally be true that “[s]hort
detentions for the purpose of preventing disruption or dealing with terrorism do not constitute persecution,” it is necessary to take account of the “special circumstances of the applicant . . . in particular his
age [76]”: at [15]. This has been applied in subsequent case law: Murugamoorthy v. Canada (Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration), (2003) 33 Imm. L. R. (3d) 119 (Can. FC, Sept. 29, 2003), at [6] and
Kularatnam v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2004] FC 1122 (Can. FC, Aug. 12,
2004), at [10].
Civil and Political Covenant, supra n. 81, at Art. 4.
Thirunavukkarasu (Can. FCA, 1993), at [21].
It should be noted that the prohibited grounds in Civil and Political Covenant, supra n. 81, at Art. 4(1) are
narrower than those in both Art. 2(2) and Art. 26. In particular, “national origin” is not included because
during drafting, “it was accepted that ‘national origin’ could not be a prohibited ground of discrimination
because nationals of enemy states were often discriminated against in war time”: McGoldrick, supra n.
116, at 413. But see A (UKHL, 2004). See generally, D. Cassel, “International Human Rights Law and
Security Detention,” (2009) 40 Case W. Res. J. Intl. L. 383. Hence, a law which applies on its terms
solely to a protected group, or in practice is applied only in respect of a protected group, is very likely
to contravene the prohibition on discrimination and hence to constitute arbitrary arrest or detention
amounting to serious harm: see Applicant A (Aus HC, 1997), at 258–59. But see Balan (Aus. FC, 2000).
For a very good treatment of this issue, see R (Sivakumar) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department,
[2003] 1 WLR 840 (UKHL, Mar. 20, 2003), especially at 847 [18], where Lord Steyn explained his finding
that the decision below which found that the applicant Tamil from the north of Sri Lanka who had been
tortured as part of the investigation into suspected terrorist activities was not a refugee was in error: “On
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a genuine legal framework, they must moreover not be “arbitrary,” and cannot result in the
arrested or detained person being treated in an inhumane or undignified way.379 The risk
of an arrest or detention that fails to meet these standards is presumptively serious harm
for refugee law purposes. While states enjoy somewhat greater latitude to arrest and detain
in the context of a genuine and officially declared national emergency, their broadened
authority must nonetheless comport with the duties to take only such steps as are strictly
required by the exigencies of the emergency, and to act in a way that is not solely grounded
in discrimination. Only where there is compliance with these internationally defined norms
will arrest and detention even in the context of a national emergency fail to be evidence of
persecutory harm.

3.4.2 Prosecution
As in the case of the more specific issue of arrest and detention discussed above, persons
facing the risk of prosecution under laws of the country of origin cannot normally be said
to fear persecution.380 If the only risk faced is of legitimate prosecution or punishment for
breach of the ordinary criminal law, refugee status is not to be recognized:
Persecution must be distinguished from punishment for a common law offence. Persons
fleeing from prosecution or punishment for such an offence are not normally refugees.
It should be recalled that a refugee is a victim – or potential victim – of injustice, not a
fugitive from justice.381
15

Indeed, a fugitive from justice is explicitly excluded from refugee status by virtue of Art.
1(F)(b).382

379

380

381
382

a realistic view of the facts there was a reasonable likelihood of persecution on the ground of race (since
he was a Tamil), a member of a particular social group (he was a Tamil from Jaffna) or political opinion
(the separatist views predominant among Tamils from the North).”
For a good treatment of the nexus issue in this context, see Perampalam v. Minister for Immigration and
Multicultural Affairs, (1999) 84 FCR 274 (Aus. FFC, Mar. 1, 1999); Nagaratnam (Aus. FC, 1999) at 579;
and NAVZ v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, [2005] FCA 13 (Aus. FC,
Jan. 21, 2005), at [43].
For example, cases where the applicant was at risk of being prosecuted under the law of bovicide in
Nepal: Lama v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, [1999] FCA 1620 (Aus. FC, Nov. 19,
1999) and SZDNE v. Minister for Immigration, [2004] FMCA 717 (Aus. FMC, Oct. 14, 2004); where the
applicant was at risk of prosecution for assaulting a government official in the course of that official’s
enforcement of family planning laws: Jiang (USCA, 5th Cir., 2010); where the applicant was at risk of
being prosecuted for engaging in trading within the security zone in southern Lebanon occupied by
Israel: El Hejjar v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, [2000] FCA 263 (Aus. FFC, Mar. 13,
2000) (although we note that the risk of torture in that case would give rise to a claim for complementary
protection); where the applicant was at risk of capital punishment for murder in Yemen even where
it is imposed by a Sharia court: Saleh v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, (1992) 962 F.2d 234
(USCA, 2nd Cir., Apr. 29, 1992), at 238–39; where any consequences the applicant feared in Haiti were
the result of the human rights violations committed under the authority of the applicant’s husband:
Mme Duvalier, 81.963 (Fr. CE [French Council of State], Jul. 1, 1992); and where the applicant was at
risk of prosecution for his role in a fraudulent transaction involving a VAT refund where there was no
evidence of political pretext or corruption in that case: Refugee Appeal No. 76339, [2010] NZAR 386 (NZ
RSAA, Apr. 23, 2010). See generally Grahl-Madsen, supra n. 2, at 192.
UNHCR, Handbook, supra n. 1, at [56].
For an in-depth analysis of this provision, see infra Ch. 7.2.
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On the other hand, a state’s laws, including in particular its criminal law, can be
manipulated as a tool to persecute. Because persecution and prosecution are not mutually exclusive,383 a decision-maker confronted with the risk of what seems to be the exercise
of criminal law authority must ensure that a prosecution is not in substance rights-violative,
and hence serious harm for purposes of the “being persecuted” analysis. A risk of persecutory harm may arise in any of three situations: where a person will be prosecuted and/or
punished outside the legitimate process of the state; where the criminal law breaches international human rights law; or where the criminal law is enforced or punishment meted
out in a disproportionate or discriminatory manner. We examine each of these scenarios in
turn.
First, there is a risk of serious harm where a person faces “prosecution” for actions not
truly unlawful in the home state.384 For example, in considering the claim of a Chinese
national at risk of official sanctions for assisting North Korean refugees, the US Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined that there was no Chinese law, statute or regulation
prohibiting such conduct, meaning that any punishment imposed by state authorities could
not be characterized as simply prosecution for violation of the ordinary criminal law.385 The
Canadian Federal Court of Appeal has similarly recognized refugee status where the risk of
“prosecution” will in fact be conducted under a “parallel system of political courts . . . [which]
is universally recognized as subversive of the rule of law,”386 and where the applicant’s claim
“was not based on fear of facing a criminal charge; it was based on fear of summary
execution.”387 These decisions accord with the view of Grahl-Madsen that
[i]n cases where the government resorts to . . . extra-legal, or at least extra-judicial, measures, it seems fitting to speak of political persecution rather than prosecution for political
offences. The same may apply if the courts have lost their independence and are in fact
only a prolonged arm of the executive.388

A second context in which what appears superficially to be only the risk of criminal
law enforcement may amount to serious harm is where the law under which prosecution
383

384

385

386
387
388

The statement in Hathaway, Refugee Status, that “while persecution and prosecution are not coterminous,
neither are they mutually exclusive” has been approved in subsequent case law: see e.g. R v. Immigration
Appeal Tribunal; Ex Parte Cimen, [1997] EWHC Admin 865 (Eng. HC, Oct. 13, 1997), at [4]; R (Abdulla),
[2001] EWCA Civ 1081 (Eng. CA, May 16, 2001), at [5]. As noted in Zhu v. Holder, (2010) 378 Fed.
Appx. 599 (USCA, 9th Cir., Apr. 29, 2010), prosecution can be used as “a mere pretext for persecution on
account of a protected ground”: at 600, citing Abedini v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, (1992)
971 F.2d 188 (USCA, 9th Cir., Jul. 24, 1992). See also Xun Li v. Holder, (2009) 559 F.3d 1096 (USCA, 9th
Cir., Mar. 23, 2009), at 1108.
In addition, prosecution under retroactive laws – that is, where the act was not criminal at the time of
commission, Civil and Political Covenant, supra n. 81, at Art. 15 – may also amount to serious harm in
this context.
Xun Li (USCA, 9th Cir., 2009), at 1109–10, discussing previous authority also. In that case, “[n]either
the IJ [immigration judge] nor the Attorney-General was able to cite to any Chinese statute or regulation
that criminalizes Li’s conduct, and the record demonstrates that no such law exists”: at 1110. Hence, “the
record compels the conclusion that the officials were not engaged in legitimate criminal prosecution”: at
1111 (emphasis in original). See further infra Ch. 5.8.
Cobbold v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (Unreported, Can. FCA, Nov. 30, 1990),
at [2].
Addo v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), (1992) 142 NR 170 (Can. FCA, May 7, 1992),
where the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal overturned the Panel’s decision: at [3].
Grahl-Madsen, supra n. 2, at 84.
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or punishment is to occur is, on its face, in breach of international human rights law –
for example, the “virulently anti-Semitic” Nazi-era Nuremberg Laws.389 Such “laws” are,
of course, patently at odds with human rights law and cannot therefore be justified as the
exercise of legitimate national criminal law authority. Yet an Australian decision assessing
risk of “prosecution” under Bangladeshi law for desertion of a merchant ship failed even to
inquire whether such a law was in breach of the prohibition of enforced labor.390 Instead,
relying on Australia’s sui generis approach previously described, the Full Federal Court found
that the pertinent question was simply whether the punishment threatened was “appropriate
and adapted” to achieving the objective of “securing Bangladesh’s reputation as a source
of merchant seamen, important for the country as a means of providing employment
and for future remittances”391 – an approach clearly at odds with a human-rights-based
understanding of when what appears to be “prosecution” is in fact “persecution.” Similar
questions arising in relation to religious practice, freedom of conscience (including military
conscription), privacy, political expression and participation, and the ability to leave one’s
country are considered below in the context of analysis addressed to those more specific
issues.
Third, it may be the case that an otherwise valid criminal law is enforced in a discriminatory manner, whether in terms of the decision to prosecute, the procedure followed, or the
punishment imposed following conviction.392 As noted by the US Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit in explaining why a refugee claim might be made out in such circumstances,
the [immigration judge’s] “legal” conclusion that Tuhin fled “prosecution” not “persecution” seems to be based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the law . . . A facially
legitimate prosecution may amount to persecution if the prosecution was motivated by
a “nefarious purpose,” i.e., to punish political opinion . . . Tuhin asserted that he was
targeted for prosecution because of his leadership role in the Jatiya Party. In support of
this assertion, he pointed to the police beatings and threats that accompanied his arrest
and human rights reports suggesting that the sweeping laws under which he was charged
were frequently used to punish political expression and that the punishments under those
laws were severe, ranging from five years to death for minor offenses such as obstructing
389

390

391

392

Xun Li (USCA, 9th Cir., 2009), at 1108, citing Sanchez-Trujillo v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,
(1986) 801 F.2d 1571 (USCA, 9th Cir., Oct. 15, 1986), at 1574. In the particular facts in Xun Li, the court
noted: “International treaties further buttress our conclusion that Li’s conduct was not criminal. China
itself has treaty obligations to protect the North Korean refugees. China has acceded to the 1951 UN
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol to that Convention”: at 1111.
SZNWC (Aus. FFC, 2010), although we note that the Federal Magistrate in the decision below did refer
in passing to “international and human rights standards”: SZNWC v. Minister for Immigration, [2010]
FMCA 266 (Aus. FMC, May 13, 2010), at [44].
SZNWC (Aus. FFC, 2010), at 36 [53], citing the Refugee Review Tribunal’s reasons. It is not clear
from where the tribunal derived this objective. For another case which has not assessed such claims
appropriately, see e.g. the confusing case on proselytization: SZDTM v. Minister for Immigration and
Citizenship, [2008] FCA 1258 (Aus. FC, Aug. 19, 2008). See also NAVZ (Aus. FC, 2005), and supra
nn. 365–367.
We note that the Qualification Directive, supra n. 37, is particularly detailed in this regard, stating at Art.
9(2) that “[a]cts of persecution” include:
“...
(b) legal, administrative, police, and/or judicial measures which are in themselves discriminatory or
which are implemented in a discriminatory manner;
(c) prosecution or punishment which is disproportionate or discriminatory;
(d) denial of judicial redress resulting in a disproportionate or discriminatory punishment.”
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traffic. The [immigration judge], however, did not address any of that evidence, focussing
instead solely on the facial legitimacy of the charges.393

Similar concerns may arise in the case of prosecution for the criminal offense of “zina,”
pertaining to “sexual intercourse by two individuals who are not married to each other.”394
While framed in gender-neutral terms in the Afghan criminal code, in practice the provision
is disproportionately used to prosecute women, often as a result of their subjection to rape,
kidnapping, or enforced prostitution.395 Women subject to “prosecution” under the law
are therefore not subject simply to the enforcement of an ordinary criminal law, but are –
assuming the consequences to be sufficiently serious – at risk of serious harm relevant to the
“being persecuted” inquiry.
Beyond simply selective prosecution, the legitimacy of the criminal law process can also
be undermined by adjudication which ignores basic standards of procedural fairness or due
process in order to effect or support political repression.396 In such a case, the individual
concerned faces a violation of procedural rights,397 including the right of everyone to “a
fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by
law.”398 More generally, because such a “prosecution” loses its claim to legal legitimacy,
both the risk of conviction as well as any sanctions that may be imposed on the applicant
following conviction may constitute serious harm for refugee law purposes.
For much the same reasons, what appears to be only exposure to prosecution may in
substance amount to a risk of persecutory harm where the punishment meted out for breach
of even an ordinary criminal law is discriminatory, in violation of human rights norms,399
or simply clearly excessive.400 As the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit explained,
393

394
396
397

398
399

400

Tuhin (USCA, 7th Cir., 2003), at 619–20; see also Lin v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, (2001) 238
F.3d 239 (USCA, 3rd Cir., Jan. 24, 2001), where the Third Circuit overturned the Board of Immigration
Appeal’s refusal on the basis that there was no evidence to support the BIA’s assertion that the applicant
was wanted only for trespass committed during a political protest; rather, he was clearly being pursued
for his political opinion and activism: see 244–46. For an example of a case where it was appropriately
found that the applicant faced prosecution not persecution, see Morente v. Holder, (2010) 401 Fed. Appx.
17 (USCA, 6th Cir., Oct. 29, 2010), at 24–25.
395
Human Rights Watch, supra n. 228, at 34.
Ibid., at 60–78.
See e.g. Khan v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2003] EWCA Civ 530 (Eng. CA, Apr. 2,
2003).
See e.g. Pacificador v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), (2003) 243 FTR 126 (Can.
FC, Dec. 12, 2003), where the Canadian Federal Court found that the Board was in error in refusing
the applicant’s claim where it had found that: “the prosecution of the Applicant was highly tainted by
corruption and that such corruption was due to his political and family affiliation, a ground for claiming
Convention refugee status”: at [78].
Civil and Political Covenant, supra n. 81, at Art. 14(1).
For a clear general statement of this proposition, see Wang (Aus. FFC, 2000), at 562–63; see also Chen
Shi Hai (Aus. HC, 2000), at 301. This was made very clear in Linden J.A.’s judgment in Cheung regarding
forced sterilization of women in the context of China’s one-child policy, where he explained, “[i]f, for
example, rather than forced sterilization, the policy was to put to death every child subsequently born
to a one-child family, no one could possibly deny that the law was persecutory. There is a point at which
cruel treatment becomes persecution regardless of whether it is sanctioned by law”: Cheung (Can. FCA,
1993), at 323. See also UK Border Agency, “Considering Asylum Claims and Assessing Credibility” (Mar.
2011), at [5.9].
In Weheliye v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, [2001] FCA 1222 (Aus. FC, Aug. 31,
2001), the Federal Court of Australia overturned the Refugee Review Tribunal’s decision on the basis
that it had failed to consider whether the laws of adultery in Somalia were applied in a discriminatory
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“a showing of disproportionate punishment may support a claim that the prosecution is a
pretext for persecution on account of political opinion.”401
In sum, while undertaking criminal prosecutions is a legitimate function of government
and is indeed required in order for a state to fulfil its human rights obligations, it is
nonetheless possible that a risk of prosecution may amount to serious harm for refugee
law purposes. Analysis of these issues by reference to international human rights standards
produces a principled and consistent approach to determining when there is a risk of
persecutory harm, rather than simply legitimate prosecution – in particular where a person
will be prosecuted and/or punished outside the legitimate process of the state; where the
criminal law breaches international human rights law; or where the criminal law is enforced
or punishment meted out in a disproportionate or discriminatory manner.

3.4.3 Freedom of movement

15

Persons lawfully in a state are entitled, within the territory of that state, to enjoy both liberty
of movement and freedom to choose their place of residence.402 As the International Court
of Justice affirmed in the Israeli Wall case, efforts to impede free internal movement “are
contrary to international law”403
as guaranteed under Article 12, paragraph 1, of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights. They also [on the facts here] impede the exercise by the persons
concerned of the right to work, to health, to education and to an adequate standard of
living as proclaimed in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights and in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.404

20

Under a human rights framework, therefore, those denied either free internal movement or
the right to choose their place of residence face the presumptive risk of serious harm relevant
to the “being persecuted” inquiry. While such claims arise infrequently, there is a logic to
their recognition: not only is the refusal to allow a lawful resident to move freely within her
own country clear evidence of the social and political disfranchisement that refugee law is
meant to remedy, but it is in substance an only somewhat less intrusive form of detention.

401

402
403

manner: at [58]. There are cases where male applicants have argued that prosecution under the adultery
laws in Iran constitutes serious harm: see e.g. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. Darboy,
(1998) 52 ALD 44 (Aus. FC, Aug. 6, 1998), where the court held that the tribunal had committed a
reviewable error for failing to consider “whether the law was applied in a way that was discriminatory”:
at 52.
Chanco v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, (1996) 82 F.3d 298 (USCA, 9th Cir., Apr. 19, 1996),
at 302; Shardar. v. Ashcroft, (2004) 382 F.3d 318 (USCA, 3rd Cir., Aug. 24, 2004), at 323; Vumi v.
Gonzales, (2007) 502 F.3d 150 (USCA, 2nd Cir., Aug. 31, 2007), at 158; Xun Li (USCA, 9th Cir., 2009), at
1109. See also H v. Independent Federal Asylum Board (UBAS), 99/20/0409 (Au. VwGH, Sept. 27, 2001),
where the Austrian Administrative Court held that: “Threat of punishment for violations of legally
binding moral ideas which have been committed abroad may justify the granting of refugee status if the
disproportionality of punishment shows that it is primarily aimed at an imputed departure from stateimposed ways of thinking”: at 5 (unofficial translation). See also SXJB v. Minister for Immigration, [2005]
FMCA 1536 (Aus. FMC, Feb. 24, 2005), at [18]; and Aala v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural
Affairs, [2001] FCA 1015 (Aus. FC, Jul. 31, 2001), at [15]. (Note the successful appeal in this case reported
at Aala v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, [2002] FCAFC 204 (Aus. FC, Jun. 21, 2002).)
Civil and Political Covenant, supra n. 81, at Art. 12(1).
404
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall (ICJ, 2004), at 201 [163].
Ibid., at [134].
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The internationally guaranteed right to freedom of movement also encompasses the
right of everyone to “be free to leave any country, including his own.”405 This aspect of
the right to freedom of movement is implicated in refugee applications where the claimant
faces the real chance upon return of punishment for having left her country – including
subjection to criminal sanctions such as imprisonment, “physical intimidation, arrest, loss
of employment or expulsion of their children from school or university.”406 Such penalties
cannot be understood to be simply the general application of valid criminal law since they
are, in substance, the criminalization of an internationally guaranteed human right.407 For
this reason, courts in, for example, Austria,408 Belgium,409 and Canada410 have found that a
person who would be charged or prosecuted for having exercised their right to “be free to
leave any country, including his own,” faces the risk of persecutory harm.411
Despite the presumptive relevance to the “being persecuted” inquiry of denials of either
the right to internal movement or to leave one’s country, a human rights framework acknowledges that these rights may be subject to restrictions that “are provided by law, are necessary
to protect national security, public order (ordre public), public health or morals or the rights
and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other rights recognized” in the Civil and
Political Covenant.412 If the limitation to which an applicant would be subject falls within
the scope of such a permissible limitation it is not rights-violative, and thus not a form of
persecutory harm. Yet as determined in the Israeli Wall case, “it is not sufficient that such
restrictions be directed to the ends authorized; they must also be necessary for the attainment
of those ends.”413 Any restriction “must conform to the principle of proportionality”414 and
“must be the least intrusive . . . amongst those which might achieve the desired result.”415

405
406

407
408

409

410

411

412
413
414

Civil and Political Covenant, supra n. 81, at Art. 12(2).
The Human Rights Committee notes that state practice reveals unnecessary measures which include
“harassment of applicants, for example by physical intimidation, arrest, loss of employment or expulsion
of their children from school or university”: Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 27:
Freedom of Movement, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9 (Nov. 2, 1999) (“HRC General Comment
No. 27”), at [17].
See text supra, at nn. 389–91.
The Austrian Administrative Court “has repeatedly stated that sanctions for illegal departure and
stay abroad, if considerably severe and disproportionate, may be relevant for granting asylum”: S
v. Independent Federal Asylum Board (UBAS), 2001/20/0426 (Au. VwGH, Jan. 29 2004) (unofficial
translation). See also 99/20/0160 v. Independent Federal Asylum Board (UBAS) (Au. VwGH, Nov. 21,
2002).
The Belgian Council for Alien Law Litigation found that an Uzbek national who would be subject to
treatment such as “questioning at the very least” likely accompanied by “harassments, telephone threats
and more serious violations of human rights” on return to Uzbekistan (from which he had departed
illegally) constituted serious harm: see 22144 (Bel. CCE, Jan. 28, 2009) (unofficial translation).
In Canada, notwithstanding the negative decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in Valentin (Can. FCA,
1991), the court has held that a claim may be made out where a Cuban man would be subjected to
imprisonment as well as “repercussions over and beyond the statutory sentence”: Castaneda v. Canada
(Minister of Employment and Immigration), (1993) 69 FTR 133 (Can. FCTD, Oct. 19, 1993), at [15].
For an incorrect approach to this type of case which fails to take into account that a law criminalizing
departure in fact criminalizes the exercise of human rights, see Guo Wei Zhi v. Minister for Immigration
and Multicultural Affairs (Unreported, Aus. FC, Dec. 10, 1998). See also AA v. Secretary of State for the
Home Department, [2007] 1 WLR 3134 (Eng. CA, Apr. 12, 2006).
Civil and Political Covenant, supra n. 81, at Art. 12(3).
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall (ICJ, 2004), at 193.
415
Ibid., citing HRC General Comment No. 27, supra n. 406, at [14].
Ibid.
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Thus, for example, persons facing the application of domestic laws or administrative practices that effectively nullify either the right to internal movement or to leave one’s own
country will almost always face the risk of persecutory harm, since such a total abrogation
of a right will be virtually impossible to justify as necessary and proportional.416
Beyond the rights to internal freedom of movement and to be able freely to leave one’s own
country, international human rights law also guarantees that “[n]o one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of the right to enter his own country.”417 This right prohibits efforts directly or indirectly to deny re-entry,418 for example by “stripping a person of nationality or . . . expelling
an individual to a third country [thereby] arbitrarily prevent[ing] [a] person from returning
to his or her own country.”419 This aspect of the right may be infringed either on a particularized basis or more generally, an example of the latter being the citizenship laws of some
states that deprive women of citizenship upon marriage to a foreign national.420
In contrast to other aspects of freedom of movement, the right not to be arbitrarily denied
the right to enter one’s own country is not subject to limitation (only emergency derogation,
discussed above, is permissible).421 It follows that where a person faces the risk of denial of
re-admission to her own country, human rights law is engaged, thus grounding a claim to
serious harm for refugee law purposes.422
Despite the clear logic of seeing a prohibition of re-entry into one’s own country as denial
of the right to freedom of movement and hence as serious harm, there is nonetheless a
unique conceptual awkwardness to such claims. In cases predicated on risk of the denial
of re-entry, the relevant harm will not accrue, as is usually the case, inside the country of
416

417

418
419
420

421
422

Civil and Political Covenant, supra n. 81, at Art. 12(3), clearly indicates that it is not sufficient that
the restrictions serve the permissible purposes; they must also be necessary to protect them. Restrictive
measures must conform to the principle of proportionality; they must be appropriate to achieve their
protective function; they must be the least intrusive instrument amongst those which might achieve the
desired result; and they must be proportionate to the interest to be protected: HRC General Comment
No. 27, supra n. 406, at [14]. The permissible limitations which may be imposed on the rights protected
under Art. 12 must not nullify the principle of liberty of movement, and are governed by the requirement
of necessity provided for in Art. 12(3), and by the need for consistency with the other rights recognized
in the Covenant: HRC General Comment No. 27, supra n. 406, at [2].
The Human Rights Committee has emphasized that “there are few, if any, circumstances in which
deprivation of the right to enter one’s own country could be reasonable”: Civil and Political Covenant,
supra n. 81, at Art. 12(3) specifically applies to the “above-mentioned rights.”
As the Human Rights Committee notes in General Comment No. 27: “It implies the right to remain in
one’s own country”: HRC General Comment No. 27, supra n. 406, at [19].
Ibid., at [21].
This is recognized in administrative guidelines in Australia: see Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, supra n. 174, at 98. It is stated that: “Gender-based persecution for reasons of nationality
may have its genesis in laws which deprive a woman of her citizenship in certain situations (for example,
marriage to a foreign national).” This is also recognized in the UK Border Agency, “Gender Issues in the
Asylum Claim” (Sept. 2010): “women may be deprived of full citizenship rights in certain circumstances,
if they marry a foreign national. In such circumstances it may be necessary to consider what harm results
from this loss and whether it amounts to persecution on the basis of nationality”: at 10.
Art. 12(4) is not subject to the same limitations as Art. 12(1) and (2), as Art. 12(3) specifically applies to
“the above-mentioned rights.”
The fact that the deprivation of citizenship will most likely have occurred prior to the application for
refugee status has been held not to affect the validity of a claim because such an act of exclusion causes
ongoing, significant harm to the individual concerned: 10 C 50.07 (Ger. BverwG [German Federal
Administrative Court], Feb. 26, 2009), at [22] (unofficial translation). See also Refugee Appeal No. 73861
(NZ RSAA, Jun. 30, 2005).
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origin – since entry is by definition refused. Recognition of refugee status is nonetheless
appropriate since the definition requires only that the person seeking protection “is outside”
her country because of a well-founded fear of being persecuted. There is, in other words, no
need to find that the harm feared is one that would actually take place inside the home state,
but simply that the risk of being persecuted accounts for the inability to return. A person who
is prevented from re-entering her own country is outside her country because the prospect
of a rights-violative denial of re-entry explains her inability to return there.423
Importantly, the right to re-enter one’s own country – indeed, the whole of the right to
freedom of movement, including to internal movement and choice of residence – is not a
right that inheres only in citizens. Courts have sometimes assumed that a denial of re-entry
“does not interfere with a stateless person’s rights in the way that it does with the rights of
a national,”424 thus impugning a claim to recognition of refugee status made on this basis.
Yet international human rights law makes no such distinction.425 The right to return is a
right to return to one’s “own country” – a notion that does not mean simply a right to go
back to one’s country of “citizenship” or “nationality.”426 Rather, human rights supervisory
bodies have determined that a stateless person with a long-standing and genuine connection
to their country of residence is also entitled to claim the state as “his own country” and
thus to re-enter that state.427 Both persons with citizenship and those who are stateless
may therefore make claims to refugee status grounded on the risk of unlawful denial of
423

424

425

426
427

Whether or not a person is actually stripped of nationality, the arbitrary refusal of the right to return
to one’s country of citizenship for a Convention reason “amount[s] to persecution” on the basis that it
would “negate one of the most fundamental rights attached to nationality, namely the right to live in the
home country . . . Denial of the right of abode would necessarily prevent the applicant from exercising
a wide range of other rights – if not all – typically attached to nationality, as well as almost inevitably
involving an interference with private and/or family life”: MA (Ethiopia) v. Secretary of State for the Home
Department, [2010] INLR 1 (Eng. CA, Apr. 2, 2009), at [60] (per Elias L.J.) and at [66] and [73] (per
Stanley Burnton L.J.). See also Refugee Appeal No. 73861 (NZ RSAA, 2005), at [107]: “Indeed he was
effectively expelled from the country as part of a series of persecutory acts by the Saudi authorities.”
Further it held that, “[h]is exclusion from Saudi Arabia, itself a form of persecution, is ongoing”: at
[117]. In 10 C 50.07 (Ger. BverwG [German Federal Administrative Court], 2009) the court explained
that “[d]e facto deprivations of citizenship may be relevant to asylum when the state leaves the individual
with the formal legal position, but de facto denies him or her the resulting rights of citizenship, and
in particular does not grant him or her the protection of the state”: at [23] (unofficial translation). On
denial of re-entry as persecution, see Adan (Eng. CA, 1997), at 1124–26. See also Ward (Can. SC, 1993),
at 711 for reference to this issue in historical materials.
MA (Palestinian Territories) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2008] EWCA Civ 304 (Eng.
CA, Apr. 9, 2008), at [26], per Maurice Kay L.J. See also AK v. Secretary of State for the Home Department,
[2007] Imm AR 81 (Eng. CA, Jul. 31, 2006): “I am far from satisfied that there is a true analogy between
a state’s denial of entry to one of its citizens and denial of entry to a stateless person (who, unlike a
citizen, has no right of entry into the country)”: at [48], per Richards L.J.
See Race Convention, supra n. 107, at Art. 5(d)(ii); Children’s Convention, supra n. 109, at Art. 10(2);
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, UNGA Res. A/RES/61/106, 2515 UNTS 3, adopted
Dec. 13, 2006, entered into force May 3, 2008, at Art. 18(1)(d).
See supra Ch. 1.3.3; and M. Foster, “An Alien by the Barest of Threads: The Legality of the Deportation
of Long-Term Residents from Australia,” (2009) 33 Melb. U. L. Rev. 483, at 516–17.
HRC General Comment No. 27, supra n. 406, at [20]. See also Joseph, Schultz, and Castan, supra n.
134, at 375. This is supported in Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee in respect
of Israel: see Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations, Israel, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79.Add.93
(Aug. 18, 1998), in relation to Palestinians “travelling in and between East Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip and
the West Bank,” that “Israel is urged to respect the right to freedom of movement provided or under
article 12, including the right to return to one’s country”: at [22].
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re-entry.428 Indeed, since many if not most stateless persons who leave the country in which
they were once habitually resident will find themselves barred from returning to that country,
the persecutory nature of that harm will in practice open the doors to refugee status for a
significant subset of the stateless population.
In contrast to persons who are outside their own country because they face the forwardlooking rejection of re-entry, a person who has been denationalized – purely past persecution, and incapable of being repeated – will not necessarily be able to establish a forwardlooking risk of serious harm. Unless able to show that the denationalization poses a real
chance of denial of re-entry, a refugee claim by a denationalized person may be recognized
only if she is able to establish a distinct forward-looking risk of harm. Thus, for example,
Germany’s Federal Administrative Court found that “a deprivation of citizenship for reasons relevant to asylum may represent persecution” because in stripping an individual of her
nationality
the state deprives the individual in question of his or her fundamental status as a citizen,
and thus necessarily denies residency protection, thereby rendering the person stateless
and unprotected – in other words: it excludes him or her from the state’s system of
protection and peace.429
428

429

Although the English Court of Appeal rejected the argument that a stateless Palestinian could found a
claim on denial of re-entry in MA (Palestinian Territories) (Eng. CA, 2008), the same court apprehended
the “force of [the] argument” that the appellant “has a well founded fear of being persecuted for a
Convention reason namely race because, as a Palestinian, he will not be readmitted to the West Bank”:
MT v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2009] Imm AR 290 (Eng. CA, Oct. 22, 2008), at
[46]. Scott Baker L.J. felt compelled to reject the claim based on the precedent of MA (Palestinian
Territories): at [47]. There is support for this in state practice. For example, in 1995 the US Immigration
and Naturalization Service General Counsel issued a legal opinion addressing the question of asylum
eligibility for stateless Palestinians, stating that “Palestinians who are expelled, denied re-entry, or have
their property confiscated without compensation because of their Palestinian nationality may qualify
for refugee status, if there is not a legitimate, non-discriminatory basis for the governmental action”:
see K. Musalo, J. M. Moore, and R. A. Boswell, Refugee Law and Policy (3rd edn., 2007), at 273. In Ouda
(USCA, 6th Cir., 2003) the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held, in considering whether there was
a risk of being persecuted on the part of the Palestinians on return to Kuwait, that “[t]he mere fact that
the Oudas were ordered by the government to leave Kuwait because they were perceived enemies of their
country is sufficient alone to establish past persecution”: at 454. However, in other decisions, claims
have been rejected because petitioners have “failed to show that entry would be denied to them based
on their nationality as opposed to the law of those countries favouring citizenship based on ancestry or
marriage”: Ouda at 453, citing Al Najjar (USCA, 11th Cir., 2001), at 1291–92. In Canada it has long been
accepted that the decision-maker “is compelled to ask itself why the applicant is being denied entry to
a country of former habitual residence because the reason for the denial may, in certain circumstances,
constitute an act of persecution by the state”: Thabet v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
[1998] 4 FC 21 (Can. FCA, May 11, 1998), at [32]. In AAAAD v. Refugee Appeals Tribunal, [2009] IEHC
326 (Ir. HC, Jul. 17, 2009) the Irish High Court granted leave to bring judicial review proceedings on the
question whether persecution could be established on the basis that “the applicant will not be accepted
back into Kuwait because he is a Bidoon”: at [86].
10 C 50.07 (Ger. BverwG [German Federal Administrative Court], 2009), at [19] (unofficial translation).
See also the decision of the Austrian Independent Federal Asylum Board in DA v. Federal Asylum Authority,
203.029/0-II/28/98 (Au. UBAS, Nov. 10, 1999), in which the court held that “[a] state’s refusal to allow
a citizen re-entry into its territory is a severe violation of the personal sphere amounting to a significant
break of relations between the state and the citizen, leaving the latter in a hopeless situation.” In that
case it was held that “this measure would be directly aimed at the applicant’s attributed oppositional
opinion and on her personal background as a woman of ‘western’ upbringing” (unofficial translation).
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The US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit similarly noted that while not all denationalizations are “instances of persecution,” nonetheless
[i]f Ethiopia denationalized the petitioner because of his Eritrean ethnicity, it did so
because of hostility to Eritreans; and the analogy to the Nazi treatment of Jews is close
enough to suggest that his denationalization was persecution . . . Indeed, if to be made
stateless is persecution, as we believe . . . then to be deported to the country that made
you stateless and continues to consider you stateless is to be subjected to persecution.430

In line with these decisions, despite the insufficiency of (past) denationalization per se to
ground a claim of forward-looking serious harm, it is surely right to recognize the existence
of serious harm at least in those cases where the denationalized person would, once in the
country, face forms of consequential human rights abuse – including because of exclusion
from the state’s protective apparatus – that rise to the level of serious harm.431
In sum, the risk of denial of the right to internal freedom of movement and choice
of residence will ordinarily amount to serious harm for refugee law purposes, unless that
denial conforms to the strict requirements for valid limitation of that right at international
law. Denial of the right to enter one’s own country – a right not subject to limitations, and
inhering in both citizens and in non-citizens who have a long-term attachment to the country
– is also a clear breach of the internationally guaranteed right to freedom of movement, the
risk of which will thus properly be understood to be serious harm for refugee law purposes.

5

10

3.4.4 Right to work
The prohibition of forced labor is derived from both the Civil and Political Covenant’s prohibition of servitude432 and from the Economic, Social and Cultural Covenant’s stipulation
that work must be “freely chosen”433 – meaning that a person may “not [be] forced in
any way whatsoever to exercise or engage in employment.”434 A claim based on forced or
430

431

432
433
434

Haile v. Holder, (2010) 591 F.3d 572 (USCA, 7th Cir., Jan. 6, 2010), citing for example “instances in
which, as a result of altered boundaries, a person finds himself a citizen of a different country”: at 573.
See also Stserba (USCA, 6th Cir., 2011), at 973–76.
In EB (Ethiopia) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2007] EWCA Civ 809 (Eng. CA, Jul.
31, 2007), Jacob L.J. noted that ordinarily “someone who has been deprived of nationality because of
race would, if returned, be in a near-impossible position – unable to vote, to leave the country or even
unable to work. They may well be treated as pariahs precisely because they had their nationality taken
away”: at [75]. See also Haile v. Gonzales, (2005) 421 F.3d 493 (USCA, 7th Cir., Aug. 29, 2005), at 497
in relation to two Ethiopians of Eritrean descent stripped of their Ethiopian citizenship. In Tesfamichael
v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, [1999] 60 ALD 223 (Aus. FC, Dec. 2, 1999) the
Federal Court held that expulsion or exile from the country of nationality would “fall within the category
of harm sufficient to constitute persecution”: at [54]. This was supported by early academic writings.
For example, Grahl-Madsen took the view that “[a]s denationalization (deprivation of citizenship) for
political, ethnic or similar reasons incurs loss of civil rights, that too may be classified as persecution”:
Grahl-Madsen, supra n. 2, at 215.
Which includes “forced or compulsory labour”: Civil and Political Covenant, supra n. 81, at Art. 8(3)(a).
Economic, Social and Cultural Covenant, supra n. 104, at Art. 6(1).
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 18: The Right to Work, UN
Doc. E/C.12/GC/18 (Feb. 6, 2006) (“CESCR General Comment No. 18”), at [6]. We note that Art. 2(3)
permits discrimination in limited circumstances against non-nationals in regard to “economic rights”
which may include work. This will not, however, sustain a blanket prohibition: see text supra, at nn.
323–27.
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compulsory labor would thus clearly rise to the level of serious harm sufficient to ground a
claim to face the risk of “being persecuted.”435
Refugee claims are, however, rarely grounded in forcible subjection to work. The more
common allegation is instead that an applicant has been denied access to work on a discriminatory basis. Since everyone has “the right to work, which includes the right of everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by work,”436 many claims involving denial of
the ability to work have been sensibly recognized by refugee decision-makers as demonstrative of serious harm. So long as denial of the ability to work is based on discrimination, the fact that the duty to allow all persons free access to work is technically an
obligation subject to progressive implementation (rather than requiring immediate implementation) is irrelevant: under Art. 2(2) of the Economic, Social and Cultural Covenant,
states are required to pursue implementation of such rights “without discrimination of any
kind.”437
While denial of the right to work is perhaps most often considered as part of a claim
to fear persecution on cumulative grounds,438 it may also independently ground a claim to
fear serious harm for refugee law purposes in situations where the deprivation is sufficiently
extensive.
First and perhaps most readily understood to be persecutory harm is the situation in
which an applicant faces the risk of “economic proscription” – the complete, or nearly
complete, denial of the right to work.439 Given the clear correlation between work and
435
436
437
438

439

See discussion of slavery, supra Ch. 3.3.3.
Economic, Social and Cultural Covenant, supra n. 104, at Art. 6(1).
Ibid., at Art. 2(2). See also CESCR General Comment No. 18, supra n. 434, at [33], describing violations
of the obligation to respect the right to work.
In addition to common law jurisdprudence on this topic, discussed below, Germany’s Federal Administrative Court has explained that it is appropriate to consider, in assessing serious harm in refugee
law, “discrimination . . . in respect of access to education or health facilities, but also occupational or
economic restrictions on earning a living”: 10 C 23.12 (Ger. BverwG, Feb. 20, 2013), at [36] (unofficial
translation). For an earlier decision, see 2 BvR 205/92 (Ger. BverfG [German Federal Constitutional
Court], May 20, 1992). In addition, in Jesús Luis v. Administración del Estado (Sp. TS, Oct. 13, 2004),
the Spanish Supreme Court considered the loss of his job due to political activities to be part of the
applicant’s claim for persecution, which also included fear of arrest and detention.
See e.g. in Australia: Ping v. Minister for Immigration, (1994) 35 ALD 225 (Aus. FC, Nov. 28, 1994),
at 231 (approved by the Full Court: (1994) 34 ALD 228); Prahastono v. Minister for Immigration and
Multicultural Affairs, (1997) 77 FCR 260 (Aus. FC, Jul. 8, 1997), at 267; Kord (Aus. FFC, 2002), at 87 [53];
Seo v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, [2001] FCA 1258 (Aus. FC, Sept. 7, 2001): “It is
clear that in some circumstances discrimination in employment on the ground of religion can amount
to persecution”: at [19]; in New Zealand: H v. Chief Executive of the Department of Labour (Unreported,
NZHC, Mar. 20, 2001), at [15]–[19]; in the UK: He v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2002]
Imm AR 590 (Eng. CA, Jul. 12, 2002), at [26]–[28], per Schiemann L.J., and [38]–[39], per Buxton L.J.,
see also authorities cited in M. Symes and P. Jorro, Asylum Law and Practice (2nd edn., 2010), at 151–53;
in the US: Ghebremedhin v. Ashcroft, (2004) 385 F.3d 1116 (USCA, 7th Cir., Oct. 13, 2004), at 1118.
See also 2 BvR 205/92 (Ger. BverfG, May 20, 1992), where the German Federal Constitutional Court
held that persecution covers restrictions on personal freedom, namely rights of religion and restricted
professional and economic activity, if the harm in its intensity and severity violates human dignity
and goes beyond what the residents of the home state have to accept in general. The persecution has
to be targeted legal interference, rather than the hardship someone has to suffer because of famine,
natural disasters, and the impact of riots, revolutions, and war. For recent Canadian authority, see
Salim v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2011] FCJ 1566 (Can. FC, Nov. 9, 2011), at
[20].
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survival in most economies,440 it is unsurprising that Grahl-Madsen writing nearly fifty
years ago explained that “[i]t is an established practice that economic proscription so severe
as to deprive a person of all means of earning a livelihood” constitutes persecution, and that
“[s]uch proscription is deemed to exist in the case of systematic denial of employment.”441
Economic proscription is most easily established in the context of “blacklisting” or other
exclusion from work in a state-controlled economy. As explained by the Federal Court of
Canada:

5

The ability to sustain oneself normally depends upon the opportunity to work and earn
a livelihood . . . [I]f, in a country in which the state controls the economy, the state takes
steps to prevent a person from securing employment, the consequences will be substantially prejudicial to the person concerned. Systematic governmental interference with the
opportunity to find work must be viewed as a serious restraint on an individual.442

In such a case, the fact that an applicant “did, and might again, obtain employment illegally,
is no answer.”443
Outside the context of a state-controlled economy, economic proscription also exists
where a sustained or systemic denial of the right to work – whether at the hands of the state,
or not subject to rectification by the state – substantially impairs the ability of an individual
to survive.444 In Ouda, for example, the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found
there to be evidence of persecutory harm since

10

[a]fter Kuwait was liberated, Ouda’s father was not allowed to return to work because
he was a Palestinian who was perceived as supporting Iraq when he continued teaching
during the war. Indeed, the Kuwaitis engaged in a general campaign to prohibit Palestinians from working, attending school, buying food, obtaining water or obtaining drivers’
licenses.445

The Canadian Federal Court has also clearly insisted on “the importance of being able to
pursue a livelihood,”446 requiring decision-makers carefully to consider “the restriction on
440

441
442

443
444
445
446

The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has explained that: “The right to work
contributes at the same time to the survival of the individual and to that of his/her family, and insofar
as work is freely chosen or accepted, to his/her development and recognition within the community”:
CESCR General Comment No. 18, supra n. 434, at [1]. See also “The Michigan Guidelines on the Right
to Work (No. 5, 2009),” (2010) 31 Mich. J. Intl. L. 293 (“Michigan Guidelines on the Right to Work”), at
293, noting that it is “interrelated, interdependent with, and indivisible from the rights to life, equality,
the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, [and] an adequate standard of living.”
Grahl-Madsen, supra n. 2, at 208; Hathaway, Refugee Status, at 238; and Foster, supra n. 120, at 90–91.
Xie v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), (1994) 75 FTR 125 (Can. FCTD, Mar. 3, 1994),
at [11]. The court went on to say that if “his blacklisting makes it illegal for him to be employed by
anyone in China,” this would likely result in persecution: at [12]. The court did not make a conclusive
finding, as its role was simply to find error and send the matter back to the panel for rehearing: see at
[15]. See also Li v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), (1994) 88 FTR 46 (Can. FCTD,
Nov. 23, 1994): “Such total or systemic inability to earn a living constitutes persecution”: at [30]; Soto
v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] FCT 768 (Can. FCTD, Jul. 10, 2002), at
[16]–[22].
Xie (Can. FCTD, 1994), at [13].
See in particular the US decisions in Desir v. Ilchert, (1988) 840 F.2d 723 (USCA, 9th Cir., Mar. 7, 1988)
and Baballah v. Ashcroft, (2004) 367 F.3d 1067 (USCA, 9th Cir., May 6, 2004).
Ouda (USCA, 6th Cir., 2003), at 454.
Horvath v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2011] FC 1350 (Can. FC, Nov. 23, 2011),
at [43].
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[an] Applicant’s ability to pursue a livelihood.”447 The court has applied this requirement
in a range of cases – including, for example, where there was evidence of persistent discrimination in accessing employment by Roma in Hungary;448 where there was a failure to
“consider whether the systemic discrimination against HIV-positive persons [in Venezuela]
in employment amounted to persecution;”449 and where there were allegations of systemic
barriers to employment in Mexico based on HIV status.450 Courts have been appropriately
cautious, requiring sufficient evidence that a denial of the right to work is indeed sustained
or systemic, since the loss of one particular job is of course not sufficient in and of itself to
establish serious harm under international human rights law.451
Economic proscription may also be manifested by the destruction of a person’s business,
confiscation of property,452 or prohibition on or inability to operate a business. So long as
the risk truly rises above financial hardship453 and amounts in substance to the inability
to earn one’s livelihood,454 the right to work is engaged. An Australian decision has thus
recognized that
[w]here land is seized unjustly or unlawfully by a government or its agents or where a
government condones or approves of seizure by individuals using threats of violence and
the land provides the livelihood of the person dispossessed, and the seizure is part of a
pattern of seizures based on race, religion, political opinion or targeted at an identifiable

447
449
450

451

452

453

454

448
Ibid., at [42].
Ibid., at [32]–[43].
Romero v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), (2012) 413 FTR 1 (Can. FC, Jun. 7, 2012),
at [2].
Diaz v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2009] 3 FCR 395 (Can. FC, Nov. 6, 2008),
at [33] (cf. the failure of the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit to appreciate the importance
of HIV testing by Mexican employers in Paredes v. Attorney General, (2007) 219 Fed. Appx. 879 (USCA,
11th Cir., Mar. 5, 2007)).
Many decisions rejecting claims based on employment are focused on the failure to establish there was
indeed an inability to work generally. A good example is provided in Abdelwahed v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service, (2001) 22 Fed. Appx. 811 (USCA, 9th Cir., Nov. 20, 2001), where the work-related
claim was rejected on the basis that the applicant “left Saudi Arabia around one month after he lost his
job. Not only did he not try to find another job in Saudi Arabia, he never gave himself the chance”: at
813. See also Ghilduta v. Mukasey, (2008) 263 Fed. Appx. 111 (USCA, 2nd Cir., Feb. 6, 2008); Zheng v.
US Attorney General, (2006) 451 F.3d 1287 (USCA, 11th Cir., Jun. 14, 2006); Alexandrescu v. Mukasey,
(2008) 537 F.3d 22 (USCA, 1st Cir., Aug. 7, 2008); Japarkulova v. Holder, (2010) 615 F.3d 696 (USCA,
6th Cir., Aug. 11, 2010).
See S2012 of 2003 v. Minister for Immigration, [2008] FMCA 954 (Aus. FMC, Jul. 31, 2008), at [23], and
Cheng (USCA, 3rd Cir., 2010), where the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that “the seizure
of property as significant as the family farm and truck, when those assets served as the exclusive source of
the family’s livelihood, constitutes a severe economic sanction that ‘could threaten [the] family’s freedom
if not their lives’”: at 194 (citations omitted).
Hence in Khourassany v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, (2000) 208 F.3d 1096 (USCA, 9th Cir.,
Apr. 5, 2000) the court appropriately rejected a claim where the applicant “was able to continue to
operate his other businesses even after his restaurant was forced to close”: at 1100. See also Sanchez v.
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2006] FC 604 (Can. FCTD, May 16, 2006), where
the court found that “[a]t most, the actions of the FARC were effectively depriving [the applicant] of the
opportunity to pursue part-time work [in the form of a part-time business outside of his day job]”: at
[17]–[20].
See e.g. Yazitchian v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, (2000) 207 F.3d 1164 (USCA, 9th Cir., Apr.
3, 2000); Baballah (USCA, 9th Cir., 2004); Hassan v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration),
(1992) 141 NR 381 (Can. FCA, Mar. 30, 1992).
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social group . . . all of the elements needed to satisfy the test of persecution under the
Convention . . . are present.455

But what of cases that fall short of economic proscription, in which the risk to the right
to work does not involve the complete nullification or substantial impairment of the right?
Is there a risk of serious harm where, for example, an individual is prohibited from working
in a profession or other occupation for which she is objectively qualified?
As a matter of international human rights law, the right to work is understood to transcend
mere survival. It rather “forms an inseparable and inherent part of human dignity,”456 and
is essential to “development and recognition within the community.”457 Indeed, the exclusion of a person from the profession or occupation for which she is objectively qualified,
particularly when accompanied by relegation to a job considered demeaning, is often undertaken precisely in order to degrade or demean, and for that reason may actually amount to
degrading treatment.458 Refugee claims by Mandeans denied employment because they are
considered “dirty”459 and by a Roma cook refused employment because “restaurant patrons
would not eat in a restaurant with a Roma cook”460 raise precisely this possibility. As the
Australian Federal Court has made clear,

5

10

it would be just as much oppressive and thus involve persecution if, instead of there being
no ability to obtain employment, there is ability to obtain employment but limited to
jobs which are . . . demeaning to the person employed to do them.461

But even where there is no such issue of degrading treatment, it may still be the case that
denial of access to work for which one is objectively qualified justifies a finding of serious
harm for refugee law purposes.462 Drawing on High Court of Australia authority that “the
455
456
459

460
461

462

SZALM v. Minister for Immigration, [2004] FMCA 262 (Aus. FMC, May 7, 2004), at [20].
457
458
CESCR General Comment No. 18, supra n. 434, at [1].
Ibid.
See supra Ch. 3.3.2.
SBBG (Aus. FFC, 2003), where the Federal Court noted, in explaining its reasons for quashing the Refugee
Review Tribunal decision, that “it is at least arguable that what the Tribunal described as ‘inconveniences,
disruptions and limitations’ are, in law, ‘persecution’ under the Convention”: at [29].
Horvath (Can. FC, Nov. 23, 2011), at [32].
Prahastono (Aus. FC, 1997), at 267, and authorities cited therein. In Kord (Aus. FFC, 2002) the Full Federal
Court expressed the principle as follows: “[h]ad he [the applicant] not been able to find employment at
all, or if the differences between the conditions of the employment open to him and of that not open
to him were significant, those matters would also have been relevant”: at 87 [53]. In Soon v. Minister for
Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, (1994) 37 ALD 609 (Aus. FC, Sept. 13, 1994) the Federal Court dismissed
the application on the basis that “[t]here is no evidence that he has been forced to engage in demeaning
work well below the level of any qualifications he has so as in substance to deny his right to work”: at
617.
In those jurisdictions, such as the US, which tend to frame the analysis as one involving economic
disadvantage, the focus is often, unsurprisingly, on the economic impact of exclusion from work. Hence,
if a person is merely excluded from work in his or her chosen field, but can otherwise obtain some form of
employment, refugee claims are less likely, although not impossible, to establish. For example, the Eighth
Circuit continues “to require a showing that allegations of economic hardship threaten the petitioner’s
life or freedom in order to rise to the level of persecution”: Makatengkeng v. Gonzales, (2007) 495 F.3d 876
(USCA, 8th Cir., Aug. 3, 2007), at 883, and “to rise to the level of [persecution]”, an economic deprivation
must be sufficiently severe “to constitute a threat to an individual’s life or freedom”: Ji v. Mukasey, (2008)
263 Fed. Appx. 116 (USCA, 2nd Cir., Feb. 7, 2008), at 118. (See also Aranyi v. Mukasey, (2008) 527 F.3d
737 (USCA, 8th Cir., May 28, 2008), at 740–41; Naik v. US Attorney General, (2010) 402 Fed. Appx. 451
(USCA, 11th Cir., Nov. 5, 2010), at 454; Barreto-Clara v. US Attorney General, (2001) 275 F.3d 1334
(USCA, 11th Cir., Dec. 19, 2001); Sofinet v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, (1999) 196 F.3d 742
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denial of access to employment, to the professions and to education . . . may constitute
persecution if imposed for a Convention reason,”463 it has been determined that there is
a risk of serious harm where a person is relegated to work “of a type which ignores any
academic or special experience or qualification to work in a highly skilled area for which the
person has been specially trained.”464 Similarly, the Federal Court of Canada has determined
that “[t]o permanently deprive a teacher of her profession and to forever convert an educated
young woman into a farm-hand and garment worker, constituted persecution.”465 The US
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit similarly insisted that since “[d]estitution or total
deprivation of livelihood . . . is not required,”466 there is persecutory harm where a person
has been subject to “sweeping limitations” on access to work in her chosen profession,
“particularly if that profession is a highly skilled one [in that case, medicine] in which the
person invested education and training.”467

463

464

465

466
467

(USCA, 7th Cir., Nov. 2, 1999).) On the other hand, in Kadri v. Mukasey, (2008) 543 F.3d 16 (USCA, 1st
Cir., Sept. 30, 2008), the US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit criticized existing authority relating
to economic persecution on the basis that the “BIA and our sister circuits have not been consistent in
articulating such a standard”; indeed “the BIA has applied at least three different standards”: at 22. In
remanding that case to the Board of Immigration Appeals to apply the new standard set out in In re
T-Z- (USBIA, 2007), the First Circuit noted that the applicant’s inability to practice as a doctor “may be
able to sustain a claim for persecution”: at 22. See also Borca (USCA, 7th Cir., 1996), at 212, regarding a
Romanian radiologist who was relegated to work as a farm labourer.
Chan (Aus HC, 1989), at 430. This has been cited in many subsequent decisions relating to employment:
see e.g. Chen v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, (1995) 58 FCR 96 (Aus. FC, Jun. 30, 1995), at
104; Gunaseelan v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, (1997) 49 ALD 594 (Aus. FC, May 9,
1997), at 599; Prahastono (Aus. FC, 1997), at 264–65. Further, this remains the position notwithstanding
that Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s. 91R(2) provides that “instances of serious harm” include “denial of
capacity to earn a livelihood of any kind, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist”: (f).
See also NBFP (Aus. FFC, 2005); SBBG (Aus. FFC, 2003), at [29]; MZKAO v. Minister for Immigration
and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, [2003] FMCA 284 (Aus. FMC, Jun. 23, 2003), at [14] (upheld
in Applicant MZKAO v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, [2003] FCA
1484 (Aus. FC, Dec. 12, 2003)). Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s. 91R is clearly designed to tighten the test
for serious harm: see Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v. VBAO, (2004)
139 FCR 405 (Aus. FC, Nov. 19, 2004), at 409 [20]. Although see SZMGR v. Minister for Immigration
and Citizenship, [2009] FMCA 174 (Aus. FMC, Mar. 20, 2009) for the view that the pre-s. 91R case law
is relevant to determining “serious harm.” Note that in MZWPD (Aus. FC, 2006) it was said that while
s. 91R(2) “imposes a significant constraint on what may amount to persecution,” it is non-exhaustive
and does not constitute a definition: at [82]–[83]. See also SZCWF (Aus. FFC, 2007), at [32].
Ye Hong v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, [1998] FCA 1356 (Aus. FC, Oct. 2, 1998),
at 9. On the other hand, whether “a person suffers persecution by reason of his inability to practice
his chosen employment is a question of fact and degree”: PW87/2001 v. Minister for Immigration and
Multicultural Affairs, [2001] FCA 1083 (Aus. FC, Aug. 10, 2001), at [20]–[21]. Cf. Ahmadi v. Minister for
Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, [2001] FCA 1070 (Aus. FC, Aug. 8, 2001), at [43]–[48].
He v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), (1994) 78 FTR 313 (Can. FC, Jun. 1, 1994), at
[15]. See also Cabello et al. v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), (1995) 93 FTR 156 (Can.
FCTD, Jan. 30, 1995), at [5]–[6]. See also Foster, supra n. 120, at 100. There is a risk however that an
element of presumption and judgment may enter decision-making in this area: see e.g. Refugee Appeal
No. 70863/98 (NZ RSAA, Aug. 13, 1998), where the Refugee Status Appeals Authority found that an
Iranian woman prohibited from working as a hairdresser was not a victim of persecution because there
“has not therefore been a substantial investment in terms of years of training and accumulated experience
which may make any proscription on following one’s normal profession particularly onerous”: at 9.
Stserba (USCA, 6th Cir., 2011), at 976, citing In re T-Z- (USBIA, 2007), at 174.
Stserba (USCA, 6th Cir., 2011), at 977.
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Such an approach resonates with recognition that the internationally guaranteed
right to work is not merely about protecting economic survival, but is also “central
to . . . development of the human personality.”468 As eloquently explained by the Refugee
Appeal Board of South Africa in a case concerning the inability of a Zimbabwean to practice
his profession for political reasons:

5

The freedom to engage in productive work – even where that is not required in order
to survive – is indeed an important component of human dignity, for mankind is preeminently a social species with an instinct for meaningful association. Self-esteem and
the sense of self-worth – the fulfilment of what it is to be human – is most often bound
up with being accepted as socially useful.469

Denial of access to government employment should be given particular weight in the
assessment of serious harm in line with the Civil and Political Covenant’s guarantee that
“[e]very citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without [discrimination] and without unreasonable restrictions” to “have access, on general terms of equality, to public service
in his country.”470 This is so not only in fairly straightforward cases of a state-controlled
economy, or where work in government is a prerequisite to professional qualification. More
fundamentally, a discriminatory refusal to allow someone to work in her state’s public service
sends a clear signal of precisely the sort of disfranchisement from membership in the body
politic that is at the heart of refugee law. As thoughtfully observed by Justice Mansfield in
the Australian Federal Court decision of Thalary:

10

15

Far from treating its citizens equally, the State then is sanctioning discrimination against
some of them for Convention reasons. It is difficult to envisage circumstances where
such discrimination may, in a practical sense, be insignificant. That is the more so when
there is a significant economic disadvantage consequent upon that restriction, although
actual economic disadvantage in an immediate personal sense is not per se the critical
matter. It is unnecessary to resort specifically to relatively recent historical examples to
make the point. To characterise the circumstances as not sufficiently serious to constitute
persecution in my view fails to acknowledge the fundamental significance of the State
positively excluding certain of its citizens for Convention reasons from employment by
the State and its organs.471

In contrast to cases in which the right to work is infringed by means of economic
proscription or refusal of access to the work for which one is objectively qualified, claims
that raise only concerns about the quality or conditions of employment do not ordinarily
rise to the level of persecutory harm. Subjection to diminished conditions such as reduced
salary, demotion, or loss of other benefits472 is more likely to be dismissed as raising concerns
468
469
470
471

472

“Michigan Guidelines on the Right to Work,” supra n. 440, at 293.
Refugee Appeal No. 53/2005 (SA RAB, Nov. 30, 2004), at [33], citing Minister of Home Affairs v.
Watchenuka, [2004] (2) BCLR 120 (SCA) (SA SCA, Nov. 28, 2003), at 127 [27], per Nugent J.A.
Civil and Political Covenant, supra n. 81, at Art. 25. We note that the limitation of the right of government
employment to citizens was misunderstood by Hill J. in Prahastono (Aus. FC, 1997): see at 268.
Thalary v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, (1997) 73 FCR 437 (Aus. FC, Apr. 4, 1997), at
448. See also SGKB v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, (2003) 76 ALD
381 (Aus. FFC, Mar. 18, 2003), where the Full Federal Court quashed the decision of the Refugee Review
Tribunal on the basis that, inter alia, it “ought to have considered whether or not the risk of losing the
opportunity of government employment was itself sufficient to constitute persecution”: at 387 [21].
In some cases, claims have been rejected where an applicant suffered only a reduction in salary or
demotion. To the extent that such decisions assume that this does not constitute a human rights
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“in the nature of unpleasantness or a conflict of personalities”473 in the workplace, thus not
qualifying as serious harm for refugee law purposes.474 But even here, care must be taken
to ensure that the real import and impact of the “conditions” of work are understood.
If, for example, an individual is, for discriminatory reasons, given the choice of working
only in an especially dangerous job or not working at all,475 she is in substance subject
to economic proscription:476 the choice between starving due to lack of work or risking
serious bodily harm or death in order to work is no choice at all. Similarly, where the
conditions of employment rise to the level of degrading treatment – for example, where
the treatment to which the Albanian applicant had been subjected in the Yugoslavian army
was “meant to humiliate and eliminate Albanian soldiers”477 – the issue is not simply poor
working conditions, but rather the risk of degrading treatment (or worse) which is clearly
tantamount to serious harm.
As can be seen, the right to work conceived through the lens of human rights law provides
important benchmarks for the assessment of serious harm. Most obviously, the risk of
forcible subjection to work is clearly rights-violative and hence a form of persecutory harm.
More generally, both subjection to economic proscription and denial of work for which an
individual is objectively qualified can also be forms of serious harm. Particular attention

473
474

475

476
477

violation this is likely mistaken in light of the Economic, Social and Cultural Covenant, at Art. 7(a)(i)
(see e.g. I v. Federal Ministry of the Interior, 92/01/0181 (Au. VwGH [Austrian Administrative Court],
Sept. 16, 1992)). Yet these cases usually appear to turn on the fact that the harm would not be sustained
or systemic (relating to one job only) or failure of nexus: see e.g. Kornetskyi (USCA, 6th Cir., 2005) (see
in particular the dissent by Bright J.); Xin Kong Ni v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, (2002) 54
Fed. Appx. 212 (USCA, 6th Cir., Dec. 27, 2002). For the opposite approach see: Tung v. Canada (Minister
of Employment and Immigration), (1991) 124 NR 388 (Can. FCA, Mar. 15, 1991).
Ye Hong (Aus. FC, 1998), at 9.
For example, in a decision before the Australian Refugee Review Tribunal involving an Ahmadi man from
Pakistan, the tribunal appropriately held that although the “applicant was transferred from one office
to another, forced to work long distances from home and that his fellow workers would not cooperate
with him,” this did not amount to serious harm: 0800834, [2008] RRTA 165 (Aus. RRT, May 12, 2008),
at [52]–[53]. See also SAAU v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, [2002] FCA 626 (Aus.
FC, May 17, 2002), at [11]. See also Kong v. Mukasey, (2008) 273 Fed. Appx. 46 (USCA, 2nd Cir., Apr. 10,
2008), where the Second Circuit appropriately rejected that part of the claim related to work on the basis
that “the IJ [immigration judge] reasonably found that Kong’s testimony that he was forced to attend
reeducation classes, and did not obtain his preferred job, does not rise to the level of persecution”: at
47–48. Finally, the fact that a person may not be eligible for assistance under an affirmative action policy
in his or her home state has appropriately been rejected as a basis for refugee status. In Gunaseelan (Aus.
FC, 1997) the Australian Federal Court confirmed that discrimination in employment can constitute
persecution, but in this case “the establishment of a state policy of positive discrimination in favour of a
particular ethnic group will not necessarily amount to persecution of other groups not the beneficiaries
of that policy”: at 601. See also Gormley v. Ashcroft, (2004) 364 F.3d 1172 (USCA, 9th Cir., Apr. 22, 2004).
Economic, Social and Cultural Covenant, supra n. 104, Art. 7(b) recognizes the right to “safe and healthy
working conditions.” A similarly straightforward issue is relegation to dangerous work for Convention
reasons which, given the potential threat to life entailed in such treatment, easily satisfies the notion of
serious harm. The Children’s Convention, supra n. 109, at Art. 32 guarantees the right of the child “to be
protected from economic exploitation and from performing any work that is likely to be hazardous or to
interfere with the child’s education, or to be harmful to the child’s health or physical, mental, spiritual,
moral or social development.” See also International Labour Organization, Convention (No. 182), at
Art. 3(d), and UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection No. 8, supra n. 94, at [30]. See also M v.
Federal Ministry of the Interior, 93/01/0285 (Au. VwGH [Austrian Administrative Court], Dec. 15, 1993).
See Prahastono (Aus. FC, 1997), at 267.
Begzatowski (USCA, 7th Cir., 2002), where the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit overturned
the Board of Immigration Appeal’s rejection of the claim: at 670.
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should be paid to restrictions on access to government service given the strong signal such
actions send about social and political exclusion. And while mere reduction in the overall
quality of working conditions will not ground a claim to fear persecutory harm, it is otherwise
where the scale or gravity of such reductions means that there is, in substance, the risk of
degrading treatment or another violation of human rights law.

5

3.5 Autonomy and self-realization
In addition to rights designed to protect physical security and liberty and freedom, the third
main category of international human rights law comprises rights that promote autonomy
and self-realization. An individual faces the risk of serious harm for purposes of the “being
persecuted” analysis not only when basic security or freedoms are threatened, but equally
when protected forms of identity, autonomy, and self-worth are at risk. Human rights law
guarantees the right of an individual to hold and to live in accordance with her beliefs, both
religious and political; to be educated (recognized as a central aspect of “the development of
the human personality”);478 to express views individually and collectively; and to form and
maintain intimate relationships, both within a family and more generally.
An overarching question related to many rights of autonomy and self-realization is
whether there can be said to be any duty on the part of an applicant to avoid the risk of
being persecuted by desisting from a relevant act, or by concealing his or her identity.479
Decision-makers have sometimes suggested that because engaging in actions such as public
religious practice, overt expressions of political opinion, or living openly as a homosexual is
“voluntary,” refugee status need not be recognized where “acting discreetly” at home is an
alternative to seeking asylum abroad.480
This reasoning is, however, not justified as a matter of international law. Rights of autonomy and self-realization exist in order to allow persons to be and to express themselves
in ways deemed fundamental without fear of harm or need to conceal. The rationale for
these rights is precisely to enable individuals to make choices about what to believe, how
to express those beliefs, and how to form and maintain intimate personal relationships. To
478

479

480

Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 11: Plans of Action for
Primary Education, UN Doc. E/1992/23 (May 10, 1999) (“CESCR General Comment No. 11”), at [22].
See also Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 13: The Right to
Education, UN Doc. E/C.12/1999/10 (Dec. 8, 1999) (“CESCR General Comment No. 13”), at [1], [4].
For example, in Applicant LSLS v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, [2000] FCA 211
(Aus. FC, Mar. 6, 2000), the Federal Court of Australia upheld a decision refusing the claim of a Sri
Lankan homosexual, noting that “[implicit in [the] finding of the Tribunal is the view that a level of
discretion for the purpose of avoiding persecution is to be expected of the applicant.” Hence, the Refugee
Review Tribunal had held that the applicant could “avoid a real chance of serious harm by refraining
from making his sexuality widely known – by not saying that he is homosexual and not engaging in
public displays of affection towards other men. He will be able to function as a normal member of
society if he does this”: at [7], [20]. For other examples, see R. Haines, J. C. Hathaway, and M. Foster,
“Claims to Refugee Status Based on Voluntary but Protected Actions,” (2003) 15 Intl. J. Ref. L. 430 at
435, and C. Dauvergne and J. Millbank, “Before the High Court: Applicants S396/2002 and S395/2002,
a Gay Refugee Couple from Bangladesh,” (2003) 25(1) Syd. L. Rev. 97. In Nezhadian v. Minister for
Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, [2001] FCA 1415 (Aus. FC, Oct. 18, 2001) the Federal Court of
Australia criticized the “discretion” concept as essentially providing a means by which a decision-maker
justified a preferred outcome: at [10].
We note that this issue has also sometimes arisen in the context of “well-founded fear” (see supra Ch.
2.7) and nexus to a Convention ground (see infra Ch. 5.4).
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suggest that there is a duty to conceal a protected characteristic or to desist from living
openly in accordance with one’s beliefs or nature is to suggest that there is, in substance, a
duty not to avail oneself of one’s basic human rights.
The High Court of Australia took the lead in rejecting the notion of a duty of discretion or
concealment, finding in the seminal decision of S395 that “persecution does not cease to be
persecution for the purpose of the Convention because those persecuted can eliminate the
harm by taking avoiding action within the country of nationality.”481 The Supreme Court of
the United Kingdom helpfully elaborated the fundamental logic of assessing the genuineness
of risk without reference to whether an individual could avoid persecution by desisting from
exercising her rights:
The underlying rationale of the Convention is . . . that people should be able to live freely,
without fearing that they may suffer harm of the requisite intensity or duration because
they are, say, black, or the descendants of some former dictator, or gay. In the absence of
any indication to the contrary, the implication is that they must be free to live openly in
this way without fear of persecution. By allowing them to live openly and free from that
fear, the receiving state affords them protection which is a surrogate for the protection
which their home state should have afforded them.482

And most recently, the Court of Justice of the European Union has also firmly rejected any
duty of concealment, finding that
where it is established that, upon his return to his country of origin, the person concerned
will follow a religious practice which will expose him to a real risk of persecution, he
should be granted refugee status . . . The fact that he could avoid that risk by abstaining
from certain religious practices is, in principle, irrelevant.483
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20

The reasoning of these senior courts is largely in accordance with a human rights framework for identifying relevant forms of serious harm. It should, however, be noted that rights
of autonomy and self-realization are rarely framed in absolute terms; rather their scope is
frequently limited by factors intended to accommodate competing rights and important
social interests. It follows that a limited exception to the rule that there is no duty to desist
from activities that form part of a protected interest is appropriate where the limitation
imposed falls within the scope of an exception expressly authorized at international law.
In all other cases, a risk of serious harm that follows from the expression of, for example,
religious identity, political opinion, or sexual orientation must be assessed without reference
to the possibility to avert harm by concealment.
481

482

483

Appellant S395/2002 (Aus. HC, 2003), at 489 [40], per Kirby and McHugh JJ.; see also at 500–1 [80]–[82],
per Gummow and Hayne JJ. In SZHBP v. Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, (2007) 97 ALD 84
(Aus. FC, Aug. 15, 2007), the Australian Federal Court applied the principles from Appellant S395/2002
to the political context: see especially at [27]–[35]. We note, however, that in Applicant NABD of 2002
(Aus. HC, 2005) a majority of the High Court of Australia declined to find that the Refugee Review
Tribunal had been in error in finding that the applicant was not at risk because “those converts who go
about their devotions quietly are generally not disturbed”: at [12].
HJ (Iran) (UKSC, 2010), at [53], per Lord Rodger; see also at [29], per Lord Hope; at [94], per Lord
Walker; at [103], per Lord Collins; at [110], per Lord Dyson. See also RT (Zimbabwe) (UKSC, 2012), at
356 [25], per Lord Dyson (with whom Lord Hope, Baroness Hale, Lord Clarke, Lord Wilson, and Lord
Reed agreed).
Bundesrepublik Deutschland v. Y (C-71/11) and Z (C-99/11) (CJEU, Sept. 5, 2012), at [79]. See also
Minister voor Immigratie en Asiel v. X (C-199/12), Y(C-200/12) and Z v. Minister voor Immigratie en Asiel
(C-201/12) (CJEU, Nov. 7, 2013), at [71].
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3.5.1 Religion
The right to religious freedom at international law includes the freedom not only to hold
religious beliefs and values, but also to manifest them “either individually or in community
with others and in public and private,”484 and specifically to engage in “worship, observance,
practice and teaching.”485 While inability to practice religion is often enforced or accompanied by other types of serious harm, the deprivation of religious freedom is serious harm
per se:
If a person is forbidden to practise his religion, the fact that he is not imprisoned, tortured,
or banished, and is even allowed to attend school, does not mean that he is not a victim
of religious persecution.486

Given the scope of the protected interest, refugee decision-makers have appropriately recognized the existence of serious harm not only when the ability to hold beliefs is threatened,487
but equally when there is an inability freely to practice one’s religion.488 As the US Court
484

485
487

488

Civil and Political Covenant, supra n. 81, Art. 18. See further Human Rights Committee, General
Comment No. 22: Freedom of Thought, Conscience or Religion, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4
(Jul. 30, 1993) (“HRC General Comment No. 22”): “The freedom to manifest religion or belief in
worship, observance, practice and teaching encompasses a broad range of acts”: at [4]. It is important
to emphasize, however, that a person can be subjected to serious harm on the basis of his or belief alone,
and it is not necessary that the harm follows from “manifestation or practice of a religious faith.” For this
reason, the decision of the Australian Federal Court in WAEW of 2002 v. Minister for Immigration and
Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, [2002] FCAFC 260 (Aus. FFC, Aug. 22, 2002) was erroneous as it
affirmed the decision below which had incorrectly held that “[a]bsent any such manifestation or practice
of a religious faith, there was no basis on which the appellant could be found to have a well-founded fear
of persecution by reason of religion”: at [14].
486
Civil and Political Covenant, supra n. 81, Art. 18(1).
Bucur (USCA, 7th Cir., 1997), at 405.
It has been suggested that to require a person “to renounce his or her religious beliefs or to desecrate
an object of religious importance” might be “regarded as a form of ‘torture’”: Fatin (USCA, 3rd Cir.,
1993), at 1242. The court went on to explain however that “[s]uch a requirement could constitute torture
or persecution, however, only if directed against a person who actually possessed the religious beliefs
or attached religious importance to the object in question”: at 1242. See also Fisher v. INS, (1994) 37
F.3d 1371 (USCA, 9th Cir., Oct. 5, 1994), at 1379–81; Kazemzadeh (USCA, 11th Cir., 2009); Gomes v.
Gonzales, (2007) 473 F.3d 746 (USCA, 7th Cir., Jan. 11, 2007), at 753. The German Administrative Court
in Wiesbaden in a 1992 decision recognized the claim of a Nepalese national from a Brahmin family
who had converted to Christianity and who risked continued pressure by his family and employer to
reconvert to Hinduism if returned to Nepal: II E 5495/84 (Ger. VG, Wiesbaden, 1992), reported at (1994)
6 Intl. J. Ref. L. 673.
McHugh J.’s classic statement of what constitutes persecution in Chan (Aus HC, 1989) posits that
“the imposition of restrictions on the freedoms traditionally guaranteed in a democratic society such as
freedom of speech, assembly, worship or movement may constitute persecution”: at 431. For more recent
authority affirming this position, in the context of the right to practice religion in public, see SBZF v.
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, (2008) 104 ALD 415 (Aus. FC, Oct. 8, 2008), at [54]–[56]. The
New Zealand Court of Appeal approved of this approach in the context of religion in S v. Chief Executive
of the Department of Labour, [2007] NZCA 182 (NZCA, May 8, 2007), at [32]–[34]. For earlier authority
in New Zealand, see Re MSM, Refugee Appeal No. 300/92 (NZ RSAA, Mar. 1, 1994). See also Kazemzadeh
(11th Cir., 2009), at 1354; Sizov (USCA, 7th Cir., 2003), at 376; Fosu v. Canada (Minister of Employment
and Immigration), (1994) 90 FTR 182 (Can. FCTD, Nov. 16, 1994), at [5]; Marshall v. Canada (Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration), [2008] FC 946 (Can. FC, Aug. 14, 2008), at [20]. The fact that the ban
is enforced by the criminal law does not negate its status as constituting serious harm in this context:
Wang (Aus. FFC, 2000), at 563, per Merkel J.; Bastanipour v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,
(1992) 980 F.2d 1129 (USCA, 7th Cir., Dec. 7, 1992), at 1132.
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of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit explained, “it is virtually the definition of religious
persecution that the votaries are forbidden to practice it.”489 The view traditionally taken
in German jurisprudence – that the “denial or even surrender of . . . beliefs under threat
of punishment”490 or prevention of “professing . . . beliefs . . . in the private sphere”491 was
persecutory harm, while the prohibition or restriction of “[r]eligious activities in public,
including missionary work,”492 was not – is thus not correct.493 As much has now been
489

490
491
492

493

Sizov (USCA, 7th Cir., 2003), at 378, citing the previous decision of Bucur (USCA, 7th Cir., 1997).
See also Muhur v. Ashcroft, (2004) 355 F.3d 958 (USCA, 7th Cir., Jan. 20, 2004), at 960–61, as cited
in Kazemzadeh (USCA, 11th Cir., 2009), at 1358, per Marcus J. (specially concurring), in an extensive
critique of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision which suggested that the applicant could hide
his religious conversion. Marcus J. cites authority from other circuits which reject the “discretion” or
“reasonableness” doctrine, and also reviews at considerable length the jurisprudence surrounding the
“free exercise” clause in the First Amendment to the US Constitution, noting that the “right to practice
one’s faith and to do so in public stands at the heart of free exercise”: at 1359. The judge concluded that
“[n]either the founders nor the drafters of the Refugee Convention could have accepted the narrow view
that secret practice can cure persecution”: at 1361 (see also the opinion of the court in Kazemzadeh at
1355, delivered by Pryor J.). See also Golesorkhi v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
(2008) 169 ACWS (3d) 846 (Can. FC, Apr. 18, 2008): “This ‘quiet Christian’ analysis is flawed because
religious persecution can exist where a claimant is prevented from practising his religion due to fear”: at
[18]. See also NM (Christian Converts) Afghanistan CG, [2009] UKAIT 00045 (UKAIT, Dec. 5, 2008), at
[66]. Of course it should be noted that courts have not always been consistent in finding that repression
of religious freedom in itself constitutes serious harm: see e.g. Li Hua Zheng v. Gonzales, (2005) 416 F.3d
97 (USCA, 1st Cir., Aug. 4, 2005) and Babayan (USCA, 9th Cir., 2005) at 980. For further discussion
of US case law, see Anker, supra n. 19, at 224–27. We note that the UNHCR Handbook, supra n. 1,
which states that persecution may include “prohibition of membership of a religious community, of
worship in private or in public, of religious instruction”: at [72], has been adopted in administrative
guidelines in Australia: Department of Immigration, 1996, supra n. 174, at [5.2], and in the UK: UK
Border Agency, “Considering Asylum Claims and Assessing Credibility” (Mar. 2011), at [6.3]. See also
UNHCR, Guidelines on Religion-Based Claims, supra n. 85, at [12].
1 C 9.03 (Ger. BverwG [German Federal Administrative Court], Jan. 20, 2004), at 8–9 (unofficial
translation).
Ibid.
Ibid. For example, in 1 C 9.03 (Ger. BverwG, Jan. 20, 2004), the German Federal Administrative Court
held that the ban on Muslim converts to Christianity from attending “public or official” church services
did not interfere with the protected religious subsistence core in asylum law, and that such interference
would only be established if common prayer and worship in private with other like-minded people
was prohibited and carried a risk for those carrying out such activity. For earlier decisions, see Federal
Republic of Germany Constitutional Court Decision 2 BvR 1300/89 (Ger. BverfG, 1992), reported at
(1993) 5 Intl. J. Ref. L. at 116–17, which held that “a prohibition of religious manifestations in public
only, which left room for religious manifestations in private, did not amount to persecution”: at 116.
The position is neatly summarized by the Federal Administrative Court in 10 C 19.09 (Ger. BverwG,
Dec. 9, 2010), in which the court referred questions to the Court of Justice for the European Union: see
infra n. 495. The court noted that the respondent government had pointed “to the case law that prevailed
in Germany prior to the transposal of Directive 2004/83/EC, according to which persecution relevant to
asylum could be assumed only in cases of interference with the core aspects of a religious belief, but not
in cases of restrictions on the public exercise of a faith”: at [9], (unofficial translation).
In addition to Art. 18(1) of the Civil and Political Covenant, supra n. 81, it is notable that Art. 9 of the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, supra n. 81, also explicitly protects public
practice. For this reason, the German position was heavily criticized: see e.g. Erich Geldbach, “Is there a
Minimum of Religious Existence?” in A. Kilp and A. Saumets (eds.), Religion and Politics in Multicultural
Europe: Perspectives and Challenges (2009): “the minimum theory as put forth by German courts has
no international foundation, no theological basis and is very weak as far as its judicial underpinning is
concerned”: at 251.
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recognized in the European Union’s Qualification Directive,494 affirmed by the Court of
Justice of the European Union to mean that “religion” encompasses “all its constituent
components, be they public or private, collective or individual.”495 In line with this understanding, Germany’s Federal Administrative Court has recently determined that “the mere
prohibition of participation in formal worship in public may constitute a sufficiently serious
act . . . and therefore, persecution.”496
Thus, for example, the Federal Court of Canada rightly determined that “[b]y destroying house churches, the Chinese government is infringing on that right [to religion] in a
persecutory manner.”497 Even less brutal means of denying the freedom to choose one’s
preferred form of religious expression – for example, limiting collective religious observance
to state-approved churches, even if theoretically of the same faith as that embraced by an
applicant – violate the right of religious freedom, and are thus evidence of persecutory harm.
As observed by the Australian Full Federal Court,

5

10

[w]hat type of “religious” freedom is it, that limits the practice of communal rites to
a service conducted by State-approved persons who substitute government propaganda
for elements of theological doctrine?498

This is not to say that the rights to religious beliefs and expression – conceived at both
the individual and collective level – are absolute, or without limits. Some courts have sought
to impose a “reasonableness” overlay on the scope of protected activities. In Kassatkine,
for example, even as the Federal Court of Canada insisted that “[a] law which requires a
minority of citizens to breach the principles of their religion [or] to be lifelong outlaws, is
patently persecutory,”499 it opined that this was true only “so long as those religious tenets
are not unreasonable as, for example, exacting human sacrifice or the taking of prohibited
drugs as a sacrament.”500 While the court’s concern was of course understandable, reliance
on a subjective “reasonableness” test to circumscribe the scope of protected religious activity
is deeply troubling.
Under a human rights approach, the sound alternative is to be guided by the Civil and
Political Covenant’s requirement that “[f]reedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be
subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public
safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.”501 This
494

495
496

497
498
499
500
501

Qualification Directive, supra n. 37, at Art. 10(1)(b) recognizes that freedom of religion encompasses
“the participation in, or abstention from, formal worship in private or in public, either alone or in
community with others.”
Bundesrepublik Deutschland v. Y (C-71/11) and Z (C-99/11) (CJEU, 2012), at [63].
10 C 23.12 (Ger. BverwG [German Federal Administrative Court], Feb. 20, 2013), at [26]–[27]. The
court cited in support the decision of the UK tribunal in MN and others (Ahmadis – Country Conditions
– Risk) Pakistan CG, [2012] UKUT 00389 (UKUT, Jun. 20, 2012) and the UK Supreme Court in HJ
(Iran) (UKSC, 2010), at [27].
Liang v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2011] FC 65 (Can. FC, Jan. 19, 2011), at
[17].
Wang (Aus. FFC, 2000), at 551, per Wilcox J.
Kassatkine v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), (1996) 119 FTR 127 (Can. FCTD, Aug.
20, 1996), at [10].
Ibid. See Haines, Hathaway, and Foster, supra n. 479, at 443, citing domestic cases on drugs and religion.
Civil and Political Covenant, supra n. 81, Art. 18(3). Given the clear link made between acts of persecution
and human rights standards in the Qualification Directive, supra n. 37, leading commentators take the
view that such limits are relevant to whether an act constitutes an “act of persecution” in the sense of
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limitation allows for a balancing of religious freedom with the protection of other important
rights, yet ensures a principled form of scrutiny before a given intrusion is deemed not to
be rights-violative (and thus, not serious harm for refugee law purposes).502
The limitations clause in the Civil and Political Covenant is, however, “to be strictly
interpreted and restrictions may not be imposed for discriminatory purposes or applied in
a discriminatory manner,”503 meaning that societal bias and prejudice against a particular
minority religion cannot constitute a legitimate reason to limit manifestation of the disfavored religion or belief.504 Further, “restrictions are not allowed on grounds not specified
[in relation to religious freedom] . . . even if they would be allowed as restrictions to other
rights protected in the Covenant, such as national security.”505 Restrictions are, on the other
hand, appropriate to prevent such rights violations as ritual killings, child sacrifice, the practice of suttee, harmful traditional practices inconsistent with the rights of women and/or
children,506 the manifestation of religion or belief which amounts to “propaganda for war or
advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination,
hostility or violence,”507 and more generally to protect the rights and freedoms of others.508

502

503

504
505
506

507

508

Art. 9 of the Qualification Directive: see Hailbronner, supra n. 86, at 1082 [7]–[9]. For an example of a
justification based on public safety, see the Human Rights Committee’s decision in Bhinder v. Canada,
Communication No. 208/1986, UN Doc. A/45/40, Vol. II (HRC, Nov. 9, 1989), in which the Human
Rights Committee found that the requirement to wear a hard hat at work, which was said to discriminate
against persons of the Sikh religion (who could not therefore wear a turban), was justified on public safety
grounds pursuant to Art. 18(3): see [6.2] and [7]. See also Singh v. France, Application No. 24479/07
(ECtHR, Nov. 27, 2008).
On the other hand, a refugee decision-maker should not assume without any “evidentiary or factual
foundation” that a restriction on religious freedom is justified: Joseph v. Sri Lanka, Communication No.
1249/2004, UN Doc. CCPR/C/85/D/1249/2004 (HRC, Nov. 18, 2005), at [7.3].
HRC General Comment No. 22, supra n. 484, at [8]. As the Full Federal Court of Australia has explained
in this context: “a law regulating the practice of religion, requiring that it be practiced or observed in
a particular way or targeting or applying only to persons practicing religion, is not a law of ‘general
application’. Thus, a fear of prosecution or punishment by the authorities for the breach of such laws can,
of itself, give rise to a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason . . . the Chinese laws in
question appear to prohibit religious practice other than by ‘authentic’ religious groups . . . and regulate
the practice of religion by those groups by requiring that they be registered in accordance with Chinese
law. Plainly, such laws are not laws of general application”: Wang (Aus. FFC, 2000), at 563 [66]–[68], per
Merkel J. (with whom Wilcox and Gray JJ. agreed).
K. Musalo, “Claims for Protection Based on Religion or Belief,” (2004) 16 Intl. J. Ref. L. 165, at 193.
HRC General Comment No. 22, supra n. 484, at [8].
See the decision of the German Federal Administrative Court, 1 C 9.03 (Ger. BverwG, Jan. 20, 2004), at
8–9, where the court cites suttee and child sacrifice as examples of permissible limitations on freedom
of religion. See also UNHCR, Guidelines on Religion-Based Claims, supra n. 85, at [16].
In accordance with the Civil and Political Covenant, supra n. 81, at Art. 20. As stated by the Human
Rights Committee in its General Comment No. 11: Prohibition of Propaganda for War and Inciting
National, Racial or Religious Hatred (Jul. 29, 1983), at [1], state parties are under the obligation to enact
laws to prohibit such acts.
However, in many cases, the fact that there is no conceivable legitimate basis on which religious freedom
could be limited means that no further inquiry is necessary. For example, in relation to Falun Gong, which
appears to have proved particularly troubling to some decision-makers, there appears to be no basis on
which the Chinese government can or indeed has claimed to be legitimate in its attempts to eradicate it.
As Posner J. has noted, “the ferocious antipathy to . . . [Falun Gong] by the Chinese government – that
government’s determination to eradicate it root and branch – is mysterious but undeniable”: Zhen Li Iao
v. Gonzales, (2005) 400 F.3d 530 (USCA, 7th Cir., Mar. 9, 2005), at 532. The Human Rights Committee
has found, in the absence of any explanation from states party to justify or explain limitations, that

266

3 serious harm

This international-law-based limitations framework also provides an answer to the view
sometimes taken that a prohibition of religious activity is persecutory only after an examination of “the importance or centrality of the practice [being limited] within the religion
and/or to the individual personally.”509 While it of course makes sense to ground refugee
status only in a risk relevant to the person seeking protection, it is in our view unwise
for decision-makers to engage in a “centrality to the religion” test before deeming a given
restriction to be important enough to amount to persecutory harm.510 Just how is such an
appraisal to be made? Indeed, decisions that have held that public practice is not “an inherent
or significant component of Falun Gong”511 or that a “requirement to proselytize is not a
core component of his [Christian] faith nor, indeed, at all essential to it”512 have been fairly
criticized as “superimpos[ing] an a priori classification derived from [the decision-maker’s]
own conceptions of the usual practices of the [relevant] denomination which the applicant
had embraced.”513

509
510

511

512
513

they cannot be justified: see e.g. Boodoo v. Trinidad and Tobago, UN Doc. CCPR/C/74/D/721/1996,
A/57/40, Vol. II (HRC, Apr. 2, 2002), at [6.6]. This was made clear by the Federal Court of Australia
in Liu v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, [2001] FCA 257 (Aus. FC, Mar. 16, 2001).
The tribunal had ruled that if China “considers that certain forms of religious behaviour, including
missionary type work, is not allowed in order to preserve good order and public safety, then that is a
matter open to it and not something which comes within the terms of the Convention”: at [7], but the
Federal Court disagreed, noting that the tribunal had given “a far broader application to the restrictions
contained in Article 18(3) than the sub-article itself provides for”: at [21]. See also Bediako v. Canada
(Solicitor General), [1995] FCJ 292 (Can. FCTD, Feb. 22, 1995), in which the tribunal had held that the
fact that the applicant’s church was banned was “justified under articles 18(3) and 19(3) of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (sic),” at [6], which the Federal Court found was “not reasonably open to
it,” and was “perverse or capricious”: at [9].
UNHCR, Guidelines on Religion-Based Claims, supra n. 85, at [16].
The position of the German Federal Administrative Court in the past was that, in order to constitute
persecution, “the suppressed religious practice must be indispensable to the religious community,
according to its own understanding, also to the individual believers themselves”: 10 C 19.09 (Ger.
BverwG, Dec. 9, 2010), at [43], citing 1 C 9.03 (Ger. BverwG, Jan. 20, 2004), at [25]. However, the court
now “is inclined to think that it may be sufficient if the applicant for asylum feels that the suppressed
religious practice of his faith is obligatory for himself or in order to preserve his religious identity”: 10 C
19.09 (Ger. BverwG, Dec. 9, 2010), at [43]. This position was affirmed in 10 C 23.12 (Ger. BverwG, Feb.
20, 2013), at [29]–[30] (unofficial translation).
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v. VWBA, [2005] FCAFC 175 (Aus.
FFC, Aug. 26, 2005), at [38]. Further, it was held that it “does not need to be practised in public, or with
others, but can be practised privately”: at [12] and [38]. This was the basis on which the Refugee Review
Tribunal had decided the claim and this was upheld by the Full Federal Court. In dissent, Marshall J.
criticized the Refugee Review Tribunal’s decision on the basis that the tribunal had accepted that the
choice of the applicant to practice privately was “not a voluntary choice uninfluenced by the fear of
harm”: at [56].
Applicant NABD of 2002 (Aus. HC, 2005), at [97], per Kirby J., citing the findings of the Refugee Review
Tribunal.
Ibid., per Kirby J. (in dissent), responding to the finding of the Refugee Review Tribunal in that case that
the Uniting Church is not one of the “fundamental faiths” that require proselytizing by their adherents:
at [97]. Thus, it was “‘not inconsistent with his belief and practices’ for the appellant, were he returned
to Iran, to avoid proselytizing the Christian religion or other active conduct that would bring him to
official notice”: at [67]. However, as Kirby J. noted, “a person who converted to Christianity . . . living
in a country overwhelmingly constituted of adherents to a different religion, might well feel a greater
desire to tell others about his new beliefs,” as was indicated by the applicant’s evidence in that case: at
[99]; see also McHugh J. at [47]. See also VWBA (Aus. FFC, 2005), at [56], per Marshall J. (in dissent);
NACR of 2002 v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, [2002] FCAFC 318
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Not only is an approach that discounts harms to “non-central” aspects of religious
observance problematic as a matter of practicality, but it distracts attention from the key
issue. Where there is evidence that a given prohibition will impinge on an applicant’s
freedom of religion or belief, the salient question should be only whether the prohibition
is one legitimately imposed under international law. If not, it is difficult to understand
why a limitation found by the decision-maker to infringe the applicant’s religious freedom
ought to be treated as anything other than persecutory.514 This principle provides a clear
answer to the not-infrequent assertion that Ahmadis from Pakistan should “curb [their]
proselytizing zeal”515 to take into account the sensibilities of those adhering to the majority
religion. Not only does religious freedom clearly include “[b]earing witness in words and
deeds,”516 but the right of a government to limit this freedom on grounds of “morals” has
been authoritatively determined by the Human Rights Committee to bar any limitation

514

515

516

(Aus. FFC, Nov. 15, 2002), especially at [39], per Lee J. (in dissent). In Minister for Immigration and
Multicultural Affairs v. Zheng, [2000] FCA 50 (Aus. FFC, Feb. 10, 2000), the Refugee Review Tribunal
had dismissed the applicant’s claim on the basis that there was “no doctrinal difference in religious
practice between the underground Church on the one hand and the open registered Church on the
other”: cited in Wang (Aus. FFC, 2000), at 559 [47]. Although this was upheld by the Full Federal Court
in Zheng, it was criticized and not followed in Wang (Aus. FFC, 2000): see at 560–71. See also Mu
v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2004] FC 1613 (Can. FCTD, Nov. 17, 2004), in
which the Minister had attempted to draw “a distinction between practicing in public and practicing in
a group” in the context of Falun Gong: at [8]. But Harrington J. rejected this on the basis that “[g]iving
public witness is a fundamental part of many religions”: at [9]. See also Zhen Li Iao (USCA, 7th Cir.,
2005), at 532–33, and Shan Zhu Qiu v. Holder, (2010) 611 F.3d 403 (USCA, 7th Cir., Jul. 12, 2010), at
407–8.
This issue frequently arises in the context of persons prohibited from wearing religious clothing or
symbols. One of the issues is whether the law banning religious insignia is truly applied across the board.
In Aykut, in rejecting the claim based on Turkey’s prohibition on the applicant wearing the veil in certain
situations, Gauthier J. emphasized that the relevant law legitimately aimed at promoting secularism,
evidenced by the fact that it “applies to all forms of religious dress or insignia including beards, cloaks,
turbans, fez, caps, veils, headscarves”: at [41]; see also at [33]–[35]. The reference to “secular policies” is a
reference to the need for the restriction to be based on some legitimate policy aim, for example secularism,
gender equality, or the right to freedom of religion of others. See e.g. decisions of the European Court
of Human Rights in Sahin v. Turkey, (2005) 41 EHRR 8 (ECtHR, Jun. 29, 2004), at [108]; and (2007) 44
EHRR 5 (ECtHR [GC], Nov. 10, 2005), at [115], and Dahlab v. Switzerland, Application No. 42393/98
(ECtHR, Feb. 15, 2001). More recently, the Human Rights Committee has found France in violation
of Art. 18 of the Civil and Political Covenant, supra n. 81, where the applicant, a member of the Sikh
religion, was required to appear bareheaded in an identity photograph (Singh v. France, Communication
No. 1876/2009, UN Doc. CCPR/C/102/D/1876/2009 (HRC, Sept. 27, 2011), at [8.1]–[8.5]), and where
the applicant, a member of the Sikh religion, was expelled from school for insisting on wearing the
keski: Singh v. France, Communication No. 1852/2008, UN Doc. CCPR/C/106/D/1852/2008 (HRC, Dec.
4, 2012), at [8.7]–[8.8].
Ahmed v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2000] INLR 1 (Eng. CA, Nov. 5, 1999), where
the Court of Appeal rejected the Immigration and Asylum Tribunal’s approach which did require the
applicant to do so. By contrast, the New Zealand Refugee Status Appeals Authority has held that “in
a predominantly Moslem country where the question of conversion from Islam to Christianity is an
extremely sensitive issue, we do not consider it unreasonable for the Government to impose a prohibition
on proselytizing activities by Christians. Such measures are justifiable on the grounds at least of public
safety or order”: Re MI, Refugee Appeal No. 10/92 (NZ RSAA, Jul. 22, 1993). See further discussion of
these issues, including an excellent recent case, MN and others (UKUT, 2012), in infra Ch. 5.7, cited with
approval in 10 C 23.12 (Ger. BverwG [German Federal Administrative Court], Feb. 20, 2013), at [27].
Kokkinakis v. Greece, (1994) 17 EHRR 397 (ECtHR, May 23, 1993), at [31].
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which discriminates “in favour of or against one or certain religions or belief systems”517 –
precisely the purport of Pakistan’s notorious Ordinance XX.518
In sum, the denial of religious freedom, including prohibition or serious restriction on
the ability to practice in community with others, is rights-violative and hence appropriately
understood to be serious harm for purposes of refugee law. While some aspects of the right
to religious freedom – including the right to have or adopt a religion and the right not to be
subject to coercion – are not subject to limitation at international law, refugee cases involving
public manifestation should be assessed in light of the ability of states under international
human rights law to restrict this aspect of religious freedom in order to balance competing
interests, rights, and freedoms – but only in a non-discriminatory, minimally intrusive way.

5

10

3.5.2 Conscience and belief, including resistance to military service
In addition to religious freedom, international human rights law guarantees also the broader
notion of freedom of thought and conscience.519 Described as a right of “spiritual and moral
existence”520 that ensures the ability to “develop autonomously thoughts and a conscience
free from impermissible external influence,”521 freedom of thought and conscience is a
right that is also closely connected to both the right to privacy522 and the right to “hold
opinions without interference.”523 In refugee law practice, the relevance of this right has
most commonly been considered524 in the context of whether subjection to compulsory
military service is serious harm for purposes of the “being persecuted” analysis.525
Cases in which children are subjected to forcible recruitment or conscription are the
easiest to resolve since both human rights and humanitarian law prohibit the recruitment
and engagement of children in armed conflict. As such, the Committee on the Rights of the
Child has explained,
517
518

519
521
523
524

525

Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34: Article 19: Freedoms of Opinion and Expression,
UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34 (Jul. 21, 2011) (“HRC General Comment No. 34”), at [48].
Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Pakistan: Convictions of Ahmadis under Ordinance XX or the
blasphemy laws and their prevalence; penalties handed out, 26 November 2007, PAK102653.E, available
at: www.refworld.org/docid/47d654712d.html (accessed Jul. 26, 2013).
520
Civil and Political Covenant, supra n. 81, at Art. 18(1).
Nowak, supra n. 134, at 412–13.
522
Ibid.
Civil and Political Covenant, supra n. 81, at Art. 17: see also infra Ch. 3.5.6.
Art. 19(1); see Nowak, supra n. 134, at 412–13.
For a rare exception, see Re MN (NZ RSAA, 1996), in which the New Zealand Refugee Status Appeals
Authority considered that the applicant’s fear of suffering disproportionate punishment for failing to
comply with the Iranian dress code for women violated her right to freedom of thought and conscience
under Art. 18, explaining that Art. 18 “is directly relevant to the appellant’s deeply held views of her
right to function as an autonomous and independent individual, to her passionate opposition, both to
the patriarchal society comprising her extended Arab family, and to the male domination of women in
Iranian society at large”: at [81].
It is clear that the Civil and Political Covenant, supra n. 81, at Art. 18(1) is the appropriate place for
consideration of this issue. Although “service of a military character” is mentioned in Art. 8, this is
so as to exclude from the scope of “forced or compulsory labour,” “any service of a military character
and, in countries where conscientious objection is recognized, any national service required by law
of conscientious objectors.” Hence the Human Rights Committee has held that “the Covenant itself
neither recognizes nor excludes a right of conscientious objection,” and thus a claim “is to be assessed
solely in light of article 18 of the Covenant”: Yeo-Bum Yoon and Myung-Jin Choi v. Republic of Korea,
Communication Nos. 1321/2004 and 1322/2004, UN Doc. CCPR/C/88/D/1321-1322/2004 (HRC, Jan.
23, 2007), at [8.2].
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under-age recruitment (including of girls for sexual services or forced marriage with the
military) and direct or indirect participation in hostilities constitutes a serious human
rights violation and thereby persecution.526

5

10

A Spanish court thus appropriately concluded that “the recruitment of children could be
considered persecution . . . on the grounds that children are entitled to special protection as
recognized in the various specific human rights instruments.”527
There are at least two other relatively clear cases in which the subjection of adults to
military service compels a finding of serious harm.
The first is where the risk is of conscription not by the state, but by vigilante or other
non-state actors.528 In such cases, the deprivation of liberty inherent in conscription cannot
be said to be “in accordance with such procedures as are established by law”529 – making it
rights-violative for reasons considered above.
The second clear case for the recognition of serious harm is where the risk faced is not simply the deprivation of liberty that is inherent in a generalized duty to render military service
to one’s country, but rather subjection to a regime of discriminatory conscription530 or conditions of service,531 or where there is “disproportionately severe punishment for [a] military
526

527
528

529
530

531

CRC General Comment No. 6, supra n. 111, at [59]; see also UNHCR, Guidelines on International
Protection No. 8, supra n. 94, at [19]–[23]. The Children’s Convention, supra n. 109, at Art. 38(2)
provides that “States Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure that persons who have not attained
the age of fifteen years do not take a direct part in hostilities,” and at Art. 38(3), “States Parties shall
refrain from recruiting any person who has not attained the age of fifteen years into their armed forces. In
recruiting among those persons who have attained the age of fifteen years but who have not attained the
age of eighteen years, States Parties shall endeavour to give priority to those who are oldest.” In addition,
the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in
Armed Conflict, adopted May 25, 2000, entered into force Feb. 12, 2002, 2173 UNTS 222 (which at the
time of writing had 151 parties) provides at Art. 2 that “States Parties shall ensure that persons who have
not attained the age of 18 years are not compulsorily recruited into their armed forces,” and at Art. 4(1)
provides that “[a]rmed groups that are distinct from the armed forces of a State should not, under any
circumstances, recruit or use in hostilities persons under the age of 18 years.” See UNHCR, Guidelines
on International Protection No. 8, supra n. 94, at [19] for discussion of international humanitarian law.
Ignacio y Maria Luisa v. Ministerio del Interior (Audiencia Nacional Sala de lo ContenciosoAdministrativo, Oct. 6, 2004) (unofficial translation).
In Applicant S (Aus. HC, 2004), the High Court of Australia did not address the issue in these terms,
rather in terms of whether the Taliban regime enjoyed sufficient legitimacy so as to have vested in it a
state’s authority to conscript as a function of sovereignty: see at [47], per Gleeson C.J., Gummow, and
Kirby JJ.; and at [101]–[102], per Callinan J. (in dissent).
In Refugee Appeal No. 75378 (NZ RSAA, 2005), the New Zealand Refugee Status Appeals Authority
adverted to the “prescribed by law” issue in relation to Applicant S: see at [73].
For example, in Applicant S (Aus. HC, 2004), the Refugee Review Tribunal had accepted that the
Taliban undertook ad hoc, random, forcible recruitment of young men, the only apparent criterion for
recruitment being that the young men be able-bodied. The High Court held that the tribunal had erred
in failing to consider whether “able-bodied young men” comprised a particular social group. See also
96/18/0485 v. Security Director for Vienna (Au. VwGH [Austrian Administrative Court], Feb. 9, 1999),
where it was held that “ethnically motivated conscription for military service, different treatment during
military service or more severe punishment for draft evasion may qualify an applicant for refugee status,
if consequences amount to threat of life or health” (unofficial translation).
Canada Immigration and Refugee Board, “Refusal to Perform Military Service as a Basis for a WellFounded Fear of Persecution” (Sept. 1992). Other examples given are “unfair delegation of military
assignments while in service” and “unfair extension of service period beyond what is lawfully established.”
See also Duarte de Guinac (USCA, 9th Cir., 1999), in which the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed the Board of Immigration Appeal’s rejection of refugee status because the Board had based its
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offence”532 based on discrimination. While most persons subject to official conscription will,
of course, be subject to restrictions on movement and consequential deprivation of liberty,
these restrictions can usually be justified under the limitations established at international
law.
But for reasons similar to those considered above in relation to the general question
of subjection to prosecution under the criminal law, military conscription ceases to be
lawful if it is conceived or conducted in a rights-violative way – including on the basis of
impermissible discrimination. Canadian courts have thus sensibly determined that there
may be a risk of persecutory harm where “the treatment afforded to selective conscientious
objectors in Israeli military prisons was harsher than that afforded to those who were jailed
because they had refused to serve for other reasons and that selective conscientious objectors
received longer sentences,”533 as well as if members of the US military “publicly opposed to
the war in Iraq”534 were found to be differentially subjected to court martial and to other
punishment “because of their political opinion.”535
But what of the situation where there is no overt discrimination in either the design or
implementation of an official system of military conscription, but some persons – motivated
by reasons of religion, political opinion, or other reasons of conscience – nonetheless resist
military service?536 Is the risk they face of being forced into military service or of being
punished for evading or deserting military service serious harm relevant to the “being
persecuted” analysis?537 The question of whether whatever harm is faced is “for reasons of”
a Convention ground is taken up in Chapter 5; our analysis here focuses on the primary
concern of whether such persons face a persecutory harm.538
Assuming that a decision-maker is satisfied that an applicant has “a real, not a simulated
belief,”539 the critical issue under a human-rights-based analysis is whether the person

532

533
534
535
536

537

538

539

decision on the notion that “mandatory military service, without more, even against one’s will, is not
a ground for asylum”: at 1160; yet the evidence established that “[f]rom the time he was conscripted
into the Guatemalan military” the applicant “was explicitly targeted for . . . oppression because he was
an Indian”: at 1161.
UNHCR, Handbook, supra n. 1, at [169]. See also Refugee Appeal No. 75378 (NZ RSAA, Oct. 19, 2005),
at [42]. All of these examples would amount to a violation of Art. 18(1) in conjunction with Art. 2(1) of
the Civil and Political Covenant, supra n. 81.
RS v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2012] FC 860 (Can. FC, Jul. 6, 2012), at [21].
Walcott v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2011] FC 415 (Can. FC, Apr. 5, 2011), at
[31].
Rivera v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), (2009) 351 FTR 267 (Can. FC, Aug. 10,
2009), at [96]–[99], and Walcott (Can. FC, 2011), at [34]–[44].
The analysis in Hathaway, Refugee Status, that there are specific circumstances in which a person may
base a successful claim on either fear of being forced into military service, or subjection to punishment
for evading or deserting military service, was cited with approval by the Federal Court of Australia in
Applicant NG 1352 v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, [1999] FCA 495 (Aus. FC, May
7, 1999), at [16]; Mijoljevic v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, [1999] FCA 834 (Aus.
FC, Jun. 25, 1999), at [23]; and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. Shaibo, [2000] FCA
600 (Aus. FC, May 10, 2000), at [28].
As the UNHCR acknowledged as long ago as 1979, persons who claim refugee status on the basis of a
refusal to perform military service are neither refugees per se nor excluded from protection: UNHCR,
Handbook, supra n. 1, at [168].
For a helpful and detailed overview of the issues and comparative case law, see P. Mathew, “Draft
Dodger/Deserter or Dissenter? Conscientious Objection as a Ground for Refugee Status,” in S. S. Juss
and C. Harvey (eds.), Contemporary Issues in Refugee Law (2013).
Applicant N403 v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, [2000] FCA 1088 (Aus. FC, Aug.
23, 2000), at [23].
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concerned is entitled to assert his principled beliefs against the lawful entitlement of the
home state to require military service of its citizens. Under a system of generalized military
conscription, the resultant loss of liberty will usually be justifiable under international law
(and hence not persecutory). In any event, exposure to that risk will not be the basis for a
successful claim to refugee status because it is not a risk faced “for reasons of” a Convention
ground. But if resistance to military service is a protected component of the distinct freedom
of thought and conscience, then a minority of those subject to conscription – the conscientious
objectors – will face a super-added harm (deprivation of freedom of thought and conscience)
that may well be “for reasons of” a Convention ground. In contrast to those who suffer no
breach of their right to freedom of thought and conscience because they hold no belief at
odds with military service, this minority faces something more which – if rights-violative,
and hence serious harm – puts them in a legally distinct position.
Two questions need to be addressed in order to make this assessment. First, does the right
to “thought [and] conscience” in the Civil and Political Covenant’s guarantee of “freedom
of thought, conscience and religion” include opposition to military service? And second,
can that belief or conscience lawfully be subject to limitation by the home state?
The interpretation and understanding of the human right to freedom of “thought [and]
conscience” has evolved over time540 such that it is now clearly understood that “to compel a
person to use lethal force, although such use would seriously conflict with the requirements
of his conscience or religious beliefs, falls within the ambit of article 18.”541 Thus, “the right
to conscientious objection to military service is inherent to the right to freedom of thought,
conscience and religion.”542 As a Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights
recently determined in relation to the regional counterpart of this right,
opposition to military service, where it is motivated by a serious and insurmountable
conflict between the obligation to serve in the army and a person’s conscience or his
540

541

542

Yeo-Bum Yoon (HRC, 2007), at [8.2]. It should be noted that any ambiguity as to whether the position
had evolved sufficiently at the time General Comment No. 22 was issued has now been dispelled by the
clear findings of violations of Art. 18 by Korea. In this respect, the House of Lords’ decision in Sepet
(UKHL, 2003) that the statements in General Comment No. 22 are “somewhat tentative” (at 866 [13])
and hence do not constitute a “clear assertion of binding principle” (at 867 [13]), no longer hold force
(per Lord Bingham, Lord Steyn agreeing at 872 [24] and Lord Hutton agreeing at 880 [56]; see also Lord
Hoffmann at 878 [48]–[49]).
Yeo-Bum Yoon (HRC, 2007), at [8.3], citing HRC General Comment No. 22, supra n. 484, at [11]. The
reference to “lethal force” has been criticized as evincing a “fairly narrow understanding of conscientious
objection” (see Nowak, supra n. 134, at 424); but it is not clear that this is necessarily required. In other
decisions on this point, for example in Eu-Min Jung v. Korea, Communication Nos. 1593 to 1603/2007,
UN Doc. CCPR/C/98/D/1593-1603/2007 (HRC, Apr. 30, 2010), the Committee did not use the “lethal
force” language, stating simply that: “the authors’ refusal to be drafted for compulsory military service
was a direct expression of their religious beliefs which, it is uncontested, were genuinely held and that
the authors’ subsequent conviction and sentence amounted to an infringement of their freedom of
conscience and a restriction on their ability to manifest their religion or belief”: at [7.4]. Although
Yeo-Bum Yoon (HRC, 2007) involved claims by Jehovah’s Witnesses, the later case of Eu-Min Jung (HRC,
2010) involved, inter alia, a pacifist: see [2.12]. The New Zealand Refugee Status Appeals Authority has
provided an excellent guide on this issue in Refugee Appeal No. 75378 (NZ RSAA, 2005), in which it
emphasizes the need to establish a “belief” which “transcends mere point of view and rather describes a
state of mind that is fundamental to the identity of the individual as a human being”: at [66].
Atasoy and Sarkut v. Turkey, Communication Nos. 1853/2008 and 1854/2008, UN Doc.
CCPR/C/104/D/1854/2008 (HRC, Jun. 19, 2012), at [10.4]; see also Min-Kyu Jeong v. Korea, Communication Nos. 1642 to 1741/2007, UN Doc. CCPR/C/101/1642-1741/2007 (HRC, Apr. 27, 2011), at
[7.3].
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deeply and genuinely held religious or other beliefs, constitutes a conviction or belief of
sufficient cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance to attract the guarantees of [the
right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion].543

As authoritatively interpreted by the Human Rights Committee, the risk to freedom of
thought and conscience is implicated in such cases whether or not the risk relates to service
in a conflict “condemned by the international community as contrary to basic rules of
human conduct”544 and regardless of whether “performing military service would include
crimes or acts”545 that amount to international crimes. Hence, while the presence of such
factors in a particular case may serve to underline the strength of belief or conscience of the
applicant,546 it is not a prerequisite to a finding that the applicant is at risk of persecutory
harm.547 So long as a genuine reason of conscience is identified and – borrowing from the
543

544
545

546

547

Bayatyan (ECtHR, 2011), at [110]. This is reminiscent of a passage in which the Canadian Federal Court
referred to a classic statement of the US Supreme Court that: “If an individual deeply and sincerely holds
beliefs that are purely ethical or moral in source and content but that nevertheless impose upon him a
duty of conscience to refrain from participating in any war at any time, those beliefs certainly occupy
in the life of that individual ‘a place parallel to that filled by . . . God’ in traditionally religious persons”:
Lebedev v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] FC 728 (Can. FC, Jul. 9, 2007), at
[46], citing Welsh v. United States, (1970) 398 US 333 (USSC, Jun. 15, 1970), at 339–40, but ultimately
concluding that there is no “internationally recognised right to either total or partial conscientious
objection”: at [48], applying Sepet (UKHL, 2003).
UNHCR, Handbook, supra n. 1, at [171].
The Qualification Directive, supra n. 37, at Art. 9(2)(e) includes, in its definition of “acts of persecution,”
“prosecution or punishment for refusal to perform military service in a conflict, where performing
military service would include crimes or acts falling within the scope of the grounds for exclusion.”
The analysis in Hathaway, Refugee Status, at 180–81, that where an individual refuses to perform military
service which offends fundamental international standards, punishment for desertion or draft evasion
may itself be regarded as persecution, was cited with approval in Al-Maisri v. Canada (Minister of
Employment and Immigration), [1995] FCJ 642 (Can. FCA, Apr. 28, 1995), at [6]; Zolfagharkhani v.
Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1993] 3 FC 540 (Can. FCA, Jun. 15, 1993), at 555;
and Ciric v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1994] 2 FC 65 (Can. FCTD, Dec. 13,
1993), at 77. See also the extensive discussion in Lebedev (Can. FC, 2007), at [57]–[82]; RS (Can. FC,
2012), at [12]; Tagaga v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, (2000) 228 F.3d 1030 (USCA, 9th Cir.,
Sept. 21, 2000), at 1034.
The statement from UNHCR, Handbook, supra n. 1 appears to have been taken as a requirement by
some decision-makers: see e.g. Hinzman v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2007]
1 FCR 561 (Can. FC, Mar. 31, 2006) and Hughey v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
[2006] FC 421 (Can. FC, Mar. 31, 2006), both dealing with applications by deserters from the US army
who objected to the war in Iraq on the basis of its illegality. In Sepet (UKHL, 2003) Lord Bingham
noted that “[t]here is compelling support for the view that refugee status should be accorded to one
who has refused to undertake compulsory military service on the grounds that such service would
or might require him to commit atrocities or gross human rights abuses or participate in a conflict
condemned by the international community” (at 863 [8]), citing Canadian and US authority. However,
in Refugee Appeal No. 75378 (NZ RSAA, 2005) the New Zealand Refugee Status Appeals Authority clearly
did not require this state of affairs, although it was present in that case: see at [118]; see also [114]–
[117]. As the Authority eloquently explained, decision-makers should avoid “making fine and arguably
artificial distinctions as to the political or other nature of the belief, depending on whether the conflict
is ‘internationally condemned’ or not. It is difficult to discern how the nature (political or otherwise) of
the objection changes with the form of service that may be required”: at [116]. In Australia, see SZAOG
v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, (2004) 86 ALD 15 (Aus. FFC, Nov.
26, 2004), where North J. held that the Refugee Review Tribunal’s failure to consider the applicant’s
claim that he objected “to service in the Chechen conflict because the army in which he was required
to serve had been involved in breaches of humanitarian law and human rights abuses” amounted to
jurisdictional error: see at [18] per North J. (in dissent).
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language of the European Court of Human Rights – there is “a serious and insurmountable
conflict between the obligation to serve in the army and a person’s conscience or his deeply
and genuinely held religious or other beliefs,”548 there is presumptive evidence of a risk that
amounts to serious harm.
The second and sole remaining question under a human-rights-based analysis is whether
the applicant’s freedom to “manifest” her beliefs may nonetheless be justifiably curtailed
by “such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety,
order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.”549 While the
maintenance of a military, at least for purposes of national defense, arguably falls within the
permissible grounds of limitation, the limit on freedom of thought and conscience must not
just relate to a ground, but must be “necessary” to secure a listed purpose. The Human Rights
Committee has made it clear that satisfaction of this critical criterion requires assessment of
whether the home state has introduced alternatives to compulsory military service.550 It has
moreover specifically rejected the argument that failure to provide for alternative service can
be justified by reference to “public safety,” “national defensive capacities,” or “to preserve
social cohesion.”551 The Committee has rather determined that
it is in principle possible, and in practice common, to conceive alternatives to compulsory
military service that do not erode the basis of the principle of universal conscription
but render equivalent social good and make equivalent demands on the individual,
eliminating unfair disparities between those engaged in compulsory military service and
those in alternative service.552

20

In line with this approach, the Canadian Federal Court appropriately required that the
assessment of the refugee claim of an Israeli conscientious objector take account of evidence
that “there is no law allowing for conscientious objector status in Israel and the so-called
Conscientious Objector Committee is haphazard, secretive and difficult to access.”553 More
generally, whatever alternative service is made available to conscientious objectors must not
itself be rights-violative.554
548
549

550
552

553
554

Bayatyan (ECtHR, 2011), at [110].
Civil and Political Covenant, supra n. 81, at Art. 18(3). The Human Rights Committee has assumed
that Art. 18(3) applies, although one could argue that it does not apply either because there can be no
limitation on the right to have freedom of thought and conscience, or on the basis that no one shall be
subject to coercion (Art. 18(2)), which is not subject to limitation. However, the better view is that where
a person seeks to avoid a legal obligation or duty on the basis of a conscientious belief, this represents a
practice or public manifestation of religion or belief which is subject to limitation under Art. 18(3) (see
Nowak, supra n. 134, at 413). We note, however, that there is apparent disagreement amongst members
of the Human Rights Committee on this issue in the recent decision in Atasoy and Sarkut (HRC, 2012);
see in particular individual opinions appended at 13–21. In Bayatyan (ECtHR, 2011), the European
Court of Human Rights undertook a lengthy assessment of whether the limitations clause applied: see
at [113]–[128].
551
Yeo-Bum Yoon (HRC, 2007), at [8.4]; affirmed in Min-Kyu Jeong (HRC, 2011), at [7.2].
Ibid.
Ibid., at [8.4]. See also Atasoy and Sarkut (HRC, 2012), at [10.4]: “A State party may, if it wishes, compel
the objector to undertake a civilian alternative to military service, outside of the military sphere and not
under military command. The alternative service must not be of a punitive nature, but must rather be a
real service to the community and compatible with respect for human rights.”
Kirichenko v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2011] FC 12 (Can. FC, Jan. 6, 2011), at
[50].
The UNHCR has noted that the existence of community service is not necessarily sufficient, because
“some forms of community service may be so excessively burdensome as to constitute a form of
punishment, or the community service might require the carrying out of acts which clearly also defy
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Thus, while subjection to compulsory officially mandated military service will not in and
of itself amount to the risk of serious harm for refugee law purposes, it is otherwise if the risk
is faced by a child or if conscription is conceived or implemented in a discriminatory fashion.
And because a conscientious objector faces not just the usual risk of (legally justifiable) loss
of liberty but also risk to freedom of thought and conscience,555 a claim to face the risk of
persecutory harm can be established in such a case unless the home country makes available
a true non-combatant and rights-regarding form of alternative service.

5

3.5.3 Education
The fundamental nature of the right to education has been emphasized by the Committee
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which has determined that it is inextricably linked
to dignity and to the “development of the human personality.”556 Indeed, as Grahl-Madsen
insightfully observed,

10

it seems clear that if a person will be excluded from institutions of learning in his home
country for political reasons, this will affect his whole life much more profoundly than a
relatively short term of imprisonment.557

In formal terms, the right to education, embodied in Articles 13 and 14 of the Economic,
Social and Cultural Covenant, as well as Article 28 of the Convention on the Rights of
the Child, requires that “[p]rimary education shall be compulsory and available free to
all.”558 Secondary education “shall be made generally available and accessible to all by every
appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of free education,”559
and higher education “shall be made equally accessible to all, on the basis of capacity, by every
appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of free education.”560
The fact that these rights are framed as duties of progressive implementation is rarely
an impediment to the recognition of serious harm in refugee cases since, as previously
analyzed, considerations of home state capacity have no place in refugee claims that involve
the withdrawal, deprivation, or discriminatory denial of access to education.561 In other

555

556
558
559
560
561

the claimant’s religious beliefs”: UNHCR, Guidelines on Religion-Based Claims, supra n. 85, at [26].
The UNHCR notes that the claimant may be able to establish a claim even where refusal to serve is
not occasioned by harsh penalties “but the individual has a well-founded fear of serious harassment,
discrimination or violence by other individuals (for example, soldiers, local authorities, or neighbours)
for his or her refusal to serve”: ibid., at [26].
The UNHCR appears to now take this position, at least where the basis of refusal is religious belief:
see UNHCR, Guidelines on Religion-Based Claims, supra n. 85, at [26], where it is stated that a law
may be persecutory where “the military service cannot reasonably be expected to be performed by the
individual because of his or her genuine beliefs or religious convictions.” For support for this position,
see comments of High Court in Applicant S (Aus. HC, 2004), at [63], per Gleeson C.J., Gummow, and
Kirby JJ.; at [83], per McHugh J.; cf. at [101]–[103], per Callinan J. (in dissent).
557
CESCR General Comment No. 11, supra n. 478, at [22].
Grahl-Madsen, supra n. 2, at 215.
Economic, Social and Cultural Covenant, supra n. 104, at Art. 13(2)(a), and Children’s Convention,
supra n. 109, at Art. 28(1)(a).
Economic, Social and Cultural Covenant, supra n. 104, at Art. 13(2)(b), and Children’s Convention,
supra n. 109, at Art. 28.
Economic, Social and Cultural Covenant, supra n. 104, at Art. 13(2)(c), and Children’s Convention,
supra n. 109, at Art. 28.
This is because progressive implementation clearly requires a state to “take steps . . . with a view to
achieving . . . the full realization” of socio-economic rights (Economic, Social and Cultural Covenant,
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words, if a state has capacity to provide only limited educational opportunities for its
population, it may not restrict such opportunities, for example, only to boys. The US Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was thus correct to find that “[t]he [Russian] government’s
refusal to provide . . . an elementary education to ‘disabled children’ solely because they are
members of the particular social group . . . cannot be excused on the basis of the need to
limit expenditures.”562
The duty of progressive implementation also proscribes state actions that reduce or nullify
rights,563 meaning that a claim to fear serious harm will readily be established where a state
removes educational opportunities from a particular region or section of the population.
Importantly, a state must respect the availability of education by not prohibiting or summarily closing religious schools, institutions entitled to special protection given the Civil and
Political Covenant’s requirement that states respect the liberty of parents “to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions.”564
While states are not required publicly to fund private schools, denial of the ability to provide religious or other private education to children may constitute serious harm in the
circumstances identified by the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit:
If a government as part of an official campaign against some religious sect closed all
the sect’s schools (but no other private schools) and forced their pupils to attend public
school, this would be, we should think . . . a form of religious persecution.565

20

Claims based on the denial of educational opportunities are often part of a claim to
fear cumulative harm566 since in addition to the inherent loss involved in the deprivation of education, a lack of educational opportunities for children “often reinforces their
subjection to various other human rights violations.”567 For example, there is a “direct
correlation between . . . primary school enrolment levels for girls and major reductions
in child marriages.”568 Yet a violation of the right to primary education is in and of
itself sufficient to constitute serious harm.569 There is, for example, no need to show

562
563
564
566

567
568
569

supra n. 104, at Art. 2(1)). The prohibition against discrimination is moreover “subject to neither
progressive realization nor the availability of resources; it applies fully and immediately to all aspects of
education”: CESCR General Comment No. 13, supra n. 478, at [31]. We note that Art. 2(3) does not
apply to education, as it is not an “economic right”: see text supra, at nn. 323–27.
Tchoukhrova (USCA, 9th Cir., 2005), at 1194.
“There is a strong presumption of impermissibility of any retrogressive measures taken in relation to the
right to education”: CESCR General Comment No. 13, supra n. 478, at [45].
565
Civil and Political Covenant, supra n. 81, at Art. 18(4).
Bucur (USCA, 7th Cir., 1997), at 405.
See e.g. Chen Shi Hai (Aus. HC, 2000), at 303 [29]. In Hapuarachchige v. Minister for Immigration and
Ethnic Affairs, (1997) 73 FCR 288 (Aus. FC, Mar. 18, 1997), Carr J. noted that, “[f]or the purposes of this
argument, it can readily be accepted that racial discrimination in the areas of education and employment
may amount to persecution”: at 301.
CESCR General Comment No. 11, supra n. 478; CESCR General Comment No. 13, supra n. 478, at [1].
CESCR General Comment No. 11, supra n. 478, at [4].
Of course, it is necessary to establish that the applicant truly is at risk of a complete denial of education,
not merely that he or she has been denied access to one particular school. For example, in Halabi v.
Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1993] FCJ 401 (Can. FCTD, Apr. 30, 1993) the
Federal Court found that “[i]n this case though the expulsion was alleged to be for political actions,
there is no evidence whatsoever that after having been expelled from the institution he made any efforts
to enrol in others”: at [4]. This has also been recognized in civil law jurisprudence. According to Alland
and Teitgen-Colly, the authors of the leading French textbook, discrimination can rise to the level of
persecution through “repetitious character,” such as through refusal of access to medical care or children’s
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that economic opportunities will be reduced as the result of the denial of access to
education.570
The risk of denial of access to education is, of course, particularly compelling in the
case of children since the right to education is integral to the “full development of the
human personality and the child’s sense of its dignity.”571 For this reason the UNHCR
correctly affirms that “bearing in mind the fundamental importance of education and
the significant impact a denial of this right may have for the future of a child, serious
harm could arise if a child is denied access to education on a systematic basis.”572 Refugee
status has thus been appropriately recognized where a child will be deprived of the right to
education for a Convention reason.573 As an Australian court determined in the case of a
thirteen-year-old Thai girl at risk of being returned to work on a farm and thus deprived of
education,
[i]t is difficult to conceive that a child returned to Thailand to work on a farm, denied
the opportunity of education, could be regarded as not suffering serious harm . . . The
serious harm . . . need not be overt physical ill treatment, significant economic hardship

570

571
572
573

enrollment in schooling: Alland and Teitgen-Colly, supra n. 158, at 376–77 (unofficial translation). And
Germany’s Federal Administrative Court has explained that it is appropriate to consider, in assessing
serious harm in refugee law, “discrimination . . . in respect of access to education or health facilities, but
also occupational or economic restrictions on earning a living”: 10 C 23.12 (Ger. BverwG, Feb. 20, 2013),
at [36] (unofficial translation). It should be noted that where the applicant is able to afford alternative
private education for a child, the denial of public education may not amount to persecution: see e.g.
Matter of H-L-H- and Z-Y-Z-, (2010) 25 I & N Dec. 209 (USBIA, Mar. 26, 2010), at 217. However,
as the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit emphasized in Zhang v. Gonzales, (2005) 408 F.3d
1239 (USCA, 9th Cir., May 26, 2005), it must not be assumed that a person will be permitted to fund a
non-public education: at 1249, cited with approval in Lin v. Mukasey, (2008) 532 F.3d 596 (USCA, 7th
Cir., Jul. 8, 2008), at 598.
Cf. Gonzalez-Alvarado v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 16488 (USCA,
9th Cir., Jun. 18, 1996). Although in M93 of 2004 v. Minister for Immigration, [2006] FMCA 252 (Aus.
FMC, Feb. 24, 2006), McInnis F.M. found that the denial of education “clearly has the potential to
provide the basis for significant economic hardship or denial of access to basic services where in both
instances that denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist”: at [42]. See also Harirchi v. Minister
for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, [2001] FCA 1576 (Aus. FFC, Nov. 7, 2001), in which the Full
Federal Court of Australia affirmed the Refugee Review Tribunal’s decision in that case in which the
tribunal had “accepted that denial of access to education could amount to persecution and could bring
an applicant within the scope of the Convention”: at [9]. In that case however the applicant had attended
university and it was not clear that any denial of further educational opportunities were for a Convention
reason.
AB (Germany), [2012] NZIPT 800107-111 (NZ IPT, Aug. 16, 2011), at [77].
UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection No. 8, supra n. 94, at [36].
As the Canadian Federal Court noted in relation to a nine-year-old Afghani girl whose claim was that
she would be deprived of the right to education on return, “[e]ducation is a basic human right and I
direct the Board to find that she should be found to be a Convention refugee”: Ali v. Canada (Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration), (1996) 119 FTR 258 (Can. FCTD, Sept. 23, 1996), at [4]. See also
Mirzabeglui v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1991] FCJ 50 (Can. FCA, Jan. 28,
1991), at [1]; Halabi (Can. FCTD, 1993), at [4]; and Hernandez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), [2010] FC 179 (Can. FC, Feb. 18, 2010): “a person may be the victim of persecution if,
because of a Convention ground, he or she is prevented from continuing his or her education”: at [40].
The Australian Refugee Review Tribunal has also held that “[d]iscriminatory denial of access to primary
education is such a denial of a fundamental human right that it amounts to persecution”: V95/03256,
[1995] RRTA 2263 (Aus. RRT, Oct. 9, 1995), at [47].
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or denial of access to basic services but rather may be constituted by the simple denial of
education to a child which at the very least would appear to be a fundamental right.574

5

10

15

Nor is the only relevant risk defined by total exclusion from education. There is an infringement of human rights law also where clearly inferior educational facilities are offered to a
disfavored group – for example, where a racial or ethnic group is characterized as “mentally
inferior” and relegated to “a remedial class” or “special school.”575 A refugee claim may
also be established on the basis of de facto exclusion, for example where primary education is technically open to all, yet some children are in practice prevented from attending
school576 – including because of a failure to respond to bullying and harassment that makes
attendance at school unbearable.577
Claims to face serious harm can also be grounded in denial of access to secondary
education, since international human rights law sets requirements of general availability and
accessibility578 and prohibits the denial of or withdrawal of access to secondary education
on the basis of a protected ground.579 Most decision-makers have thus sensibly refrained
from distinguishing between primary and secondary education in articulating the principle
that a denial of access to education can amount to serious harm, often speaking simply of
the right of “children” to an education.580 Indeed, it is common for decisions affirming the
salience of denial of education as serious harm to involve children whose age suggests that
it is secondary rather than primary education that is at risk.581
574

575

576

577

578
579
581

M93 of 2004 (Aus. FMC, 2006), at [42], finding that the denial of education may well pose a “threat to
the person’s capacity to subsist,” at [42], but this was in the context of the specific language of s. 91R(2)
of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).
A good example is provided in the case of Roma children from Hungary, where the Canadian Refugee
Protection Division found that members of this group only have a 50 percent chance of completing
primary school and less than 2 percent of gypsy teenagers attend high school: YSC (Re), [1998] CRDD
No. 26 (Can. IRB, Jan. 22, 1998). See also the evidence in Bledy (Can. FC, 2011), at [5]. This is supported
by case law in the European Court of Human Rights which has found discrimination against Roma
children in the provision of education by “placing the majority of them in special schools for children
with learning disabilities or particularly low intelligence” (see discussion in Clayton, supra n. 53, at
466–67).
See generally Foster, supra n. 120, at 217. This is particularly a problem in parts of Africa heavily affected
by HIV. A study by Human Rights Watch found that in one heavily AIDS-affected province in Kenya,
girls make up only 6 percent of those who are promoted to grade five after four years of primary school:
Human Rights Watch, “In the Shadow of Death: HIV/AIDS and Children’s Rights in Kenya” (Jun. 2001).
See e.g. Freiberg v. Canada (Secretary of State), (1994) 78 FTR 283 (Can. FCTD, May 27, 1994), where
the Federal Court of Canada found that the “problems encountered by [the applicant’s] daughter at
school and the attacks suffered (she was beaten by other students),” “had serious consequences for the
right . . . of access to educational institutions”: at [20]–[21]. See also SBAS (Aus. FC, 2003), where the
Federal Court held that: “[t]o suggest, as the RRT did, that distress caused to a child by a teacher on
account of a child’s religious beliefs as an incident of governmental educational policy was a matter ‘to
be dealt with by parents and does not indicate to the tribunal that the situation at school for young Sabeans
is so bad as to be considered persecutory’, is to fail totally to understand the nature of the claim advanced”:
at [63] (emphasis in original).
Economic, Social and Cultural Covenant, supra n. 104, at Art. 13(2)(b).
580
Ibid., at Art. 2(2).
See e.g. Chen Shi Hai (Aus. HC, 2000), at 303 [29].
See e.g. Halabi (Can. FCTD, 1993), where the refugee claimant was aged seventeen. The claim failed on
an evidentiary basis. Zhang (USCA, 9th Cir., 2005) involved the claim of a Chinese girl who was fourteen
at the time of leaving China, which is the relevant age since the court was there considering whether she
had established “past persecution” (as per the relevant US statute). The court stated that, “[d]enial of
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The jurisprudence suggests somewhat more reluctance to recognize persecutory harm in
the case of denial of access to tertiary education, often in the mistaken belief that there is no
internationally guaranteed right to access post-secondary education.582 While it is true that
access to tertiary education may be validly limited “on the basis of capacity,”583 the deprivation or withdrawal of tertiary education for discriminatory reasons amounts to a human
rights violation that cannot be justified on the basis of resource constraints. Indeed, government policy directed at preventing a particular segment of the community from accessing
university education is often aimed at the “impoverishment of the [relevant] community”584
or the exclusion of that particular community “in an insidious and incremental way so as not
to attract the attention of the international community.”585 Accordingly, American courts
have acknowledged that systemic exclusion of a protected group from tertiary education,
such as “the exclusion of Jewish students from German universities under the Nürnberg
Laws”586 or a Romanian law “forbidding [ethnic Hungarians] from [attending] college” is
persecutory “even if it did not prevent them from earning a livelihood.”587
In sum, while denials of primary or secondary education for a Convention reason are
most readily recognized as persecutory, bars on access to tertiary education may also be
the basis for a finding of relevant serious harm. This not only follows from the nature of
relevant obligations under international human rights law, but is also profoundly sensible
since education is “an empowerment right . . . the primary vehicle by which economically
and socially marginalized adults and children can lift themselves out of poverty and obtain
the means to participate fully in their communities.”588
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3.5.4 Expression and assembly
The Civil and Political Covenant protects the right to “hold opinions without interference”589
and also the right “to freedom of expression.”590 More explicit affirmation of the overarching principle of freedom of expression is evident in related commitments to “freedom of thought,”591 the “right of peaceful assembly,”592 and the right to “freedom of

582
583
584
585
586
587

588
589
591

access to educational opportunities available to others on account of a protected ground can constitute
persecution”: at 1247, and remanded the case to the immigration judge to properly consider this aspect
of her claims.
See analysis of decisions in Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, discussed in Foster, supra n. 120 at
143–45.
Economic, Social and Cultural Covenant, supra n. 104, at Art. 13(2)(c).
See V01/13122 (Aus. RRT, 2003), discussing the Iranian policy towards the Baha’i.
N01/38085 (Aus. RRT, Feb. 18, 2002), discussing the plight of the Rohingya from Burma.
Chen v. Ashcroft, (2004) 113 Fed. Appx. 135 (USCA, 6th Cir., Oct. 28, 2004), at 139.
Bucur (USCA, 7th Cir., 1997), at 403–4. The court distinguished earlier decisions on the basis that they
had involved the denial of education to non-citizens of equal educational opportunities with citizens: at
403. See also Korniejew v. Ashcroft, (2004) 371 F.3d 377 (USCA, 7th Cir., Jun. 14, 2004), at 383. See also
Harirchi (Aus. FFC, 2001), in which the Full Federal Court of Australia affirmed the Refugee Review
Tribunal’s decision which had held that “denial of access to education could amount to persecution”
in the context of a case involving tertiary education: at [9]. The case had been properly rejected on
evidentiary grounds. See further authorities cited in Foster, supra n. 120, at 223–24.
CESCR General Comment No. 13, supra n. 478, at [1].
590
Civil and Political Covenant, supra n. 81, at Art. 19(1).
Ibid., at Art. 19(2).
592
Ibid., at Art. 18(1).
Ibid., at Art. 21.
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association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions.”593 The Human
Rights Committee has described freedom of opinion and freedom of expression as being
indispensable conditions for the full development of the person. They are essential for
any society. They constitute the foundation stone for every free and democratic society.
The two freedoms are closely related, with freedom of expression providing the vehicle
for the exchange and development of opinions.594
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Instances in which the denial of freedom of opinion and expression is the harm feared per
se are rare. More commonly, the risk faced is for reasons of holding or expressing an opinion
(raising the question of whether the risk is “for reasons of” a political or other opinion,
addressed in Chapter 5) with the harm itself constituted by subjection to arrest, detention,
and potentially prosecution under the criminal law of the home state (issues considered
above). But whether the claim is the unusual one in which the risk is the denial of freedom of
opinion and expression itself or the more common scenario of the imposition of sanctions
for holding or expressing an opinion, the critical question for analysis of serious harm is
whether the limitation on freedom of opinion and expression sought to be imposed is one
that is permissible at international law. If the limitation is permissible, then a human rights
framework suggests that serious harm is not established. Similarly, if the criminal or other
law is deployed fairly to enforce a limitation on freedom of opinion and expression, then the
risk is simply of valid prosecution or punishment, not of “being persecuted.”
The Civil and Political Covenant expressly authorizes several forms of limitation on
freedom of expression, assembly, and association. Some are quite specific, for example
that “[a]ny propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law”595 and that “[a]ny advocacy of
national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or
violence shall be prohibited by law.”596 In addition, excepting only the absolute right to hold
opinions, expressive freedoms may be subject to limitations “provided by law” and which are
shown to be “necessary . . . for the protection of national security or of public order (ordre
public), or of public health or morals.”597 The rights to peaceful assembly and freedom of
association may additionally be limited as necessary to protect public safety, or the “rights
and freedoms of others.”598
593
594
595
597

598

Ibid., at Art. 22(1). See also Art. 25 and rights to political participation.
HRC General Comment No. 34, supra n. 517, at [2].
596
Civil and Political Covenant, supra n. 81, at Art. 20(1).
Ibid., at Art. 20(2).
Civil and Political Covenant, supra n. 81, at Art. 19(3) specifically applies to the rights in Art. 19(2)
not Art. 19(1). Art. 19(3)(b) is preceded by the statement that the “exercise of the rights provided for
in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities”: at Art. 19(3). Another
basis for limitation is where necessary for “respect for the rights or reputation of others”: see also at
Art. 21 and Art. 22(2). An example of a case in which a limitation was found reasonable was where the
applicant feared prosecution under a law of general application in India which prohibited flag burning.
The Australian Federal Court held that “a general law outlawing flag burning would appear, on its face,
to have a perfectly legitimate purpose, namely the prevention of defacing national symbols”: Sidhu v.
Holmes, [2000] FCA 776 (Aus. FC, Jun. 9, 2000), at [19]. Although the court also noted that in that case
“there was no material before the Court to indicate that the law was in fact intended to achieve any other
purpose and nor was there any evidence to establish that the law was, or would be, applied in a politically
discriminatory fashion”: at [23]. This decision was upheld on appeal: see Sidhu v. Holmes, [2000] FCA
1653 (Aus. FFC, Nov. 28, 2000), at [24].
Civil and Political Covenant, supra n. 81, at Art. 21.
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As earlier analyzed,599 the scope of permissible limitation has been carefully circumscribed
by the Human Rights Committee. It has emphasized that not only must any valid limitation
be “provided by law” – not simply by administrative procedure or practice – but also that
the nature and scope of the limitation must be only for an authorized reason and “must
conform to the strict tests of necessity and proportionality.”600 The Committee has more
generally determined in quite emphatic terms that “when a State party imposes restrictions
on the exercise of freedom of expression, these may not put in jeopardy the right itself. The
Committee recalls that the relation between right and restriction and between norm and
exception must not be reversed.”601
Because freedom of expression, assembly and association may only be limited for quite
specific reasons and must be narrowly tailored to meet those specific objectives, a risk of
serious harm for refugee law purposes is readily recognized in instances of deployment of
the criminal law to effect the near-complete denial of these rights. As determined by the
New Zealand tribunal,

5

10

[g]iven the complete suppression of political activity in Iran (outside of a very narrow
band of “acceptable” conduct as defined by the current regime) the appellant was denied
a core human right . . . [I]n Iran, the severe if not extreme penalties imposed on those
engaged in the non-violent expression of their political opinion cannot, on any sensible
view, be described as prosecution rather than persecution.602

Even where the limitation of expressive freedom is more carefully constrained, it is
important carefully to assess the reasons for and proportionality of what may appear to be a
valid constraint. As noted by Justice Finn of the Australian Federal Court, “[i]t is not unheard
of, for example, for a State to utilise sedition-like and public security offences to silence its
opponents.”603 Thus, while a law of general application designed to protect public safety
resulting in, for example, a prosecution of “people engaged in violent demonstrations with
damage to property and loss of life”604 or of those involved in a political organization that
engages in “substantial violent and criminal activities”605 may be perfectly legitimate, analysis
599
600

601
602

603
604

605

See e.g. text supra, at nn. 412–16 and 501–8.
HRC General Comment No. 34, supra n. 517, at [22]. For a recent example, involving prosecution in
Russia for expression of views concerning homosexuality found in violation of Art. 19, see Fedotova v.
Russia, Communication No. 1932/2010, UN Doc. CCPR/C/106/D/1932/2010 (HRC, Nov. 30, 2012).
HRC General Comment No. 34, supra n. 517, at [20].
Re GJ (NZ RSAA, 1995), at 398–99. See also A 9 K 10452/89 (Ger. VG Stuttgart [German Administrative
Court, Stuttgart], Jul. 12, 1990), reported at (1991) 3 Intl. J. Ref. L. 744–45, and 2 BvR 502/86 (Ger.
BverfG [German Federal Constitutional Court], Jul. 10, 1989), reported at (1991) 3 Intl. J. Ref. L. 343–44.
See also Perkovic v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, (1994) 33 F.3d 615 (USCA, 6th Cir., Aug.
29, 1994), where the Sixth Circuit held that criminal prosecution under laws in the former Yugoslavia
that punished peaceful expression of dissenting political opinion and other related rights amounted to
persecution rather than prosecution; see other authorities cited in Cruz-Samayoa v. Holder, (2011) 607
F.3d 1145 (USCA, 6th Cir., Jun. 21, 2010), at 1151–53.
Applicant A101/2003 v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, (2004) 82 ALD
787 (Aus. FC, May 6, 2004), at 789 [24].
WADL v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, [2002] FCAFC 276 (Aus. FFC, Aug. 29,
2002), at [23]. See also the careful and detailed analysis in Cruz-Samayoa (USCA, 6th Cir., 2010),
finding that the applicant was at risk of prosecution not persecution for his leadership role in violent
demonstrations.
Guitierrez v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2000] EWCA Civ J0504-17 (Eng. CA, May
4, 2000), at 5. See also MZQAP v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs,
(2005) 85 ALD 41 (Aus. FFC, Mar. 15, 2005), where the Full Federal Court upheld the decision of the
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should be undertaken of whether the law is designed so as to minimize the infringement on
expressive freedom, and whether it has been shown not only to be related to the protection
of public safety, but truly “necessary” to achieve that end.606
In assessing the validity of a given limitation, it is also important to assess the relevance
of other rights that can have a close connection to the right to freedom of expression. For
example, given the clear protection of the rights of ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities
at international law,607 a state cannot validly rely on the general limitations clause to justify
the suppression of peaceful protests by such minority groups – even if such protests are
seen to be socially disruptive or otherwise uncomfortable for the majority. In line with
this understanding, the Canadian tribunal sensibly recognized the existence of persecutory
harm in the case of a Macedonian man from Bulgaria subject to “a sustained and systematic
attempt to prevent any exercise whatsoever of minority cultural rights.”608
In sum, a risk to the right to “hold opinions without interference” – which is not subject to
any form of lawful limitation – should generally be understood to be serious harm for refugee
law purposes, whether the risk is to the right per se or of criminal law or other enforcement
intended to suppress the holding of a given opinion. Where the risk is instead to “freedom
of expression” – including to such related rights as the “right of peaceful assembly” and
the right to “freedom of association with others, including the right to form and join trade
unions” – risks that fall outside the bounds of authorized limitation at international law will
similarly be persecutory harms. Both the rationale for, and scope of, such limitations must,
of course, be carefully assessed in line with international legal norms before either the denial
of the right itself or enforcement intended to suppress the right is deemed permissible and
thus insufficient to ground a claim to serious harm for refugee law purposes.

3.5.5 Family and marriage
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The protection of the family as “the natural and fundamental group unit of society,”609
including the “right of men and women of marriageable age to marry and to found a

606

607
608
609

Refugee Review Tribunal which held that a law banning the LTTE under legislation banning terrorist
organizations did not amount to persecution: see at 46–47 [24]–[26]. Although in R v. Federal Ministry
of the Interior, 94/20/0722 (Au. VwGH, Jul. 27, 1995), the Austrian Administrative Court held that even
though the applicant may have supported separatist aims as a supporter of AISSF, which was responsible
for murders, hostage-taking, and rapes, these were not necessarily attributable to the applicant, who
had never been accused of committing such crimes but had allegedly just made propaganda for the
organization. Hence the court held that his fear of imprisonment could be linked to his political
opinion. We note that issues surrounding whether mere membership of a political organization which
engages in such activity is sufficient to warrant exclusion under Art. 1(F)(b) are further examined in
that context in infra Ch. 7.
See e.g. Dwomoh v. Sava, (1988) 696 F. Supp. 970 (USDC SDNY, Oct. 13, 1988), where the US District
Court for the Southern District of New York held that: “in countries where there is no procedure by
which citizens can freely and peacefully change their laws, officials or form of government, and where
some individuals who express views critical of the government are arrested and held incommunicado
for long periods without due process, a coup attempt is a form of expression of political opinion the
prosecution of which can qualify as ‘persecution’ within the statutory definition of ‘refugee’”: at 979.
See also Camara v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1991] FCJ 56 (Can. FCA, Jan.
28, 1991). See also SZDOS v. Minister for Immigration, [2005] FMCA 121 (Aus. FMC, Feb. 28, 2005), at
[38]–[39].
Civil and Political Covenant, supra n. 81, at Art. 27.
F (ZU) (Re), [1990] CRDD 1126 (Can. IRB, Nov. 22, 1990), at 3.
Civil and Political Covenant, supra n. 81, at Art. 23(1).
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family”610 can inform the inquiry into serious harm for refugee law purposes in several
ways.
First, as considered above, persons who face the risk of forced marriage, properly understood to be a form of modern slavery, can of course also ground their claim on breach of the
requirement at international human rights law that “[m]arriage shall be entered into [with]
the free and full consent of the intending spouses.”611
Second, a refugee claim may be based on the risk of enforced separation from family
members in the home state.612 In some cases, given the risk of often severe psychological
harm, the harm feared may rise to the level of cruel or inhuman treatment, discussed
above.613 But the right to family life has independent utility in, for example, cases in which
the risk feared is of loss of custody due to the application of discriminatory or arbitrary
family laws.614 Given the duty of states to “ensure equality of rights and responsibilities of
spouses as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution,”615 a woman confronting a

610
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613

614

615

611
Ibid., at Art. 23(3).
Ibid., at Art. 23(2).
See e.g. SZQOT (Aus. FFC, 2012), in which Nicholas J. observed that, “it may be open to a decision
maker to conclude that a husband had a well founded fear of persecution if, for example, widespread
discrimination against couples on racial or religious grounds made it impossible for the husband to live
with his wife without fear of them being harassed. The husband and the wife might then be forced to
live apart”: at 157 [64].
The most extreme cases involve the risk of loss of a child in the form of a risk to the life of the child. See
e.g. the decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court in 2 BvR 1549/91 (Ger. BverfG, May 11,
1992), where the court held that threats against the life of one’s child constitute real threats of persecution
against the mother: reported at (1994) 6 Intl. J. Ref. L. 668. In Gatimi (USCA, 7th Cir., 2009), Posner
J. noted, “[i]f . . . your child [is] killed, in order to harm you, the fact that you are not touched does
not mean that those acts cannot constitute persecution of you”: at 16, and Ni (USCA, 7th Cir., 2011):
at 1017. See also N v. Federal Ministry of the Interior, 95/20/0246 (Au. VwGH [Austrian Administrative
Court], Sept. 12, 2006).
In B (PV) (Re), [1994] CRDD 12 (Can. IRB, May 10, 1994) the Canadian tribunal considered evidence
that on return to Somaliland, the applicant would automatically lose custody of her two minor children
(and all contact) because under Sharia law “children belong to the clan of their father and for this reason
a divorced woman would not be given the custody of her children, either male or female”: at 3. This
was supported by the fact that the applicant had already lost custody of, and all contact with, her eldest
son: at 4. Taking into account that such discriminatory laws violate a number of rights in the Universal
Declaration, supra n. 81, and the Women’s Convention, supra n. 108, the Division concluded that,
“the psychological trauma which the claimant would suffer upon losing custody and access to her two
remaining children would constitute ‘serious harm’ in the Convention refugee sense. Having endured
years of physical and emotional abuse in order to avoid losing her children, the claimant’s statement that
she would be ‘destroyed’ if she lost her children now does not strike the panel as a mere figure of speech”:
at 4. In the later decision of the CRDD in MA1-00356 (Can. IRB, Dec. 18, 2001) one of the members
relied on a decision of the Canadian Supreme Court (KLW v. Winnipeg Child and Family Services, [2000]
2 SCR 519 (Can. SC, Oct. 13, 2000)), which held that the removal of a child from a parent’s care was
detrimental to the psychological well-being of the parent and thus potentially in violation of section 7
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms which protects the right to “life, liberty and security
of the person.” For a recent UK decision, see AM and BM (UKUT, 2010), where the Upper Tribunal of
the Immigration and Asylum Chamber held that, in relation to a former victim of trafficking, “where
the victim of trafficking has a child, if it is considered that the family’s sense of ‘honour’ meant that
a daughter could not live in the family home with an illegitimate child, that could lead to the family
separating the child from the victim of trafficking. That too would amount to persecution”: at [171]. In
Tamas-Mercea v. Reno, (2000) 222 F.3d 417 (USCA, 7th Cir., Jul. 28, 2000) the court stated that “having
one’s children forcibly taken, killed or kidnapped might rise to the level of persecution”: at 425.
Civil and Political Covenant, supra n. 81, at Art. 23(4).
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discriminatory custody law that would nearly automatically award custody of the children
to her husband can fairly be said to face the risk of persecutory harm.
Indeed, the child facing such a situation may herself be said to face the risk of persecutory
harm in the sense not only of arbitrary interference with her family,616 but also often
of extreme psychological suffering that rises to the level of cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment. More generally, the child facing enforced separation from her parent may confront
a range of related risks:
[U]naccompanied and separated children face greater risks of, inter alia, sexual exploitation and abuse, military recruitment, child labour (including for their foster families)
and detention. They are often discriminated against and denied access to food, shelter,
housing, health services and education. Unaccompanied and separated girls are at particular risk of gender-based violence, including domestic violence. In some situations,
such children have no access to proper and appropriate identification, registration, age
assessment, documentation, family tracing, guardianship systems or legal advice.617
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The third context in which claims for refugee status may implicate the right to family and
marriage is where there is a risk of a prohibition on marrying freely. In Israel, for example,
inter-religious marriage is not recognized as legally valid unless performed outside the
country. Palestinians from the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and “enemy countries” are moreover
collectively barred from securing a residency permit in Israel, meaning that the ability of
even a validly married Palestinian couple to live together may be severely compromised
on the basis of race.618 In both these senses, the right “to marry and to found a family” is
infringed, especially given the clearly framed provision in the Civil and Political Covenant
that “[t]he family . . . is entitled to protection by society and the State.”619
Persons facing the risk of denial of the right to same-sex marriage face a comparable, if
somewhat more legally challenging, form of serious harm. International human rights law
somewhat oddly protects “[t]he right of men and women of marriageable age to marry and
to found a family.”620 As codified, the right is not restricted to “a man and a woman”; the
rather awkward plural phrasing might thus plausibly be said to extend the right to marry to
same-sex couples since a gay couple is composed of “men,” while a lesbian couple consists
of “women.” The duty to implement all Convention rights without discrimination, and the
explicit guarantee of equal protection of the law without reference to either “sex” or “other
status,” would suggest a similar result.
Arguments raised against seeing the right to marry as applicable to same-sex couples
are not terribly persuasive. It is true that there is nothing in either the context or object
and purpose of the provision on the right to marry that suggests an intention to effect
what would have been – almost a half-century ago when the Covenant was adopted – quite
a radical stance. Yet both international human rights law and refugee law decisions have
recognized the importance of seeing human rights standards as living instruments, not
conceptually bound by views at the time of adoption. It can also be argued that while the
right to marry is framed as a right that cannot be limited or qualified, certain common
restrictions are permissible, such as “restrictions on incestuous marriages or on persons
616
617
618
619

See Refugee Appeal Nos. 76226 and 76227 (NZ RSAA, 2009), at [112]. See also UNHCR, Guidelines on
International Protection No. 8, supra n. 94, at [17].
CRC General Comment No. 6, supra n. 111, at [3].
Human Rights Watch, “Israel: High Court Rulings Undermine Human Rights” (Jan. 30, 2012).
620
Civil and Political Covenant, supra n. 81, at Art. 23(1).
Ibid., at Art. 23(2).

284

3 serious harm

who are already married”621 or a prohibition on bigamy or polygamy – so why not a
similar implied restriction against same-sex marriage? The answer in human rights terms, is
however, clear. Whereas some constraints, such as a prohibition on polygamy, might be said
to follow from the Civil and Political Covenant’s requirement that states take appropriate
steps “to ensure equality of rights and responsibilities of spouses as to marriage” (since such
practices “violate[] the dignity of women”)622 there is no comparable argument grounded
in the Covenant or international law more generally to imply such a constraint to same-sex
marriage.
Despite the strength of the arguments favoring the view that denial of the right to marry
to same-sex couples is in breach of the internationally protected right to marry, it is also
true that this debate remains presently unsettled.623 Given this lack of clarity, it is especially
important that decision-makers look beyond simply the claim that the denial of the ability to
marry is in and of itself serious harm to consider also the prospect that a homosexual from a
country that denies marriage rights may also face other forms of serious harm. Simply put, if
the home state has stigmatized or explicitly or implicitly forbidden an intimate relationship
on Convention grounds, inability to marry may not be the only harm feared.624
The rights to family and marriage codified in international human rights law thus provide
a helpful measure of relevant serious harm for refugee law purposes. There may be a risk of
persecutory harm where the risk is of forced marriage; where there is the prospect of enforced
separation from family members in the home country; and, in at least some circumstances,
where there is a legal prohibition on marriage to a freely chosen partner.

3.5.6 Privacy
The right not to be “subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family,
home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation”625 may
621
622

623

624
625

Joseph, Schultz, and Castan, supra n. 134, at 609, citing M. Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights: CCPR Commentary (1st edn., 1993), at 409–10. See also Nowak, supra n. 134, at 529–30.
See HRC General Comment No. 28, supra n. 155, at [24], analyzing Civil and Political Covenant, supra n.
81, at Art. 23(4). We also note that while such a limitation could not be justified as an official derogation,
reading a limited exception into Civil and Political Covenant, supra n. 81, at Art. 23 could be permitted
on the basis of Article 5(1)’s statement that Covenant rights cannot be interpreted as implying any right
to engage “in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms
recognised herein.” See also Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General
Recommendation on Article 16 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/GC/29 (CEDAW, Feb. 26, 2013), at [27].
A prohibition on same-sex marriage has been held not to violate Art. 23: Joslin v. New Zealand, Communication No. 902/1999, UN Doc. CCPR/C/75/D/902/1999 (HRC, Jul. 30, 2002), cited in Joseph, Schultz,
and Castan, supra n. 134, at 608. See also Nowak, supra n. 134, at 525, also citing decisions of the
European Court of Human Rights at n. 58. In Joslin, the Human Rights Committee noted that “Article
23, paragraph 2, of the Covenant is the only substantive provision in the Covenant which defines a right
by using the term ‘men and women,’ rather than ‘every human being,’ ‘everyone’ and ‘all persons.’ Use
of the term ‘men and women,’ rather than the general terms used elsewhere in Part II of the Covenant,
has been consistently and uniformly understood as indicating that the treaty obligation of States parties
stemming from article 23, paragraph 2, of the Covenant is to recognize as marriage only the union
between a man and a woman wishing to marry each other”: at [8.2], cited in Nowak, supra n. 134, at
526.
See e.g. Al-Ghorbani and Alghurbani v. Holder, (2009) 585 F.3d 980 (USCA, 6th Cir., Nov. 9, 2009).
Civil and Political Covenant, supra n. 81, at Art. 17.
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serve to ground refugee claims based on a fear of illegal searches of a person’s home by
state agents, illegal surveillance, and home invasions by state or non-state agents.626 More
critically, however, the right to privacy has also been interpreted to encompass “the sphere
of a person’s life in which he or she can freely express his or her identity, be it by entering
into relationships with others or alone.”627 It is this aspect of “individual existence and
autonomy”628 or “self-realization”629 that encompasses sexual autonomy – an issue that has
most commonly arisen in refugee law in the context of claims by homosexual or transsexual
applicants.630
It is not, of course, necessary to rely on a risk to privacy rights in order to find serious
harm where members of a sexual minority will be subject to exogenous harm – for example,
to beatings or other physical assaults. But privacy rights may be a useful means of explaining
the serious harm that will be faced by someone who faces the risk of two distinct forms of
harm: first, of “prosecution” under sodomy or other discriminatory laws; and second, the
risk faced by a person who will (sensibly) conceal her sexual identity upon return home in
order to avoid the risk of physical harm or other clearly persecutory harms. We examine
each of these issues in turn.
First, as analyzed above, a person who is subject to punishment under a law that is itself
in conflict with a norm of international human rights law cannot be said to be at risk
of legitimate prosecution; she rather faces the risk of the distortion of the criminal law
to achieve a persecutory end. As such, the risk of serious harm for refugee law purposes
is established in the form of an unjustified loss of liberty or other consequence of the
unlawful “prosecution.” In this regard, it is important to note that the right to privacy
cannot (as can some other rights) be delimited by reference to such factors as the protection

626

627
628

629
630

Tuhin (USCA, 7th Cir., 2003): conduct that “might cross the line from harassment to persecution
includes: ‘detention, arrest, interrogation, prosecution, imprisonment, illegal searches, confiscation of
property, surveillance, beatings or torture’”: at 619 and authorities cited therein.
Coeriel et al. v. The Netherlands, Communication No. 453/1991, UN Doc. CCPR/C/52/D/453/1991 (HRC,
Dec. 9, 1994), at [10.2].
Nowak, supra n. 134, at 377; see also Joseph, Schultz, and Castan, supra n. 134: a right to privacy
comprises “freedom from unwarranted and unreasonable intrusions into activities that society recognises
as belonging to the realm of individual autonomy”: at 476–77.
Nowak, supra n. 134, at 385.
As in the cases considered above, the notion that an applicant can be expected to exercise a duty of
concealment so as to avoid persecution has now been discredited in the leading common law courts:
Appellant S395/2002 (Aus. HC, 2003); HJ (Iran) (UKSC, 2010); Refugee Appeal No. 74665/03 (NZ RSAA,
2004), at [114]. As in the case of religious freedom, some German decisions have relied on the concept
of “forum internum” to define a core area of homosexual behavior such that if the applicant is able to be
discreet and is only prevented from revealing his or her homosexuality in public, this has to be reasonably
expected: see e.g. 11 K 81/06.A (Ger. VG Düsseldorf [German Administrative Court, Düsseldorf], Jan.
30, 2007); 5 K 1875/08.A (Ger. VG Düsseldorf, Mar. 11, 2009). Other courts have criticized this approach
as obsolete on the basis that the Qualification Directive is said to indicate that homosexuality is an
integral part of human identity which cannot be expected to change: see e.g. M 21 K 04.51 494 (Ger. VG
München [German Administrative Court, Munich]); and 1 A 1824/07 (Ger. VG Oldenburg [German
Administrative Court, Oldenburg], Nov. 13, 2007). This issue would now appear to be settled in light of
the recent decision in Minister voor Immigratie en Asiel v. X (C-199/12), Y (C-200/12) and Z v. Minister
voor Immigratie en Asiel (C-201/12) (Nov. 7, 2013), in which the CJEU held that “requiring members of
a social group sharing the same sexual orientation to conceal that orientation is incompatible with the
recognition of a characteristic so fundamental to a person’s identity that the persons concerned cannot
be required to renounce it”: at [70].
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3 serious harm

of “public health or morals.”631 While it is true that the right as enshrined in the Civil and
Political Covenant proscribes only “arbitrary” interference with privacy, the Human Rights
Committee has made clear that “the expression ‘arbitrary interference’ can . . . extend to
interference provided for under the law.”632 Critically, the Committee also insisted in Toonen
that a state cannot assert its own definition of “morality” to justify the criminalization of
homosexuality:

5

The Committee cannot accept either that for the purposes of article 17 of the Covenant,
moral issues are exclusively a matter of domestic concern, as this would open the door
to withdrawing from the Committee’s scrutiny a potentially large number of statutes
interfering with privacy.633

Because the criminalization of homosexuality per se is thus incapable of justification, a
refugee claim based on risk of subjection to criminal sanctions for breach of a sodomy
or similar law should be understood to meet the requirement to show the risk of relevant
serious harm. For example, the Belgian Conseil du Contentieux des étrangers appropriately
and straightforwardly recognized refugee status to persons at risk of arrest (as well as of
consequential physical assault in prison) on the basis of homosexuality under the “laws” of
Mauritania634 and Senegal.635
The second context in which the right to privacy is of importance to the claims of members of sexual minorities is where – rather than confronting either violence or arrest for
being open – the individual concerned opts to conceal her sexual identity. In such cases,
the risk faced in the home country has been determined by the New Zealand Refugee
Status Appeals Authority to be denial of the right to privacy. In considering the case of
a young man from Iran who feared that he would be persecuted for reasons of his sexual orientation, it was accepted that homosexuality is illegal in Iran, and continues to be
punished with extreme severity (ranging from the death penalty to flogging). It was found
that to avoid these sanctions, homosexuality must be “carefully hidden under the camouflage of feigned heterosexuality.”636 Noting that, in the case of Toonen, the Human Rights
Committee determined both that “it is undisputed that adult consensual sexual activity in
private is covered by the concept of ‘privacy’”637 and, most importantly, that “the continued
631
632
633

634
635
636
637

See e.g. Civil and Political Covenant, supra n. 81, at Art. 19(3)(b).
UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 16: Article 17 (Right to Privacy), Apr. 4, 1988,
at [4].
Toonen v. Australia, Communication No. 488/1992, UN Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (HRC, Mar. 31,
1994), at [8.6]. See Refugee Appeal No. 74665/03 (NZ RSAA, 2004), at [112]. Indeed, this has been
affirmed more recently by the Human Rights Committee in Fedotova (HRC, 2012), where it stated that
“the concept of morals derives from many social, philosophical and religious traditions; consequently,
limitations . . . for the purpose of protecting morals must be based on principles not deriving exclusively
from a single tradition. Any such limitations must be understood in the light of universality of human
rights and the principle of non-discrimination”: at [10.5].
35247 (Bel. CCE [Belgian Council for Alien Law Litigation], Dec. 2, 2009).
36527 (Bel. CCE [Belgian Council for Alien Law Litigation], Dec. 22, 2009).
Refugee Appeal No. 74665/03 (NZ RSAA, 2004), at [114]. See also Hathaway and Pobjoy, supra
n. 145.
Toonen v. Australia, Communication No. 488/1992, UN Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (HRC, Mar. 31,
1994), at [8.2]. This is in accord with the jurisprudence on the right “to private life” emanating from the
European Court of Human Rights: see e.g. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, (1981) 4 EHRR 149 (ECtHR,
Oct. 22, 1981); Lustig-Prean and Beckett v. United Kingdom, (2000) 31 EHRR 601 (ECtHR, Dec. 27,
1999); and Smith and Grady v. United Kingdom, (1999) 29 EHRR 493 (ECtHR, Sept. 27, 1999).
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existence”638 of even an unenforced anti-sodomy law infringes the privacy right, it was
determined that the applicant faced the risk of persecutory harm in Iran, specifically that a
return to Iran would deny him “a meaningful ‘private’ life.”639
Much the same result would be reached by focusing instead on the risk of serious psychological harm inherent in the need to conceal one’s sexual identity in order to be safe. As
the gay applicant testified in RG (Colombia), for him, self-repression “would be to die.”640
Hence the “long-term deliberate concealment” of a person’s sexuality, involving denial of
the “fundamental right to be what they are,”641 can amount to the kind of threat to “mental integrity” appropriately considered within the ambit of cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment at international law.
In sum, claims to fear serious harm on the basis of risk to the right to privacy as the relevant
form of serious harm are thus appropriately recognized not only where there is a risk of illegal
searches or surveillance or of home invasion, but also where personal autonomy – including
sexual autonomy and expression – is threatened. Laws that criminalize homosexuality are
not valid at international law by virtue of their clear conflict with the right to privacy,
meaning that the risk of “prosecution” under such a law is in substance persecutory, and
hence serious harm. And where a member of a sexual minority feels compelled to conceal
his or her identity to avoid abuse or arrest, she will generally continue to be at risk of serious
harm, whether framed as a violation of the right to privacy or, in the alternative, a risk of
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.
638
640
641

639
Refugee Appeal No. 74665/03 (NZ RSAA, 2004), at [114].
Toonen (HRC, 1994), at [5.1].
RG (Colombia) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2006] Imm AR 297 (Eng. CA, Jan. 20,
2006), at [17]. See further, Hathaway and Pobjoy, supra n. 145.
HJ (Iran) (UKSC, 2010), at [11]–[12], per Lord Hope.

